

Patriotism and Education: An Introduction

That patriotism is a complicated concept became clear in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Mr. Westheimer, the guest editor of this Kappan special section, poses the question of how schools should approach the tension between loyalty to one's country and the importance of dissent.

By Joel Westheimer

A CARTOON published in the *New Yorker* in October 2001 shows a couple in a New York apartment entertaining friends. As the hosts clutch each other's hands, the woman confesses to their guests, "We're still getting used to feeling patriotic." Another *New Yorker* cartoon shows a policeman walking away from a car. Inside, reading the newly issued ticket, the driver asks his passenger incredulously, "Flagless in a patriotic zone?" In a third cartoon, an elegantly dressed woman hands a pile of expensive dresses, a fur coat, and her credit card to a sales clerk and says, "This isn't for me — it's for the economy."

New Yorker cartoons are hardly a barometer of national sentiment about patriotism following 9/11, but the magazine has a distribution of over 800,000 — a large percentage of which are subscriptions in the city where the Twin Towers fell — and its authors, cartoonists, and even advertisers reflected a mélange of conflicted feelings about loyalty, solidarity, and the right to dissent in a democracy. Editor David Remnick was initially criticized for censoring authors and capitulating to pressure from the Bush Administration to lend support to military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but the magazine also was where Susan Sontag furiously observed that "the unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems, well, unworthy of a mature democracy." Perhaps the contributor who most plainly captured the confusion of the months to come was cartoonist Victoria Roberts, who drew a middle-aged husband and wife sitting down to dinner. Both look slightly perplexed as the husband says simply, "Who ever thought patriotism could be so complicated?"

The complexity of patriotism is further reflected in the great many ways it has been represented by politicians, the media, authors, critics, and religious leaders. Each has shaped various ideas about patriotism and its importance to national unity and sought to advance particular notions of patriotism over others. Nowhere are

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the debates around these various visions of patriotic attachment more pointed, more protracted, and more consequential than in our nation's schools. As several authors in this special section make clear, patriotism is highly contested territory.

The articles here explore the relationship between patriotism and education. Pedro Noguera and Robby Cohen ask readers to think about what educators' responsibilities are in wartime. Digging deep into the nation's past, they present provocative historical examples that do not lend themselves to facile analysis or pat good-guy/bad-guy stories. They ask whether, in an era of educational accountability, we are not ignoring our responsibility to students to present clear and accurate information on varying viewpoints about the "war on terrorism." "Given that our nation is at war in at least two countries," they ask, "shouldn't educators be accountable for ensuring that all students have some understanding of why we are fighting, of whom we are at war with, and of what is at stake?"

Diane Ravitch challenges us to think about what schools actually do to encourage students' appreciation of U.S. culture. She points out that educators stand strong in their belief that children's self-esteem is linked to knowledge and appreciation of their ancestral culture but not to that of the United States, where they live and will one day vote and raise children. "How strange," Ravitch muses, "to teach a student born in this country to be proud of his parents' or grandparents' land of birth but not of his or her own. Or to teach a student whose family fled to this country from a tyrannical regime or from dire poverty to identify with that nation rather than with the one that gave the family refuge." Critical of jingoistic conceptions of patriotism, Ravitch nonetheless calls for attention to traditional respect for and celebration of the nation's heritage and democratic principles and ideals.

Michael Bader offers a provocative contribution to our section on patriotism in education. A clinical psychologist, Bader asks readers to consider the psychological needs served by various expressions of patriotic fervor. He examines from a psychologist's perspective the collective responses both to 9/11 and to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina. In a compelling analysis of the links between our need for security and protection and our early life experiences at home, Bader suggests that patriotism can be a force for good or evil, but that the key to understanding our own motivations is to understand their emotional and psychological roots in the universal need for attachment and affiliation. He

draws on 25 years of clinical experience to show that patriotism often offers a symbolic resolution to longings we all experience for both safety and relatedness. Bader shows how both the political Left and the political Right "seek to link their partisan agendas to the evocation and satisfaction of these frustrated longings."

Gloria Ladson-Billings shares a deeply personal exploration of what it means to be a patriotic African American woman in the United States. "I am a patriot," she flatly declares, adding, "To most people who know me that statement probably comes as a surprise." Ladson-Billings, who is currently president of the American Educational Research Association, takes readers through her experiences growing up as an African American in the 1950s and 1960s and deftly examines the effects of those experiences on her thinking about the United States and about her patriotic attachments. How are we to understand patriotism, she asks, in a country where African Americans could be excluded from attending schools that white children attended or where "a 14-year-old boy from Chicago could be killed (beaten, lynched, castrated, and drowned) for whistling at a white woman"? Many members of Ladson-Billings' family served proudly in the military — in segregated units. Criticizing the "vacuous speeches" and "empty rhetoric" that politicians employ when they talk about what it means to be patriotic, Ladson-Billings reclaims the noble call to patriotic action on behalf of all U.S. citizens and those who are powerless around the globe.

In "Patriotism, Eh?" Sharon Cook adds a Canadian perspective on patriotism and education. As anthropologists know well, one's understanding of one's own culture is greatly improved by the study of another. My current country of residence, Canada offers a starkly different perspective on U.S. notions of patriotism. Canadians, Cook argues, have pride in peacefulness, in welcoming new immigrants (at a higher per-capita rate than virtually any Western nation), and in caring for the nation's citizens and other residents. By analyzing key historical events, Cook plumbs the significance of Canada's relationships to England and the U.S. She explains that national patriotism in Canada (though it too has had its excesses) is generally of a mild-mannered kind, perhaps because a more jingoistic form "seems unnecessary if one already finds inclusion in the family of a respected imperial power."

Patriotism and war have been intertwined in complex ways since the dawn of the nation-state. Many readers may know that the No Child Left Behind Act includes a provision that requires high schools to turn

over personal information on students to military recruiters. In addition, the Pentagon now maintains a database of some 30 million 16- to 25-year-olds, including their names, ethnicities, addresses, cell phone numbers, family information, extracurricular activities, and areas of study (for more information, watch the 11-minute video at www.LeaveMyChildAlone.org). In "Hearts and Minds: Military Recruitment and the High School Battlefield," William Ayers tracks the recent explosion in the military presence in schools and classrooms throughout the U.S., paying special attention to Chicago. Ayers notes that Chicago has the largest JROTC program in the country and, according to some, the "most militarized" school system in America. His powerful stories of recruits, veterans, and Purple Heart recipients are as emotionally wrenching as they are deeply hopeful. What's more, his topic has important historical antecedents. For example, in 1911, Katherine Devereux Blake, a New York City elementary school principal, predicted an upcoming struggle in public education between those who advocate a greater military presence in the schools and those who want students to learn peace. "They are organized for war," Blake proclaimed. "We must be organized for peace."¹ In this article, Ayers details the heavy incursions those "organized for war" have made.

Joseph Kahne and Ellen Middaugh provide a systematic and sobering examination of high school students' attitudes toward patriotism. They surveyed over 2,000 seniors in 12 California high schools and conducted 50 focus groups to learn about students' patriotic commitments. Regardless of your beliefs about the

importance of teaching patriotism in schools, it's reasonable to ask what should be taught about patriotism and what students already think and know. Kahne and Middaugh's findings are likely to challenge your assumptions. For example, although a majority of high school seniors believe that "if you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them," only 16% of high school seniors express consistent support for what the authors see as a democratic vision of patriotism. Moreover, most students do not necessarily see any connection between patriotism and civic participation.

Finally, my article, "Politics and Patriotism in Education," explores the ideological battles that are being waged in the name of patriotism in the nation's classrooms. Like Kahne and Middaugh, I suggest that patriotism and democratic ideals are not inherently at odds with one another but that a democratic form of patriotism is far from inevitable. To the contrary, there is much cause for concern over a far more dangerous brand of patriotic sentiment that is better described as "authoritarian" and that is widely on the rise.

This special section also features a series of Point of View opinion pieces. Nine prominent educators and public figures from a wide range of backgrounds and perspectives have provided short responses to the question "What should children learn in school about patriotism?" The answers are as diverse and fascinating as the contributing authors. After reading responses from Studs Terkel, Cindy Sheehan, Maxine Greene, Bill Bigelow, Walter Parker, Joan Kent Kvitka, Chester Finn, Denise Walsh, and Dean Wiles, you are unlikely to think about patriotism and education in precisely the same way as you did before.

Before I turn readers over to the contributing authors, let me return to the realm of comics, since they capture so well the mix of public sentiment around deeply complex political issues. A high school social studies teacher I know developed a curriculum for her students that would engage the full complexity of issues that arose following the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Frustrated with the lack of curricular resource materials available, she found, through the *Rethinking Schools* website, a suggestion to use political cartoons to examine the contentious issues arising from the war. Enthusiastically, she put together several lessons that would allow her students to examine critically all sides of the debates about the war by culling cartoons from across the political spectrum. But when two of the cartoons she used raised the ire of a parent of one of her stu-

dents, her principal requested that she discontinue the lessons she had planned.

The two offending cartoons both came from the controversial comic strip “Boondocks,” the brainchild of 28-year-old cartoonist Aaron McGruder. The strip stars Huey Freeman, a little African American kid living in suburbia who has attracted more than his share of controversy. The first cartoon the teacher used was originally published on Thanksgiving Day 2001, when polls suggested that President Bush’s approval ratings were higher than 90% and when popular support for the war on terror was widespread. Huey is leading the Thanksgiving prayer: “Ahem,” he begins. “In this time of war against Osama bin Laden and the oppressive Taliban regime, we are thankful that *our* leader isn’t the spoiled son of a powerful politician from a wealthy oil family who is supported by religious fundamentalists, operates through clandestine organizations, has no respect for the democratic electoral process, bombs innocents, and uses war to deny people their civil liberties. Amen.” The second shows Huey calling the FBI’s antiterrorist hotline to report that he has the names of Americans who helped train and finance Osama bin Laden. “Okay, give me some names,” the FBI agent says. And Huey responds: “All right, let’s see, the first one is Reagan. That’s R-E-A-G. . . .”

Students responded to these and the other cartoons used with an enthusiasm for debate that the teacher reported she had rarely witnessed in her classroom. She was careful to ensure that students received exposure to the broad spectrum of political perspectives, and, she noted, a vast majority of her students sported a plethora of patriotic symbols on their clothes and schoolbags during the weeks following 9/11.

Schools, of course, did not invent the brand of patriotism that involves stifling democratic debate. The same fear of dissenting viewpoints sometimes witnessed in schools can also be seen outside. It was not only the 16- and 17-year-old students of this teacher who were prohibited from debating McGruder’s critique of the war. Some of the 250 newspapers that run the strip pulled it either selectively or in its entirety after September 11. Many noted that it was “too political.” In what could arguably be a successful alignment, the school curriculum may actually prepare students well for the adult world they are soon to enter — one in which, as McGruder observes, the media have “become so conglomerated that there are really very few avenues left for people to express dissent.”

Indeed, there is some evidence that many are learn-

ing the lessons of my-country-right-or-wrong patriotism very well. In response to a “Doonesbury” strip critical of Bush Administration policies, some readers posted notes on the “Doonesbury” website. From Maurepas, Louisiana: “Your . . . biased state of mind has no place for a patriotic thinking America. Grow up. . . . We are at War!” From Melbourne, Florida: “Your disloyalty to our society and our country shine through quite clearly.” In apparent confusion between former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and “Doonesbury” creator Gary Trudeau, one reader from Arkansas echoed the xenophobic sentiments so often part and parcel of jingoistic patriotic campaigns: “Why don’t you go back to Canada, or even better France?” But perhaps Virginia Beach resident Stuart Schwartz best captured the attitude toward dissent shared by those who favor what I describe in my article as authoritarian patriotism: “Please do the public a service and die.”


A Pew Research Center poll in 2003 found that 92% of respondents agreed either completely or mostly with the statement “I am very patriotic.”² However, as will become clear when reading the articles that follow, what it means to be patriotic is a matter of considerable debate. And it always has been. As far back as the 1890s, policy makers realized that public schools could serve as a “mighty engine for the inculcation of patriotism.”³ But 116 years later, patriotism and its role in the school curriculum remain disputed territory.

This special section of the *Kappan* sets out to capture the controversies surrounding patriotism and education. Like the teacher who wanted to show a range of controversial opinions, the articles that follow express a healthy variety of viewpoints and approaches to the topic. In *Spheres of Justice*, Michael Walzer argues that the democratic citizen must be “ready and able, when the time comes,” to engage in dialogue and “to deliberate with fellow [citizens], listen and be listened to.”⁴ The contributors to this section of the *Kappan* write in that spirit.

1. Katherine D. Blake, “Peace in the Schools,” *National Education Association Proceedings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1911), pp. 140–46, cited in Susan Zeiger, “The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory: U.S. Teachers and the Campaign Against Militarism in the Schools, 1914–1918,” *Journal of Women’s History*, Summer 2003, p. 150.

2. Pew Research Center, “The 2004 Political Landscape: Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized,” November 2003.

3. George Balch, “Methods of Teaching Patriotism in Public Schools” (1890), cited in Cecilia O’Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 175.

4. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 310. 



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DEFINING ANTISEMITISM

I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Dina Porat^[*]

INTRODUCTION

The term 'antisemitism' is difficult to define due to: a) its inherently emotional dimension; b) its complicated origins – religious, political and ideological – elements of which continued over the centuries but changed in form; c) the problem created by the fact that both Jews and other Semitic peoples, especially Arabs, came to be included in this label – coined in Germany in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr, the 'patriarch of antisemitism' – thus creating a problem from the onset. Marr, who did not actually relate to the Arab nations, apparently chose this term because of its ostensibly scientific ring,^[1] and indeed it caught on and has been used worldwide ever since.

The forefathers of Zionism had hoped that the creation of a state would normalize relations between Israel and the Jewish communities abroad, which would cease being part of a Diaspora with all the associated difficulties, and between the Jewish and the non-Jewish world, which would treat the Jewish state much as any other country. Consequently, antisemitism would decline and be reformulated. However, nothing of the sort happened, and the search for a definition has not changed in essence.

Because of the political and other uses made of antisemitism for generations, the term was redefined in various periods and in different ways, depending on the time, the place and the circumstances. These definitions served not only the needs of those who made use of antisemitism, but also those of the society or the state which attempted to characterize or limit it. Many of the definitions can be found in lexicons and encyclopedias and it may well be through them that one can trace changes in its meaning over time. Moreover, these definitions, perhaps more than any others, reflect the spirit of the society as well as the consensus created within it since the encyclopedia and the lexicon are the results of joint efforts of the staffs of the institutes which produce them.

Based on these assumptions, an attempt will be made to examine some definitions created at the end of the 19th century; those published in Jewish and Anglo-American encyclopedias from the beginning of the 20th century, and some Israeli ones. Finally, we shall ask whether there exists an agreed definition for the term 'the new antisemitism', which entered the public discourse with the latest waves of antisemitism after October 2000.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The 1882 edition of the *Great Brockhaus Lexicon* provided a definition of an antisemite that changed very little in subsequent editions, including those which appeared after World War II: "Anyone who hates Jews or opposes Judaism in general, and struggles against the character traits and the intentions of the Semites." This definition contains a number of components, among them an emotional one: hatred of Jews. The inclusion of an emotional element in a respected lexicon reflects the fact that a phenomenon of this kind had existed in society as a permanent, or at least visible, fixture, to an extent that it was necessary to acknowledge its existence. In addition, this definition refers to hatred of the Jew as a person, but not to hatred of Judaism as a concept, only opposition to it without characterizing it. In the second part of the definition (which was removed from the post-World War II editions), referring to the antisemite as a person who fights the character traits and intentions of Semites,^[2] there is a link, and perhaps a fusion, between Semites and Jews, which is characteristic of the beginnings of racist theory in the second half of the 19th century. It was only later that the Jews were differentiated from other Semitic peoples, especially the Arabs; in the meantime Jews in the definition are not merely Semites but characterize Semitism, and especially the evil in it.

Typical of racist theory is the identification of character traits among groups of people: the Semites or the Slavs or the Latins have certain permanent features which cannot be changed by education or environment.

Therefore, racist theory is essentially anti-Christian in nature, since it does not recognize equality among peoples and the right of the individual to the mercy of God. In regard to the Jews, however, it perpetuated the image created by the Church: negative characteristics which have been reaffirmed over the centuries and became firmly embedded in society's consciousness.

Another concept, which appears in this definition, and which became firmly implanted is that Semites (later identified as Jews) have certain intentions that antisemites seek to foil. The essence of these intentions is the ostensible desire to harm Christian society. It should be stressed that the Brockhaus definition was published about a decade prior to the publication of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which promoted the notion that the Jews were plotting to take over the world and were planning and organizing to realize their ambition.

In 1887, Theodor Fritsch, one of the 'founding fathers' of modern-political antisemitism, who served as a kind of bridge between modern antisemitism and the Nazi Party, wrote his treatise *Antisemitic Catechism*. This provides a set of 'commandments' for antisemitism – dos and don'ts – which appeared in dozens of editions throughout his long life.^[3] His definition, too, was a clear one: "anti – to oppose, Semitism – the essence of the Jewish race; anti-Semitism is therefore the struggle against Semitism." This is still a racist definition, because of the identification of a Jew as a Semite, and in essence it relates to the Jewish collective, defined as a race. The emphasis here is on the struggle against antisemitism originating in the years that have passed since Wilhelm Marr coined the term.

The period that extended almost to the end of the 19th century was marked by antisemitic activity, defined as political antisemitism and represented by the emergence of political parties with antisemitic platforms, or at least with an antisemitic plank. In most of the countries of western and central Europe manifestos and petitions, accompanied by street demonstrations in the cities, were presented to the parliaments demanding restriction of the Jews' civil rights. Although the definition continued to be racist, the struggle was political, and was reflected in the terminology.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In World War II, the Nazi Party leadership had to deal with the use of the term 'antisemitism'. On 17 May 1943, a German official sent a letter to his colleague referring to the meeting of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (Hajj Amin al-Husayni) with Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi Party's chief ideologue, and to the latter's promise to issue instructions to the press to refrain from using the expression 'antisemitism'. Even in the letter, the word appeared inside quotation marks, the idea being not to insult the mufti who was "a friend of the Germans," so that no one could say that the Germans were "throwing the Jews and the Arabs into the same pot."^[4] Indeed, in 1944, Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels ordered the radio and the press to stop using the term 'antisemitism' since it no longer suited the needs of the Third Reich, and to replace it with the words 'Jew' and 'Judaism', or 'anti-Jewish' and 'anti-Judaism'. Rosenberg and Goebbels were not attempting to create another definition but to dismantle the existing one: they did away with the concept, created in the 19th century, of Semitism being identical with Judaism. This was due, first, to Nazi Germany's categorical differentiation between Arabs and Jews and to its signing of agreements with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who made lengthy visits to Berlin and Rome. The Arabs, who were Semites and considered allies, could no longer be included in a hostile or negative definition. Second, the use of the terms Judaism and Jews created a clearer focus on what were perceived in 1944 – when the extermination was in full swing – to be the central and eternal enemies of Nazism. While this separation served the purposes of the Third Reich at the time, the term 'antisemitism' continues to be used in Germany today, 60 years after the defeat of the Nazis.

In 1901, the first edition of the 12-volume *Jewish Encyclopedia* appeared in London and New York, the first time in Jewish history that such a work was published. It was compiled in the United States by more than 400 Jewish experts with the aim of educating the Jewish public, while at the same time presenting the Jewish people and its wealth of culture to the world, and especially the educated public in the country. It should be borne in mind that this period, the turn of the century, witnessed the mass immigration of Jews to the United States. Coming mainly from eastern Europe, these Jews had not yet been absorbed into the country and were still seeking their place in it. This reality dictated the character of the encyclopedia to a certain extent and is reflected in the definition of antisemitism and the presentation of its history. For example, in the entry on the Dreyfus trial, which had been held during the years when the encyclopedia was being prepared, emphasis was placed on the religious origins of antisemitism and not on its secular-political ones, as if to say that in a modern country like the United States antisemitism of this type could not develop. Indeed, after the Dreyfus affair, there were signs of a decline of the antisemitism in Europe that had existed there mainly since 1870.

Nevertheless, the definition of antisemitism written by Gotthard Deutsch, professor of Jewish history from Cincinnati, in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, emphasizes the term's racist, and not its religious, origins and characterizes 'Jew' according to the perceived racist notion: "greed, a special aptitude for money-making, aversion to hard work, clannishness and obtrusiveness, lack of social tact and especially of patriotism. Finally, the term is used to justify resentment for any crime or objectionable act committed by an individual Jew."^[5] It is implied that these traits were only those a narrow-minded bigot steeped in prejudice would accuse the Jews of having, and that Jews, collectively and individually, were not really like that. This inference was necessary

at the time due to the masses of Jews who had arrived in America. Many lived in poverty in the slum neighborhoods of the large cities, where their customs and dress drew attention and aroused suspicion. This had nothing to do with characteristics, said the Jewish scholars, but rather with conditions and circumstances, which would change in the future. In other words – “Give us a chance.” Indeed, other entries in the encyclopedia discuss the origins of the supposed collective characteristics of the Jewish people and the question of whether Jews really had such traits and whether they could be attributed solely to their living conditions. The entry also discusses positive features of the Jewish people, such as their high level of culture, amazing adaptability and contribution to world civilization. The entry on Herzl follows Pinsker’s line, which considered the roots of antisemitism to lie in exile and Jewish nationalism to be its solution (‘autoemancipation’); both of them offered a political solution, but first and foremost a spiritual and moral one. The First Zionist Congress had been held only four years prior to publication of the encyclopedia, and its impact, especially Herzl’s meteoric rise in the firmament of Jewish history, was evident in the entries.

It is possible, although we have no proof of this, that in the 11th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, published in 1911, criticism is leveled at the tendency manifested in certain entries in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* to stress the religious element: “The Jews,” writes the author of the entry Lucien Wolf, one of the most prominent members of the Anglo-Jewish community at the beginning of the 20th century, “contend that anti-Semitism is a mere atavistic revival of the Jew-hatred of the Middle Ages.” In other words, it had no place in the modern world of the new century, since atavism was a throwback to the emotions and phenomena of past generations. Wolf had little faith in the optimism of Jewish scholars, which derived from the decline of antisemitism in Europe from the last decade of the 19th century until the outbreak of World War I, nor in the continued stability of Britain, where he wrote his entry during the long reign of Queen Victoria. Thus, his criticism was directed at Jews both in the United States and in Britain: religious prejudices, he believed, had indeed been reawakened by antisemitic incitement, but prejudice was not the cause of antisemitism; it was, rather, racism, which had always been a part of political struggles. Thus he urged the Jews living in the respectable refuge of Britain not to delude themselves, although they lived in an enlightened and democratic country. They should see, instead, the true nature of antisemitism and the role it could play in the political struggles and tensions between various groups, even during that period.^[6]

Other Jewish encyclopedias published during the 20th century, including the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, with a lengthy entry written by historian Benjamin Eliav,^[7] do not continue this line. They present similar definitions of antisemitism, citing the various sources – religious, economic, social and racist – and even the animosity and the hatred that the term embodied. The definition of antisemitism in the *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, written by Israel Gutman, adds a crucially important dimension: “Throughout the generations, concepts, fantasies and accusations have stuck to the term that portrayed a negative cognitive and emotional web, at times independent of Jewish society as it was fashioned and existed in reality.”^[8] The subject of the gulf between the real and the imagined, and the political use made of it, which is the essence of antisemitism, will be discussed below.

Following World War II, the non-Jewish encyclopedias in the English-speaking world took up the question of defining antisemitism. The *Everyman’s Encyclopedia* published in Britain in 1949 and again in 1951 in New York, defines antisemitism thus: “those who were opposed to the Jews in the second half of the 19th century. This hatred of the Jews, or antisemitism as it was called, was not the outcome of antipathy to their religion, but arose on account of their wealth and power which they were accumulating.”^[9] On the one hand, reference is made to an emotional dimension, hatred, but the description is written entirely in the past tense. This edition was published in the years immediately following World War II, after the overthrow of the Nazi regime, and contains the hope that antisemitism was indeed a thing of the past, that it too had been destroyed now that the entire world had realized just how heavy a price Jews and non-Jews had paid for the hatred and persecution of minorities. On the other hand, the entry makes absolutely no mention of the Nazi regime, its antisemitism or its consequences, as if the events had never happened. The reason, seemingly, was that these were the early years of the Cold War, and the previous enemy, Germany, had left the scene and been replaced by the Soviet Union.

Another example also provides proof of that frame of mind: About a year later, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a foreword to the first edition of Anne Frank’s diary in English. She, too, makes no mention of the Jews, the Holocaust or the Germans, or even that Anne had been Jewish; moreover, in the play, a muted and adapted version of the diary, which opened on Broadway in 1955, the Germans were not shown at all, even at the end.^[10]

A no less striking aspect of the definition in *Everyman’s Encyclopedia* is its reference to the rise of antisemitism as the result of the accumulation of wealth and power by the Jews, a fact with which the writer does not disagree; on the contrary, it is clear to him that the Jews had become so rich and powerful in the second half of the 19th century that they aroused resentment. Does this infer that the Jews actually brought antisemitism, and its consequences, upon themselves? Since property and power interest English-speaking countries more than religious or race, is there not a warning to non-Jewish readers implied in this definition? It should be borne in mind that the description appears in *Everyman’s Encyclopedia*, which is intended for a mass

readership. The *Hebrew Encyclopedia* (see below) states that, “almost every hatred of a minority has inherent in it a certain expression of strong powerful urges of possession and rule.”

In the mid-1960s, there was a surprising turn of events. In 1966, the *Britannica Merriam Webster Dictionary of the English Language*, one of the leading English language dictionaries, published a new edition with the following definition of antisemitism: “(1) hostility toward Jews as a religious or racial minority group, often accompanied by social, economic and political discrimination.” Thus far there is nothing new, but it continues: “(2) opposition to Zionism: sympathy with opponents of the state of Israel.”^[11] The time was just prior to the Six Day War, a period when the State of Israel was under threat, first, in the United Nations from the Soviet bloc, which unequivocally supported the Arab states in their efforts to get rid of the Jewish state (and was also trying to gain support from the Third World). This coalition changed tactics following the Six-Day War and tried to expel Israel from the United Nations, boycott it and denounce it; it succeeded in doing the latter in 1975 when the resolution equating Zionism with racism was passed. However, when the Webster published its unambiguous statement that antisemitism was also opposition to Zionism and sympathy for those who opposed the State of Israel, it took a stand regarding the constant threat to Israel and its existence. Namely, it was saying that as in the past when the abrogation of the rights of the individual Jew to equality and even to life was defined as discrimination, the abrogation of the right of Israel to be equal to any other country in the manner in which others related to it was also discrimination. Prior to Israel’s stunning victory in 1967 on the one hand, and before the sharpening of the Israel-Arab dispute, on the other, Israel had been perceived in the western world as a small democratic country, the realization of the yearning of a people for its homeland, a people which had not enjoyed fair treatment in the international arena and needed to be protected from its attackers and adversaries. Therefore antisemitism equaled anti-Zionism and both were discrimination.

ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE ANTISEMITISM

About a decade after the establishment of the State of Israel, the fourth volume of the *Hebrew Encyclopedia* was published. It contained a comprehensive entry on antisemitism, the first part of which was written by historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu. After the requisite discussion on the essence of the term, its meaning and its history, Netanyahu added a new tier to the subject which was, “hatred of the other, hatred of the alien and hatred of the weak,” and he defined antisemitism as a kind of hatred of minorities which included all three of these hatreds, “in a more forceful and consistent form than in any other form of hatred of minorities.”^[12] This, in essence, is a Zionist definition, and, like Zionism, is an optimistic one: a state of being different, alien and weak can be changed, and this can be done through the abolition of the Diaspora and the establishment of the State of Israel. Once the Jews had a state of their own, they would be like all other nations; even those who did not live in the homeland such as an Irishman or Italian living outside his home country. They would no longer be foreigners whose status was different from that of other foreigners. As soon as this state became strong – those living outside it would also gain in strength and the state would be their support wherever they were. This was the prophecy of the founding fathers of Zionism, and it was the hope of the state’s founders and citizens, at least for the first twenty years after its establishment. Its existence would eliminate the elements that had given rise to antisemitism, regardless of time and place.

About a decade later, in 1969, the historian Shmuel Ettinger attempted to revolutionize this concept. In his analysis of “The Roots of Antisemitism in Modern Times,” he described antisemitism as a reflection of the stereotype of the Jew created over hundreds of years, and which had become part of various representations of culture. Because the image had become an intrinsic part of the culture – in sculpture, painting, sacred music, popular sayings and in various linguistic expressions – it would never be uprooted and would continue feeding antisemitic sentiments in the future.^[13] Moreover, trying to erase these expressions would be an effrontery to this cultural legacy. Even the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra plays passions and oratorios as part of this view.

In saying this, Ettinger in essence determined that Zionism would not solve the problem of antisemitism and would not destroy it, because there was no connection between them: the image of the Jew and that of the State of Israel and its citizens existed separately. Hence, we have today the phenomenon of antisemitism without Jews, such as that, for example, found in Japan and Poland, with the extant representation of the Jew sufficient to feed it. This change also reflects the state of mind in post-1967 Israel. A society which considers itself stronger than in the past can allow itself greater openness, including self-criticism, and can admit to hopes that had proved false. Zionism will not solve the problem of antisemitism, and the existence of the State of Israel might even complicate matters for the Jewish communities, which have to adopt a position on current affairs in their own countries. Nevertheless, it is clear that the State of Israel has placed Jewish and Israeli reactions to antisemitism on an entirely different plane.

Two years later, Professor Ya’akov Tury and his students at Tel Aviv University analyzed Ettinger’s article and arrived at the following definition: “Modern day political antisemitism is the manipulation for political reasons of emotions that have existed for a long time against an unrealistic image [about which Ettinger and later Gutman had written]. Antisemitism is not an ideology, as it is sometimes presented, but rather ‘a multi-faceted substitute’, and therefore it can serve the ideas of sundry circles.” Tury recognizes the central place of the unrealistic image, but emphasizes a differentiation that had not been made previously. On the one hand, there is the active antisemite who writes, publishes and signs petitions, desecrates cemeteries and

torches synagogues, and strives to realize the political alliances and targets he has set for himself; on the other, there are large circles of people that hear of his acts or read what he writes and support him or vote for him. The activist is the one who manipulates public feeling in order to garner support for what he does. Antisemitism, here, is not an ideology but a tool employed by factions, groups and political parties, even those diametrically opposed to each other, which can unite for this purpose despite their differences. [14] Tury's ideas also provide another explanation for *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*: if the Jews are multi-faceted, including cosmopolitans and socialists, nationalist Zionists and converts to Christianity, secular scientists and the ultra-Orthodox, but nevertheless comprise one community, this would mean that they have some kind of sophisticated plan which determines how tasks are to be divided up among each part of the community so that the Jews are consolidated as a public. This danger must therefore be exposed and the non-Jews unite against it despite their differences.

In the summer of 1979 the so-called *Ma'ariv* trial, in which the newspaper was sued by two members of the British Parliament, was held in the Jerusalem District Court. Their work *Tell It Not in Gath*, which dealt with Israel's control over the world press through its connections with the Jewish communities, was defined by the paper as "an antisemitic book written in the style of Nazi propaganda." Naturally, this called for a definition of antisemitism and an antisemite, and I was called upon as an expert witness. I followed Tury's line, adding the following points:

- The essence of antisemitism is the gulf between the image of the Jew as it was and still is constructed by the antisemite, and the Jew's actual status and power. This is also true of the State of Israel, regarding its image and its true power and status. The wider the abyss, the stronger the antisemitism, and there is no greater proof of this than the pitiful state of the Jewish people on the eve of World War II, as opposed to the fanatical belief of the Nazi leadership in the Jews' omnipotent power.
- Legitimate criticism of individuals and countries is transformed into prejudice once it denounces their behavior as arising out of fixed, age-old characteristics and does not relate to the event itself, seeing it rather as a link in a chain of identical deeds.
- One does not have to read the writings of antisemites who preceded them in order to reach the same views they expressed.

The worldview, filtered through the prism of *The Protocols* and centering on the belief of Jewish, and now Jewish-Israeli, power and intentions, is sufficient to create a state of mind, with accompanying expressions and conclusions, in those from completely different backgrounds and even among the highest levels of society. [15]

After October 2000, with the outbreak of the second intifada and the actions that followed, a new term began to be used: 'the new antisemitism'. A first wave of violent antisemitism that lasted for several weeks was followed by the events of September 2001, namely, the Durban Conference and the September 11 attacks in the United States. The third wave, which began with the Passover massacre in 2002 followed by the 'Defensive Shield' Operation, only abated after the elections in France in the summer of that year. The new term grew out of all these events. It still lacks an agreed-upon definition; certainly, the encyclopedias have yet to come up with one.

In the meantime, the situation is still on the boil: waves of violence are carried out against the background of intensifying antisemitic and anti-Zionist propaganda reaching the world public through the various communications media. For the present, one can say that the image of the Jew and his supposed intentions are no different from those in the past; however the arena is now that of radical Islam, which utilizes antisemitic motifs that originated in Christian Europe in order to achieve their religious and political objectives. Their materials purposely blur the difference between Israel and the Jewish communities in the world; thus the differentiation between antisemitism and anti-Zionism which had existed in the past despite the entry in the Webster's, is becoming increasingly less clear. At this stage, attacks that were once directed against the individual Jew are now directed against both him and the Jewish state.

In 1986, Bernard Lewis defined antisemitism in his book *Semites and Antisemites*. [16] The components of his definition have already been discussed here, but the question regarding the connection between Jews and Arabs in the term antisemitism, as in late 19th century Germany and Nazi Germany, has re-risen, aided and abetted today by radical Islam.

Following the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993, a historic resolution was passed according to which antisemitism was defined as a form of racism. The wording of the resolution was accompanied by a denunciation of discrimination against Arabs, Muslims and blacks arising out of xenophobia and negrophobia. At the Durban Conference the Arabs went one step further, claiming that antisemitism 2000-style was hatred of Arabs by Jews and those who agreed with them, thus adding islamophobia to the list. This argument gained force after the 9/11 events which occurred two days after the end of the conference.

The anti-globalization movement places Arab countries in the poor, colored south and Israel and the Jews in the rich, white north. This dichotomy raises the question of whether the Arabs and the Jews belong to

the same family of nations and should be included in the same term. The problem of defining these various phenomena at the beginning of the present millennium remains unresolved, although there have been renewed attempts to tackle it (see below).

It seems fitting to conclude with the words of two intellectual giants: Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell, who wrote during World War II and immediately after it, respectively, and defined antisemitism and antisemites with disgust. Sartre described antisemitism as “blaming the presence of the Jews for all the disasters befalling the individual and the public, and making suggestions on what steps to take to improve the situation, from limiting their rights up to their deportation and annihilation.” He categorically refused to view antisemitism as an opinion, since the antisemite is “a person who fears, it is not the Jews that he fears, but rather himself, his consciousness, his liberty, his instincts, the need to admit responsibility for what he had done, his solitude, the changes that might affect him, society and the world... in short, antisemitism is the fear for the condition of man.”^[17] Bertrand Russell put it more succinctly: “Had Hitler been a brave man, he would not have been an antisemite.”^[18]

II. PROPOSAL FOR A REDEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM

Kenneth S. Stern^[+]

The European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) was roundly criticized in 2003 for suppressing a report written for it by the Centre for Research on Antisemitism at Berlin's Technical University. The report (later leaked, then released by the EUMC) stated that a significant share of the hate crimes committed against European Jews since the collapse of the Middle East peace process in the fall of 2000^[19] had been committed by young Muslims. Thus, it was no surprise that when the EUMC released its own report, entitled “Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003,” in March 2004, the controversy continued, largely because the press release stated that while “it is not easy to generalise, the largest group of the perpetrators of antisemitic activities appears to be young, disaffected white Europeans.”^[20]

The irony was that while the press release distorted reality, the March EUMC report was more nuanced than the press release suggested, and in some ways superior to the earlier, suppressed report. Recognizing that antisemitism came from a variety of sources, it neither downplayed nor diminished the role of young Muslims in the rash of arson attacks, vandalism, intimidation, and assaults on individuals.

A much more fundamental problem, however, went largely unnoticed in the report: EUMC's troubling definition of antisemitism. While noting, correctly, that there was no universally agreed upon definition, the report – after many pages of intellectual throat-clearing – concluded that antisemitism comprised a series of stereotypes, including the Jew as “‘deceitful’, ‘crooked’ [and] ‘artful’ [in] nature; [his] ‘foreign’ and ‘different essence’; [his] ‘irreconcilability’, ‘hostility’, [and] ‘agitation’; [his] ‘commercial talent’ and ‘relation to money’; [his] ‘corrupt’ nature’; and notions relating to ‘Jewish ‘power and influence’,” and of a “‘Jewish ‘world conspiracy’.”^[21]

The “core of antisemitism,” EUMC therefore concluded, was “any acts or attitudes that are based on the perception of a social subject (individual, group, institution or state) as “the (‘deceitful’, ‘corrupt’, ‘conspiratorial’, etc.) Jew.”

One of the main problems with this approach is that cause and effect are reversed. Stereotypes are derived from what antisemitism is; they are not its defining characteristic. However, the real reason for this line was apparent in the last part of the definitional section, under the heading “Antisemitism and Antizionism,” as follows:

According to our definition, anti-Israel or antizionist attitudes and expression [*sic*] are in those cases antisemitic, where Israel is seen as being representative of ‘the Jew’, i.e., as a representative of the traits attributed to the antisemitic construction of ‘the Jew’... But what if the opposite is the case and Jews are perceived as representatives of Israel?... [W]e would have to qualify hostility towards Jews as ‘Israelis’ only then as antisemitic, if it is based on the underlying perception of Israel as ‘the Jew’. If this is not the case, then we would have to consider hostility toward Jews as ‘Israelis’ as *not* [emphasis in original] genuinely antisemitic, because this hostility is not based on the antisemitic stereotyping of Jews.

In other words, if a Jew was attacked on the streets of Paris because the perpetrator viewed Israelis as conspiratorial, money grubbing, greasy or slimy, and then saw the Jew before him as a substitute for that Israeli – this was antisemitism. However, if someone was upset with Israeli policy and then attacked that same Jew in Paris as a surrogate for Israel or Israelis – this was not antisemitism. While it did not consider such attacks antisemitic, the EUMC nevertheless said they should still be monitored, although it did not say how this would be done.

Five days after the report was released, a Montreal Jewish elementary school was firebombed. A note left behind indicated that the attack was in retaliation for Israel's assassination of a Hamas leader – presumably, not antisemitism according to the EUMC definition. The functional equivalent would be declaring

the lynching of a young African American man in the 1960s racist if the motivating factor was a belief that blacks were shiftless or lazy or were destroying the white gene pool, but not if the same victim was swinging from the same magnolia tree and the murderer was motivated by dislike of the Voting Rights Act of 1964.

The problem with the EUMC definition was twofold: first, it bent logic in order to disqualify almost any act motivated by dislike or even hatred of Israel from the label 'antisemitic'; second, it focused too much on the mind and heart of the actor rather than on the character of the act.

Neither the EUMC nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assumes to brand any particular individual an antisemite. Neither, for that matter, do Jewish NGOs dedicated to communal defense, which reserve the label for only the most clear-cut and outrageous perpetrators – a David Duke or a Louis Farrakhan – so as not to cheapen the word. (Note that even after his very vocal criticism of Mel Gibson's film *The Passion of the Christ*, Abe Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League said the movie was not antisemitic. [22])

It is neither necessary nor helpful for groups that monitor or combat antisemitism to examine the head of perpetrators – asking, do they *really* hate Jews? Instead they should look at the act and see whether the Jew (or person or property mistaken as Jewish) was selected as a victim simply because he was a Jew. If a Jew on the streets of Paris is beaten up because he is the victim of a random mugging, this is not antisemitism. But if he is beaten up because he is a Jew, it need not matter whether the attacker thinks that his victim is one of the Elders of Zion, or picks on him because he is angry at Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. If a Jew is selected for attack because he is a Jew, this is antisemitism, just as beating up a gay person because he is gay is homophobia.

Definitions become trickier, however, when looking beyond criminal acts to matters of expression – hate speech, for example. When is such a manifestation antisemitic, to be counted in a list of antisemitic events, and when is it not?

There are no ironclad rules but some good indicators. What makes the matter complex is that antisemitism has three overlapping strains: religious antisemitism, which is the oldest form, and which comes in both Christian and Muslim varieties; race-based antisemitism, which sees Jews not as a religion (from which one could conceivably convert) but as a race (from which one cannot); and politically-based antisemitism, otherwise known in recent years as anti-Zionism, which treats Israel as the classic Jew. Whereas the Jew is disqualified by antisemitism from equal membership in the social compact, antisemites seek to disqualify Israel from equal membership in the community of nations. The EUMC's definition fails to recognize this aspect of antisemitism. All types employ similar tropes and, at heart, see Jews as acting collectively to harm non-Jews. Antisemitism also comes into play when there is a need to 'explain' why things go wrong.

There is less difficulty in classifying an act or expression as antisemitic when it is motivated by religious or race-based hatred. Matters get somewhat more problematic, or at least controversial, when dealing with anti-Zionism. Clearly, criticism of Israel is not antisemitism if a specific program, policy, political leader or party is attacked as it might be in respect to any other country. But when the perceived deficiencies of the society are used to undermine its basic legitimacy, or to tarnish Jews collectively, this is, in effect, antisemitism, whether by design or not.

Some charge that when Israel is censured for acts that worse offenders are not, this is antisemitism too. It may or may not be, depending on whether the accuser's mandate is broad or narrow. If a group is supposed to look at human rights abuses globally, but spends most of its energies creating the impression that Israel is the world's worst human rights offender – this is a problem. But if its mandate is to look specifically at Israeli treatment of Palestinians, then other factors, such as fairness and the language it uses to describe its findings, have to be taken into account as well before reaching that conclusion.

Trickier still, is anti-Zionism antisemitism? Back in 1947, few would have claimed so. But today no one, for example, is clamoring for the delegitimation of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, Samoa, Bangladesh or Qatar, or scores of other countries that became nations after the end of World War II. There are two rare exceptions to contemporary anti-Zionism being antisemitism. This is because they do not discriminate against the Jew and deny him the right of self-determination. Some ultra-Orthodox Jews believe that Israel should not exist until the Messiah comes; and some people believe that there should be no nation-states, or that there should be no nation-states with links to a religion. These are not significant groups, and the latter ones (anarchists and those who oppose religion-linked states) become problematic if they inordinately harp on Israel rather than, say, Spain or Russia.

There is a strong argument to be made that antisemitism is involved when the belief is articulated that of all the peoples on the globe (including the Palestinians), only the Jews should not have the right to self-determination in a land of their own. Or, to quote noted human rights lawyer David Matas:

One form of antisemitism denies access of Jews to goods and services because they are Jewish. Another form of antisemitism denies the right of the Jewish people to exist as a people because they are Jewish. Antizionists distinguish between the two, claiming the first is antisemitism, but the second is not. To the antizionist, the Jew can exist as an individual as long as Jews do not exist as a people. [23]

Matas correctly terms this distinction “nonsense.”

The problem here is also one of practical concerns versus intellectual honesty. If some people are reluctant to define acts of antisemitism as including assaults on Jews because the attacker does not like Israel's actions, they are hardly likely to agree to include any but the most outrageous expressions of anti-Zionism in a definition of antisemitism.

Yet, without overly pushing the matter of anti-Zionism as antisemitism, a good working definition of antisemitism for monitors and incident counters might be the following, developed by this author along with other experts during the second half of 2004:

Antisemitism is hatred toward Jews because they are Jews and is directed toward the Jewish religion and Jews individually or collectively. More recently, antisemitism has been manifested in the demonization of the State of Israel.

Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’. It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace and in the religious sphere include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews – such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel include:

- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of the State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.

However, criticism of the policies of any Israeli government similar to that leveled against any other democratically elected government should not be regarded as antisemitic.

Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries). Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries – are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. Antisemitic discrimination is denying Jews opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.

Whereas this definition provides a useful framework and concrete examples to help governmental organs and NGOs monitoring antisemitism decide what to include or exclude, Jewish NGOs concerned with communal defense should be less reticent regarding anti-Zionism. They need not brand those who utter anti-Zionist expressions antisemitic in order to so label them. Again, we are not concerned about whether the person is motivated by hatred, ignorance or any other factor, but rather with monitoring, cataloging, and hopefully educating about antisemitic acts.

In my view, the comparison between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa, while perhaps less serious than that made between Israel and the Nazis, should still be considered an expression of antisemitism, just as I do not see much distinction between denial of the Holocaust and the similar anti-historical canard that rejects any significant historic Jewish link to the land of Israel, whether it be the claim that the Temple did not exist or that it was entirely an Arab land (let alone a Muslim or Palestinian one) from ancient times until European Jews began to appear a little over a century ago.

While it is not reasonable to expect a youngster born in Gaza to share the Zionist narrative, and, of course, everyone is entitled to their own point of view, people are not entitled to twist the facts. The distortion or erasure of Jewish history in the Middle East (as opposed to differing, reasonable interpretations of that history) is no less antisemitic than the distortion or wiping out of Jewish history regarding World War II in Europe.

Ultimately, there is probably no textbook definition of antisemitism. It might be recalled that US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, when faced with a similar quandary regarding the definition of obscenity, wrote, “I know it when I see it.” To monitor antisemitism effectively – which is a precondition for developing strategies and allocating resources to fight it intelligently – we need to rely on better guideposts than the subjective standard Stewart articulated. However, we also need to understand why we are looking at it, and the reasons why some may want to view antisemitism with blinders when it comes to some types of perpetrators.

In the end, all types and expressions of antisemitism harm not only Jews, but also – history shows – endanger freedom and democracy. Therefore, those who monitor or combat antisemitism need to make sure

that while they do nothing to cheapen the word, they also include all appropriate acts and events, because the cataloging of these manifestations is a precondition to forming effective counter-strategies and an intelligent allocation of resources.

III. A WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM

On 28 January 2005, the EUMC adopted an altered version of the above definition as a ‘working definition’; it will be evaluated in fall 2005. Additionally, OSCE used the EUMC’s ‘working definition’ in its report “Education on the Holocaust and on Anti-Semitism: An Overview and Analysis of Educational Approaches,”^[24] and in OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) law enforcement officer training program on combating hate crimes.

The document reads as follows:

The purpose of this document is to provide a practical guide for identifying incidents, collecting data, and supporting the implementation and enforcement of legislation dealing with antisemitism.

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews.

Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.

In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.

Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:

- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.

However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries). Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property—such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries—are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries. [Note: ECRI in its General Policy Recommendation No. 9, 25 June 2004, has offered specific recommendations regarding the criminalization of antisemitic acts.]

EPILOGUE

Six months after the adoption of the ‘working definition’, on 7 July 2005, a Lithuanian court found that the editor-in-chief of the Vilnius daily *Respublika* had published material “propagating national, racial and religious enmity,” when he alleged there was a “global plot” of Jews to rule “the world, money, mass media and politics.” The court’s decision specifically cited the EUMC’s working definition and found that the newspaper’s text “correspond[ed] to the... hallmarks of antisemitism” enumerated by the EUMC.^[25]

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^[1] Moshe Zimerman, *Wilhelm Marr – The Patriarch of Antisemitism* (Jerusalem, 1982; in Hebrew).

^[2] *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie*, Vol I, pp. 585–6 (Wiesbaden, 1966).

^[3] Theodor Fritsch, *Antisemiten Katechismus* (Leipzig, 1887).

^[4] Letter from Hans Hagemayer to Dr. Koepper, 17 May 1943, doc. xcii-28, in Léon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, *Das Reich und die Juden* (Munich, 1978), p. 369.

^[5] *The Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York/London, 1990), Vol. I, pp. 641–9.

^[6] *Britannica* (11th ed., 1911), Vol I, pp. 134–45. Lucien Wolf, a prolific publicist, statesman and historian, signed the

- item as vice- president of the Jewish Historical Society of England, and former president of the society.
- [7] *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York, 1939–43, 1948); *New Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York, 1962), pp. 17–18; *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1971), Vol II, pp. 87–95.
- [8] *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, editor-in-chief: Israel Gutman (Yad Vashem /Sifriat Poalim, 1990; in Hebrew), Vol I, pp. 98–116.
- [9] *Everyman's Encyclopedia* (UK, 1949, NY, 1951; 3rd ed.), Vol. 7, p. 373.
- [10] Dina Porat, "A Forty Year Struggle – Anne Frank's Diary and the Holocaust Deniers, 1958–1998," in *The Holocaust – The Unique and the Universal*, essays presented in honor of Yehuda Bauer, (Jerusalem, 2001; in Hebrew), pp. 160–84.
- [11] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 1966, p. 96.
- [12] Ben-Zion Netanyahu, "Antisemitism," in *The Hebrew Encyclopedia* (Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, 1959; in Hebrew), Vol IV, pp. 493–508, quoted, pp. 496–7.
- [13] Shmuel Ettinger, "The Roots of Antisemitism in Modern Times," in: *Molad* 25 (1968; in Hebrew), pp. 323–40.
- [14] Jacob Tury, MA seminar on "The Debate on Rights for the Jews in the 18th and 19th Centuries," 1971, Department of Jewish History, Tel Aviv University.
- [15] A copy of the trial minutes is located at the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University.
- [16] Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (London, 1986 [& 1997]), p. 242.
- [17] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Reflections sur la Question Juive* (Tel Aviv, 1978), p. 31; translation and comments, Menachem Brinker (Hebrew).
- [18] Bertrand Russell, *New Hopes for a Changing World* (London, 1951), Ch. XII, p. 109. Russell's analysis in this chapter is very much like Sartre's in his book.
- [19] The report covered incidents that occurred during the first half of 2002. See "Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in the European Union: First Semester 2002, Synthesis Report," Draft 20, Feb. 2003, p. 5 – <http://uk-org-bod.supplehost.org/eumc/eumc.pdf>.
- [20] "EU Anti-Racism Body Publishes Antisemitism Reports," EUMC Media Release, 31 March 2004.
- [21] European Union Monitoring Center, "Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003" (Vienna, 2004), p. 237 – <http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/as/PDF04/AS-Main-report-PDF04.pdf>, p. 237.
- [22] ABC's Primetime Live, "Mel Gibson's Passion," 16 Feb. 2004.
- [23] David Matas, "Combatting Antisemitism," a paper based on discussions at the Jacob Blaustein Institute Seminar on Human Rights Methodology and Antisemitism, Vienna, Austria, 17–18 June 2003, p. 15.
- [24] http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/06/14897_en.pdf.
- [25] Decision, Vilnius City District 2 Court judge A. Cininas, #A11-01087-497/2005, 7 July 2005.

DESIGNED BY M@TAN

Interpretation and Social Criticism

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THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES

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The first two of these lectures were given as the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Harvard University on November 13 and 14, 1985. The third was given at Harvard Hillel on November 15. The three were written at roughly the same time, employ the same vocabulary, make the same arguments; they belong together, the last supplying what the first two largely lack: some degree of historical concreteness and specificity.

My aim is to provide a philosophical framework for the understanding of social criticism as a social practice. What do social critics do? How do they go about doing it? Where do the critic's principles come from? How does he establish his distance from the people and institutions he criticizes? The argument sustained through the three lectures, that social criticism is best understood as critical interpretation, runs parallel to arguments made in recent years by European philosophers. But I have tried to find my own way, in my own language, without direct reference to their work. I hope to publish in the near future a larger book dealing with the practice of criticism in the twentieth century — a more explicitly political book, for which these lectures constitute a theoretical preamble. There I will have occasion to address the question, as much political as it is philosophical, whether social criticism is possible without "critical theory."

I am grateful to the many members of the Harvard community, critics all, who attended these lectures and explained to me where I had gone wrong. My revisions certainly reflect their criticism — especially that of Martha Minow, Michael Sandel, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Shklar, and Lloyd Weinreb — though the reflection is probably, as often as not, obscure and incomplete. "The Prophet as Social Critic," in an earlier version, was discussed at a symposium on prophecy at Drew University and published in the Drew

Gateway along with a helpful response by Henry French. A number of people here at the Institute for Advanced Study read the lectures for me and commented on them in detail: Clifford Geertz, Don Herzog, Michael Rustin, and Alan Tertheimer. They had a lot to do with, though they are not responsible for, their final form.

I. THREE PATHS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Despite my title, I shall not argue in this lecture that there are three and only three ways of doing moral philosophy. It's not my purpose to suggest an exhaustive list, only to look at three common and important approaches to the subject. I shall call these the path of discovery, the path of invention, and the path of interpretation. I mean to describe the last as the one (of the three) that accords best with our everyday experience of morality. Then, in my second lecture, I shall try to defend interpretation against the charge that it binds us irrevocably to the status quo — since we can only interpret what already exists — and so undercuts the very possibility of social criticism. Since criticism is a feature of everyday morality, the charge has a twofold character: it suggests not only that interpretation is a bad program for, but also that it is a bad account of, moral experience. It is, as they say, neither normatively nor descriptively correct. I shall argue against both these aspects of the charge, proceeding in this first lecture by way of theoretical contrast, in the second by way of practical example, focusing more on the account here, more on the program there, but not tying myself to this simple and probably misleading division. The third lecture will bring account and program together in an extended historical analysis of social criticism, in this case biblical prophecy, in the interpretive mode.

1

We know the path of discovery first and best from the history of religion. Here, to be sure, discovery waits upon revelation; but

someone must climb the mountain, go into the desert, seek out the God-who-reveals, and bring back his word. This man or woman is for the rest of us the discoverer of the moral law: if God reveals it to him, he reveals it to us. Like the physical world, like life itself, morality is a creation; but we are not its creators. God makes it, and we come, with his help and with the help of his servants, to know about it and then to admire and study it. Religious morality commonly takes the form of a written text, a sacred book, and so it requires interpretation. But we first experience it through the medium of discovery. The moral world is like a new continent, and the religious leader (God's servant) is like an explorer who brings us the good news of its existence and the first map of its shape.

I should note one significant feature of this map. The moral world is not only divinely created; it is constituted by divine commands. What is revealed to us is a set of decrees: do this! don't do that! And these decrees are critical in character, critical from the beginning, for it would hardly be a revelation if God commanded us to do and not do what we were already doing and not doing. A revealed morality will always stand in sharp contrast to old ideas and practices. That may well be its chief advantage. But it is, necessarily, a short-lived advantage, for once the revelation is accepted, once the new moral world is inhabited, the critical edge is lost. Now God's decrees, so at least we pretend to ourselves, regulate our everyday behavior; we are what he wants us to be. Any morality that has once been discovered, of course, can always be rediscovered. The claim to have found again some long-lost or corrupted doctrine is the basis of every religious and moral reformation. But God is not present now in the same way as he was in the beginning. Rediscovery does not wait upon revelation; it is our own work, archaeological in form; and we have to interpret what we dig up. The moral law rediscovered lacks the blazing clarity of its first coming.

I mean this brief account of religious morality as a prelude to a more secular story. There are natural as well as divine revelations, and a philosopher who reports to us on the existence of natural law, say, or natural rights, or any set of objective moral truths has walked the path of discovery. Perhaps he has walked it as a kind of moral anthropologist, searching for what is natural in what is real. More likely, given the standard form of the philosophical enterprise, the search is internal, mental, a matter of detachment and reflection. The moral world comes into view as the philosopher steps back in his mind from his social position. He wrenches himself loose from his parochial interests and loyalties; he abandons his own point of view and looks at the world, as Thomas Nagel argued in his own Tanner Lectures, from “no particular point of view.”¹ The project is at least as heroic as climbing the mountain or marching into the desert. “No particular point of view” is somewhere on the way to God’s point of view, and what the philosopher sees from there is something like objective value. That is, if I understand the argument, he sees himself and all the others, himself no different from the others, and he recognizes the moral principles that necessarily govern the relations of creatures like those.

The necessity, clearly, is moral, not practical, else we would not have to step back to discover it. Hence the principles, once again, are critical principles; they exist at some distance from our parochial practices and opinions. And once we have discovered them, or once they have been announced to us, we ought to incorporate them into our everyday moral life. But I confess to less confidence in this secular discovery than in the earlier religious discovery. Most often, the moral principles here delivered to us are already in our possession, incorporated, as it were, long ago, fami-

¹“The Limits of Objectivity,” in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, vol. I (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 83. Cf. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

liar and well-thumbed by now. Philosophical discovery is likely to fall short of the radical newness and sharp specificity of divine revelation. Accounts of natural law or natural rights rarely ring true as descriptions of a new moral world. Consider Professor Nagel's discovery of an objective moral principle, the only one specified and defended in his lectures: that we should not be indifferent to the suffering of other people.² I acknowledge the principle but miss the excitement of revelation. I knew that already. What is involved in discoveries of this sort is something like a dis-incorporation of moral principles, so that we can see them, not for the first time but freshly, stripped of encrusted interests and prejudices. Seen in this way, the principles may well look objective; we "know" them in much the same way as religious men and women know the divine law. They are, so to speak, *there*, waiting to be enforced. But they are only there because they are really here, features of ordinary life.

I don't mean to deny the reality of the experience of stepping back, though I doubt that we can ever step back all the way to nowhere; even when we look at the world from *somewhere else*, however, we are still looking at the world. We are looking, in fact, at a particular world; we may see it with special clarity, but we will not discover anything that isn't already there. Since the particular world is also our own world, we will not discover anything that isn't already here. Perhaps this is a general truth about secular (moral) discoveries; if so, it suggests what we lose when we lose our belief in God.

But I have been assuming a philosopher who strains to see more clearly, if only in abstract outline, the moral reality in front of him. One can, by contrast, call that reality into question and set out in search of a deeper truth, like a physicist piercing the

²"Limits of Objectivity," pp. 109–10. In his own social criticism, Professor Nagel relies on more substantive principles. To what extent these are "objective" principles, I am not sure. See Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.

atom. Thus the moral philosophy called utilitarianism, founded on a very small number of psychological axioms: godless in its origins and radically unfamiliar in its outcomes, utilitarianism suggests what we gain by the imitation of science. Bentham obviously believed that he had discovered objective truth, and the applications of this truth are, very often, not recognizable at all as features of ordinary life.³ Frightened by the strangeness of their own arguments, most utilitarian philosophers fiddle with the felicific calculus so that it yields results closer to what we all think. So they pull the exception back to the rule: without confidence in revelation, we can only discover what we know. Philosophy is a second coming (lower case) which brings us, not millennial understanding, but the wisdom of the owl at dusk. There is, though, this alternative, which I will later find more frightening than attractive: the wisdom of the eagle at daybreak.

2

Many people, perhaps for good reasons, won't be satisfied with the wisdom of the owl. Some will deny its objectivity, despite the detachment of the philosophers who seek it out; but that is not a denial I want to defend. I am inclined to agree with Professor Nagel's sardonic view of the skeptic's question, What reason can I possibly have for *not* being indifferent to my neighbor's pain? What reason can I have for caring, even a little bit? Nagel writes: "As an expression of puzzlement, [this] has that characteristic philosophical craziness which indicates that something very fundamental has gone wrong."⁴ Yes, but what is more worrisome than

³Bentham suggests that utilitarianism is the only plausible account of what ordinary people think about morality, but his ambition goes far beyond providing such an account. He claims to have discovered the foundation of morality: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do. . . ." *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* ch. I. It is apparent in the rest of the *Principles* that these two masters don't always point to what ordinary people think *they* ought to do.

⁴"Limits of Objectivity," p.110.

this craziness is the sense I have already expressed, that the moral principles revealed in this or that undoubtedly sane philosophy lack the special edge, the critical force, of divine revelation. “Don’t be indifferent . . .” is not at all the same thing as “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” And the second of these is unlikely to figure in the list of philosophical discoveries — if only because the question, Why should I love him *that much*? isn’t crazy. The principle of non-indifference — let’s call it, more positively, the principle of minimal concern — is conceivably a critical principle, but its strength is uncertain. A great deal of work would have to be done, and it’s not clear that it could be done by a man or woman standing nowhere in particular (or even by a man or woman standing somewhere else), to work out its relation to everyday social practice.

On the other hand, men and women standing nowhere in particular could construct an entirely new moral world — imitating God’s creation rather than the discoveries of his servants. They might undertake to do this because they thought that there was no actually existing moral world (because God was dead, or mankind radically alienated from nature, or nature devoid of moral meaning); or they might undertake the construction because they thought that the actually existing moral world was inadequate or that our knowledge of it could never be, as knowledge, sufficiently critical in character. We might think of this undertaking in terms Descartes suggests when he describes his intellectual project (in the *Discourse on Method*): “to reform my own thoughts and to build on a foundation wholly my own.” In fact, I suppose, Descartes was really launched on a journey of discovery, “like a man who walks alone, and in the dark,” searching for objective truth.⁵ But in the analogies that leap to his mind, there is no objective

⁵ Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1968), pp. 38, 39.

truth to discover, and the project is explicitly constructive in character.

So I thought to myself that the peoples who were formerly half savages, and who became civilized only gradually, making their laws only insofar as the harm done by crimes and quarrels forced them to do so, could not be so well organized as those who, from the moment at which they came together in association, observed the basic laws of some wise legislator; just as it is indeed certain that the state of the true religion, the laws of which God alone has made, must be incomparably better ordered than all the others. And, to speak of human things, I believe that, if Sparta greatly flourished in times past, it was not on account of the excellence of each of its laws taken individually, seeing that many were very strange and even contrary to good morals, but because, having been invented by one man only, they all tended towards the same end.⁶

This is the path of invention; the end is given by the morality we hope to invent. The end is a common life, where justice, or political virtue, or goodness, or some such basic value would be realized.

So we are to design the moral world under this condition: that there is no pre-existent design, no divine or natural blueprint to guide us. How should we proceed? We need a discourse on method for moral philosophy, and most philosophers who have walked the path of invention have begun with methodology: a design of a design procedure. (The existentialists, who don't begin that way, though they are clearly committed to an invented morality, are of little help in the business of invention.) The crucial requirement of a design procedure is that it eventuate in agreement. Hence the work of Descartes' legislator is very risky unless he is a representative figure, somehow embodying the range of opinions and interests that are in play around him. We can't adopt the simple expedient of making the legislator omnipotent, a

⁶*Discourse on Method*, p. 36.

rational and benevolent despot, for that would be to settle a basic feature of the design — the just distribution of power — before the design procedure had even gotten started. The legislator must somehow be authorized to speak for all of us or, alternatively, all of us must be present and accounted for from the beginning. It isn't easy to see how we might choose a representative, a proxy for humankind. But if we give up on representation and opt for the alternative, universal presence, we are more likely to produce cacophony than order, and the outcome will be "more the product of chance," as Descartes writes, "than . . . of a human will operating according to reason."⁷

There are a variety of solutions to this problem; the best known and most elegant is that of John Rawls, which I need hardly elaborate here.⁸ The Rawlsian solution has the nice result that it ceases to matter whether the constructive or legislative work is undertaken by one, few, or many people. Deprived of all knowledge of their standing in the social world, of their interests, values, talents, and relationships, potential legislators are rendered, for the practical purposes at hand, identical. It makes no difference whether such people talk to one another or one among them talks only to himself: one person talking is enough. Other proposed solutions (that of Jürgen Habermas, for example) are more cumbersome, requiring that we imagine actual conversations, but only in circumstances carefully designed to lift the discourse above the level of ideological confrontation.⁹ The participants

⁷*Discourse on Method*, p. 35.

⁸*A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁹*Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), especially chapter 1. But there is a dilemma here: if the circumstances of what Habermas calls ideal speech or undistorted communication are specified in detail, then only a limited number of things can be said, and these things could probably be said by the philosopher himself, representing all the rest of us. As Raymond Geuss has argued, it isn't as if we have a real choice about what opinions we will finally form. (See *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], p.72.) If, on the other hand, the circumstances are only roughly specified, so that ideal speech

must be liberated from the bonds of particularism, else they will never produce the rational outcome that they require, namely, a moral world so designed that all of them are prepared to live in it, and to think it just, whatever place they come to occupy, whatever projects they come to pursue.

Assume the death of God or the meaninglessness of nature — apparently painless assumptions in these latter days — and then we can say of these legislators that they invent the moral world that would have existed if a moral world had existed without their inventing it. They create what God would have created if there were a God. Now, this is not the only way of describing what happens on the path of invention. Descartes' Spartan analogy suggests a different view, which I think is also Rawls' view, a minimalist version of inventiveness. What Lycurgus creates is not the best city, the city that God would have created, but only the best city for the Spartans, the work, as it were, of a Spartan god. I will want to come back to this possibility later on. I need to consider first the stronger claim that the moral world that we invent behind the veil of ignorance or through an ideologically uncluttered conversation is the only world we could, invent, universally inhabitable, a world for all persons.

The critical force of an invented morality is more like that of divine law than philosophical discovery (or, it is closer to the wisdom of the eagle than the owl). Rawls' difference principle, to take a much-discussed example, has something of the novelty and specificity of revelation. No one would think of saying that it was just plain crazy to call it into question. As divine law derives its force from its creator, so the difference principle derives its force from the process by which it was created. If we accept it, it is because we have participated, or can imagine ourselves having participated, in its invention. And if we invent one such principle,

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resembles a democratic debate, then the participants can say almost anything, and there seems no reason why the results should not (sometimes) turn out to be "very strange and even contrary to good morals."

we can obviously invent others as we need them; or we can deduce from the one a whole system of rules and regulations. Bruce Ackerman, in his book on liberal justice, manages to cover a range of issues roughly equivalent to that covered by the Exodus and Deuteronomic codes — though his revelation is delivered not to one but to every actual and imaginable nation.¹⁰ So we create a morality against which we can measure any person's life, any society's practices.

It is not the case, of course, that the lives and practices we measure are morally meaningless until we measure them. They embody their own values, which are distorted — so philosophers of invention must believe — by a radically imperfect design procedure. These values are created by conversation, argument, and political negotiation in circumstances we might best call social, over long periods of time. The point of an invented morality is to provide what God and nature don't provide, a universal corrective for all the different social moralities. But why should we bow to universal correction? What exactly is the critical force of the philosopher's invention — assuming, still, that it is the only possible invention? I will try to answer these questions by telling a story of my own, a story meant to parallel and heighten certain features of the Rawlsian account of what happens in the original position: a caricature, I'm afraid, for which I apologize in advance; but caricature has its uses.¹¹

Imagine, then, that a group of travelers from different countries and different moral cultures, speaking different languages, meet in some neutral place (like outer space). They have to cooperate, at least temporarily, and if they are to cooperate, each of them must refrain from insisting upon his own values and practices. Hence we deny them knowledge of their own values and

¹⁰*Social Justice in the Liberal State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

¹¹The caricature is aimed at Rawls' epigones rather than at Rawls himself, who would not accept, I think, its first stipulation.

practices; and since that knowledge isn't only personal but also social knowledge, embodied in language itself, we obliterate their linguistic memories and require them to think and talk (temporarily) in some pidgin-language that is equally parasitic on all their natural languages — a more perfect Esperanto. Now, what principles of cooperation would they adopt? I shall assume that there is a single answer to this question and that the principles given in that answer properly govern their life together in the space they now occupy. That seems plausible enough; the design procedure is genuinely useful for the purposes at hand. What is less plausible is that the travelers should be required to carry those same principles with them when they go home. Why should newly-invented principles govern the lives of people who already share a moral culture and speak a natural language?

Men and women standing behind the veil of ignorance, deprived of all knowledge of their own way of life, forced to live with other men and women similarly deprived, will perhaps, with whatever difficulties, find a *modus vivendi* — not a way of life but a way of living. But even if this is the only possible *modus vivendi* for these people in these conditions, it doesn't follow that it is a universally valuable arrangement. (It might, of course, have a kind of heuristic value — many things have heuristic value — but I won't pursue that possibility now.) There seems to be a confusion here: it is as if we were to take a hotel room or an accommodation apartment or a safe house as the ideal model of a human home. Away from home, one is grateful for the shelter and convenience of a hotel room. Deprived of all knowledge of what my own home was like, talking with people similarly deprived, required to design rooms that any one of us might live in, we would probably come up with something like (but not quite so culturally specific as) the Hilton Hotel. With this difference: we would not allow luxury suites; all the rooms would be exactly the same; or, if there were luxury suites, their only purpose would be to bring more business to the hotel and enable us to improve all the other

rooms, starting with those most in need of improvement. But even if the improvements went pretty far, we might still long for the homes we knew we once had but could no longer remember. We would not be morally bound to live in the hotel we had designed.

I have been assuming that my own view of hotels is widely shared, and so I should note one telling dissent — a line from Franz Kafka's journal that goes like this: "I like hotel rooms. I always feel immediately at home in hotel rooms, more than at home, really."¹² But note the irony: there is no other way to convey the sense of being in one's own place except to say "at home." It is a hard thing to suggest to men and women that they give up the moral comfort that those words evoke. But what if they don't share that comfort? What if their lives are like that of Kafka's K., or of any twentieth-century exile, outcast, refugee, or stateless person? For such people, hotels are very important. They need the protection of the rooms, decent (if bare) human accommodation. They need a universal (if minimal) morality or, at least, a morality worked out among strangers. What they commonly *want*, however, is not to be permanently registered in a hotel but to be established in a new home, a dense moral culture within which they can feel some sense of belonging.

Thus far my story. But there is another, and a more plausible, way of thinking about the process of moral invention. Let us assume now that the actually existing (social) moralities incorporate, as they claim to do, divine commands or natural laws or, at least, genuinely valuable moral principles however these are understood. Our purpose now is not invention *de novo*; rather, we need to construct an account or a model of some existing morality that gives us a clear and comprehensive view of the critical force of its own principles, without the intervening confusion of prejudice or self-interest. Hence we don't meet with travelers

¹²Quoted in Ernst Pawel, *The Nightmare of Reason: A Life of Franz Kafka* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1984), p. 191.

in outer space but with fellow members in inner or social space. We consult our own moral understandings, our reflective awareness of principles, but we try to filter out, even to bar entirely, any sense of personal ambition or advantage. Our method, once again, is epistemic denial, which functions now, according to Rawls, as a “device of representation.”¹³ So we surrender all knowledge of our position in society and of our private connections and commitments — but not, this time, of the values (like liberty and equality) that we share. We want to describe the moral world in which we live from “no particular point of view” within that world. Although the description is carefully designed and its immediate conditions are highly artificial, it is nonetheless a description of something real. Hence it is more like philosophical discovery than divine revelation. The inventiveness of the philosopher consists only in turning moral reality into an ideal type.

The idealized morality is in origin a social morality; it is neither divine nor natural, except insofar as we believe that “the voice of the people is the voice of God” or that human nature requires us to live in society — and neither of these views commits us to approve of everything the people say or of every social arrangement. The project of modeling or idealizing an existing morality does depend, however, upon some prior acknowledgment of the value of that morality. Perhaps its value is simply this: that there is no other starting point for moral speculation. We have to start from where we are. I shall want to argue more than this later on, for where we are is always *someplace of value*, else we would never, so to speak, have settled there. Some such argument, it seems to me, is equally as important for invention in its second, minimalist version as it is for interpretation. Its importance is conceded by philosophers of invention who appeal to our intuitions, sometimes in constructing, sometimes in testing, their models and ideal types. Intuition is a pre-reflective, pre-

¹³“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1985), p. 236.

philosophic knowledge of the moral world; it resembles the account a blind man might give of the furnishings of a familiar house. The familiarity is crucial. Moral philosophy is here understood as a reflection upon the familiar, a re-invention of our own homes.

This is, however, a critical reflection, re-invention with a purpose: we are to correct our intuitions by reference to the model we construct out of those same intuitions—or, we are to correct our more groping intuitions by reference to a model we construct out of our more confident intuitions. We move back and forth in either case between moral immediacy and moral abstraction, between an intuitive and a reflective understanding.¹⁴ But what is it that we are trying to understand? And how does our understanding of it, whatever it is, acquire critical force? Clearly, at this point, we are not trying to understand divine law or to grasp an objective morality; nor are we trying to build an entirely new city. Our focus is on ourselves, our own principles and values—otherwise, intuition would be no help. Since this is also the focus of those committed to the path of interpretation, I want now to turn to them. They also face in an especially direct way the problem of critical force. Given that every interpretation is parasitic on its “text,” how can it ever constitute an adequate criticism of the text?

3

The argument thus far is usefully summarized by way of an analogy. The three paths in moral philosophy can be compared, roughly, to the three branches of government. Discovery resembles the work of the executive: to find, proclaim, and then enforce the law. Enforcement is not, I admit, a common philosophical task, but those who believe that they have discovered the true moral law

¹⁴For a useful discussion of this process, which reaches for what Rawls has named “reflective equilibrium,” see Norman Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 76, no. 5 (1979), pp. 256-82.

are likely enough to want or, whatever their private preferences, to believe themselves duty bound to enforce it. Moses exemplifies this reluctant sense of duty. Irreligious writers like Machiavelli have called him a legislator, but if we attend to the biblical account, we see that he did not legislate at all; he received the law, taught it to the people, and strove to see that it was obeyed; he was an unwilling but at least occasionally energetic political leader. The obvious philosophical parallel is Plato's philosopher-king, who does not create the good, but finds it, and then sets himself, with similar reluctance, to enact it in the world. Utilitarianism provides more straightforward examples (as does Marxism, another example of scientific discovery).

Discovery is not itself execution; it simply points toward executive authority. But invention is legislative from the beginning, for the philosophical inventor means to invest his principles with the force of (moral) law. That's why invention is the work of representative men and women, who stand for us all because they could be any one of us. But invention is of two sorts, as I have already argued, and these two correspond to two different sorts of lawmaking and require two different sorts of representation. Invention *de novo* is like constitutional legislation. The lawmakers, since they are creating a new moral world, must represent every possible or potential member, that is, everybody, wherever he lives and whatever his current values and commitments. Minimalist invention is more like the work of legal codification. Now the lawmakers, since what they are codifying already exists, must represent the people for whom it exists, that is, a group of men and women who share intuitions, who are committed to a particular set of principles, however confused that set may be.

Codification is obviously an interpretive as well as an inventive or constructive enterprise: here the second path runs close to the third. Still, a code is a law or a system of laws, while an interpretation is a judgment, the proper work of the judicial branch. The claim of interpretation is simply this: that neither discovery nor

invention is necessary because we already possess what they pretend to provide. Morality, unlike politics, does not require executive authority or systematic legislation. We don't have to discover the moral world because we have always lived there. We don't have to invent it because it has already been invented — though not in accordance with any philosophical method. No design procedure has governed its design, and the result no doubt is disorganized and uncertain. It is also very dense: the moral world has a lived-in quality, like a home occupied by a single family over many generations, with unplanned additions here and there, and all the available space filled with memory-laden objects and artifacts. The whole thing, taken as a whole, lends itself less to abstract modeling than to thick description. Moral argument in such a setting is interpretive in character, closely resembling the work of a lawyer or judge who struggles to find meaning in a morass of conflicting laws and precedents.

But lawyers and judges, it might be said, are bound to the legal morass; it is their business to find meaning there and they have no business looking elsewhere. The legal morass, or better, the meaning that can be found within it, is authoritative for them. But why should the moral morass be authoritative for philosophers? Why shouldn't they look elsewhere, in search of a better authority? The morality we discover is authoritative because God made it or because it is objectively true. The morality we invent is authoritative because anyone would invent it, could only invent it, so long as he adopted the proper design procedure and worked at the proper distance from his immediate, parochial self. But why is this existing morality authoritative — this morality that just *is*, the product of time, accident, external force, political compromise, fallible and particularist intentions? The easiest way to answer these questions would be to insist that the moralities we discover and invent always turn out, and always will turn out, remarkably similar to the morality we already have. Philosophical discovery and invention (I leave aside divine revelation) are

disguised interpretations; there is really only one path in moral philosophy. I am and will continue to be tempted by this view, even though it does not do justice to the sincere ambition (or, sometimes, the dangerous presumption) of discoverers and inventors. But I don't want to deny that it is possible to walk the first *two* paths, nor to assert that people doing that are really doing something else. There are indeed discoveries and inventions — utilitarianism is one example — but the more novel these are the less likely they are to make for strong or even plausible arguments. The experience of moral argument is best understood in the interpretive mode. What we do when we argue is to give an account of the actually existing morality. That morality is authoritative for us because it is only by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are. Our categories, relationships, commitments, aspirations are all shaped by, expressed in terms of, the existing morality. Discovery and invention are efforts at escape, in the hope of finding some external and universal standard with which to judge moral existence. The effort may well be commendable, but it is, I think, unnecessary. The critique of existence begins or can begin from principles internal to existence itself.

One might say that the moral world is authoritative for us because it provides us with everything we need to live a moral life — including the capacity for reflection and criticism. No doubt some moralities are more “critical” than others, but that does not mean they are better (or worse): it is more likely that they provide, roughly, what their protagonists need. At the same time, the capacity for criticism always extends beyond the “needs” of the social structure itself and its dominant groups. I don't want to defend a functionalist position. The moral world and the social world are more or less coherent, but they are never more than more or less coherent. Morality is always potentially subversive of class and power.

I will try in my second lecture to say why subversion is always possible and how it actually works. But I need now to elaborate

on the claim that moral argument is (most often) interpretive in character. The claim seems more plausible with regard to the judicial analogy. For the question commonly posed to lawyers and judges takes a form that invites interpretation: what is the legal or the constitutional thing to do? The reference of the question is to a particular body of laws or to a particular constitutional text, and there is no way to answer the question except by giving an account of the laws or the text. Neither the one nor the other has the simplicity and precision of a yardstick against which we might measure the different actions urged by the contending parties. Deprived of a yardstick, we rely on exegesis, commentary, and historical precedent, a tradition of argument and interpretation. Any given interpretation will be contentious, of course, but there is little disagreement about what it is that we are interpreting or about the need for the interpretive effort.

But the question commonly posed to ordinary men and women arguing about morality has a different form: what is the right thing to do? And now it isn't clear at all what the reference of the question is or how we are to go about answering it. It doesn't appear that the question is about the interpretation of an existing and particular morality, for it is possible that the morality, however interpreted, doesn't tell us the right thing to do. Perhaps we should search for, or invent, a better morality. But if we follow the course of the argument, listen to it, study its phenomenology, we will see, I think, that it is the meaning of the particular moral life shared by the protagonists that is at issue. The general question about the right thing to do is quickly turned into some more specific question — about the career open to talents, let's say, and then about equal opportunity, affirmative action, quotas, and so on. These can be read as matters of constitutional law, requiring legal interpretation; but they are also moral matters. And then they require us to argue about what a career is, what sorts' of talents we ought to recognize, whether equal opportunity is a "right," and what social policies it mandates if it is. These issues

are pursued within a tradition of moral discourse — indeed, they only arise within that tradition — and they are pursued by interpreting the terms of that discourse.¹⁵ The argument is about ourselves; it is the meaning of our way of life that is at issue. The question we actually answer is not quite the question we asked at first. It has a crucial addition: what is the right thing *for us* to do?

It is true nonetheless that the moral question is commonly put in more general terms than the legal question. The reason for this can only be that morality is in fact more general than law. Morality provides those basic prohibitions — of murder, deception, betrayal, gross cruelty — that the law specifies and the police sometimes enforce. We can, I suppose, step back, detach ourselves from our parochial concerns, and “discover” these prohibitions. But we can also step forward, as it were, into the thicket of moral experience where they are more intimately known. For they are themselves parochial concerns — concerns, that is, of every human parish. We can, again, adopt this or that design procedure and “invent” the prohibitions, much as we might invent the minimally decent accommodations of a hotel. But we can also study the actual historical processes by which they came to be recognized and accepted, for they have been accepted in virtually every human society.

These prohibitions constitute a kind of minimal and universal moral code. Because they are minimal and universal (I should say almost universal, just to protect myself against the odd anthropological example), they can be represented as philosophical discoveries or inventions. A single person, imagining himself a

¹⁵The point seems obvious to me, but perhaps I should make it more specific. In a society where children inherited the employments and positions of their parents, and learned what they needed to know about their employments and positions largely from their parents, the “career open to talents” would not be a plausible, it might not even be a comprehensible, idea. Planning a career is not a universal human experience. Nor is there any reason to think that men and women who don’t recognize that experience as their own, or who don’t accord it the same centrality that it has for us, are morally benighted. Should we press it upon them? (How would we do that?) Increased social differentiation will make it available — and supply at the same time the moral language necessary to argue about its meaning.

stranger, detached, homeless, lost in the world, might well come up with them: they are conceivable as the products of one person talking. They are in fact, however, the products of many people talking, of real if always tentative, intermittent, and unfinished conversations. We might best think of them not as discovered or invented but rather as emergent prohibitions, the work of many years, of trial and error, of failed, partial, and insecure understandings — rather as David Hume suggests with regard to the ban on theft (for the sake of “stability of possession”) which, he writes in the *Treatise*, “arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression and by our repeated experience of the inconvenience of violating it.”¹⁶

By themselves, though, these universal or almost universal prohibitions barely begin to determine the shape of a fully developed or livable morality. They provide a framework for any possible (moral) life, but only a framework, with all the substantive details still to be filled in before anyone could actually live in one way rather than another. It’s not until the conversations become continuous and the understandings thicken that we get anything like a moral culture, with judgment, value, the goodness of persons and things realized in detail. One can’t simply deduce a moral culture, or for that matter a legal system, from the minimal code. Both of these are specifications and elaborations of the code, variations on it. And whereas deduction would generate a single understanding of morality and law, the specifications, elaborations, and variations are necessarily plural in character.

I see no way in which the pluralism might be avoided. But if it were avoided, it would be avoided equally in morality and law; in this sense there is no difference between the two. If we had, for example, a priori definitions of murder, deception, betrayal, and so on, then moral and legal specification could plausibly take shape as a series of deductive steps with a necessary end. But we

^{16A} *Treatise of Human Nature*, bk III, pt. II, ch. ii.

don't have such definitions, and so in both cases we are dependent on socially created meanings. The moral question is general in form because it refers to the minimal code as well as to the social meanings, while the legal question is more specific because it refers only to the social meanings established in the law. But in answering the first question as much as in answering the second, our method can only be interpretive. There is nothing else to do, for the minimal code, by itself, doesn't answer either question.

Nothing else to do: this is a stronger claim than that with which I began. We can always, I suppose, discover or invent a new and fully developed morality. It will indeed have to be fully developed if it is to reach all the way to the historically peculiar idea of human life as a career. Still, we may be tempted by discovery or invention when we see how the interpretive enterprise goes on and on, never moving toward definitive closure. Discovery and invention don't produce closure either, of course, and it is interesting to reflect for a moment on the ways in which they fail. They fail in part because there is an infinite number of possible discoveries and inventions and an endless succession of eager discoverers and inventors. But they also fail because the acceptance of a particular discovery or invention among some group of people gives rise immediately to arguments about the meaning of what has been accepted. A simple maxim: every discovery and invention (divine law is an obvious example) requires interpretation.

That is exactly right, someone might say, and it explains why interpretation is the familiar form of moral argument. It has its place and importance, but only during periods of "normal morality" — which are as workmanlike as the periods of normal science described by Thomas Kuhn — between the revolutionary, paradigm-shattering moments of discovery and invention:¹⁷ With regard to morality, however, this view is more melodrama than

¹⁷*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

realistic history. Certainly, there have been historically crucial discoveries and inventions: new worlds, the force of gravity, electromagnetic waves, the power of the atom; the printing press, the steam engine, the computer, effective methods of contraception. All these have transformed the way we live and think about the way we live. Moreover, they have done so with the force and abruptness of revelation — much as in the argument of the medieval Jewish philosopher Judah Halevi about religion: “A religion of divine origin arises suddenly. It is bidden to arise, and it is there. . . .”¹⁸ Can we find anything like that in (secular) moral experience? The principle of utility? The rights of man? Maybe; but moral transformations seem to occur much more slowly, and less decisively, than transformations in science and technology; nor are they so clearly progressive in character, as greater factual knowledge or expanded human capacities presumably are. Insofar as we can recognize moral progress, it has less to do with the discovery or invention of new principles than with the inclusion under the old principles of previously excluded men and women. And that, as we will see, is more a matter of (workmanlike) social criticism and political struggle, than it is of (paradigm-shattering) philosophical speculation.

I will look closely at some “moments” of moral transformation in my second lecture. For now I only want to suggest that the sorts of discoveries and inventions likely to be incorporated into our moral arguments (I leave aside for now discoveries and inventions that are coercively imposed) are unlikely to have definitive effects upon those arguments. We can see this in a small way in the body of literature that has grown up, already, around the Rawlsian difference principle — focused most importantly on the question of equality: how egalitarian would the principle actually be in its effects? And then: how egalitarian was it meant to be? how egalitarian should it be? Leave aside the deeper argument

¹⁸*The Kuzari*, trans. by Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York: Schocken, 1964), p. 58.

about whether the difference principle is an invention in the strong or weak sense (or even itself an interpretation or misinterpretation of our existing morality): whatever it is, it raises questions to which there are no definitive and final answers. The difference principle may have arisen “suddenly,” but it’s not just “there.”

Still, there are better and worse answers to the questions I have just posed, and some of the better ones will be grafted onto the principle itself and become in their turn objects of interpretation. How can we recognize the better answers? It is sometimes said against interpretation as a method in moral philosophy that we will never agree on which ones are better without the help of a correct moral theory.¹⁹ But in the case I am now imagining, the case of the difference principle, we are driven to interpretation because we already disagree about the meaning of what purports to be, or what some readers take to be, a correct moral theory. There is no definitive way of ending the disagreement. But the best account of the difference principle would be one that rendered it coherent with other American values — equal protection, equal opportunity, political liberty, individualism, and so on — and connected it to some plausible view of incentives and productivity. We would argue about the best account, but we would know roughly what we were looking for and would have little difficulty excluding a large number of inadequate or bad accounts.

It might be helpful at this point to contrast interpretation as I understand it with Michael Oakeshott’s “pursuit of intimations.” His is, no doubt, an interpretive enterprise, but it is significantly constrained by the fact that Oakeshott is prepared to pursue only the intimations of “traditions of behavior” and everyday social arrangements, without any reference to “general concepts” (like liberty or equality, or, for that matter, the difference principle).²⁰

¹⁹This is Ronald Dworkin’s objection to my own *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983): see “To Each His Own,” in *The New York Review of Books*, April 14, 1983, pp. 4–6, and the subsequent exchange, *New York Review*, July 21, 1983, pp. 43–46.

²⁰*Rationalism in Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp. 123–25.

The shared understandings of a people, however, are often expressed in general concepts — in its historical ideals, its public rhetoric, its foundational texts, its ceremonies and rituals. It is not only what people do, but how they explain and justify what they do, the stories they tell, the principles they invoke, that constitute a moral culture. Because of this, cultures are open to the possibility of contradiction (between principles and practices) as well as to what Oakeshott calls “incoherence” (among everyday practices). And then it isn’t always possible for interpretation to take the form that he prefers: “a conversation, not an argument.” Oakeshott is right to insist that “there is no mistake-proof apparatus by means of which we can elicit the intimations most worthwhile pursuing. . . .”²¹ Indeed, there isn’t; but that is not to say that the pursuit might not be (has not been) considerably more adventurous than he allows. And in the course of the adventure, conversations turn naturally into arguments.

Interpretation does not commit us to a positivist reading of the actually existing morality, a description of moral facts as if they were immediately available to our understanding. There are moral facts of that sort, but the most interesting parts of the moral world are only in principle factual matters; in practice they have to be “read,” rendered, construed, glossed, elucidated, and not merely described. All of us are involved in doing all these things; we are all interpreters of the morality we share. That doesn’t mean that the best interpretation is the sum of all the others, the product of a complicated piece of survey research — no more than the best reading of a poem is a meta-reading, summing up the responses of all the actual readers. The best reading isn’t different in kind, but in quality, from the other readings: it illuminates the poem in a more powerful and persuasive way. Perhaps the best reading is a new reading, seizing upon some previously misunderstood symbol or trope and re-explaining the entire poem. The case is the same with moral interpretation: it will sometimes confirm and

²¹Ibid., p. 124.

sometimes challenge received opinion. And if we disagree with either the confirmation or the challenge, there is nothing to do but go back to the “text” — the values, principles, codes, and conventions that constitute the moral world — and to the “readers” of the text.

The readers, I suppose, are the effective authority: we hold up our interpretations for their approval.²² But the matter isn’t closed if they don’t approve. For readers are also re-readers who change their minds, and the population of readers also changes; we can always renew the argument. I can best explain my own view of that argument, and conclude this lecture, with a Talmudic story (the Talmud is, after all, a collection of interpretations, simultaneously legal and moral in character). The background for this story is a text from Deuteronomy 30:11-14.

For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.

I won’t quote the story itself but retell it, for stories of this sort are better told than recited.²³ We break in on a dispute among a group of sages; the subject doesn’t matter. Rabbi Eliezer stood

²²I mean readers in the widest sense: not only other interpreters, professionals, and adepts of one sort or another, members of what has been called the interpretive community. These people may be our most stringent readers, but they are nevertheless only an intermediate audience. The interpretation of a moral culture is aimed at all the men and women who participate in that culture — the members of what we might call a community of experience. It is a necessary, though not a sufficient, sign of a successful interpretation that such people be able to recognize themselves in it. For a similar view, see Geuss, *Idea of a Critical Theory*, pp. 64-65.

²³The story is from the Talmudic tractate *Baba Metzia* 59b. See the discussion in Gershom Scholem, “Revelation and Tradition as Religious Categories in Judaism,” in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York: Schocken, 1971), pp. 282–303.

alone, a minority of one, having brought forward every imaginable argument and failed to convince his colleagues. Exasperated, he called for divine help: "If the law is as I say, let this carob tree prove it." Whereupon the carob tree was lifted a hundred cubits in the air — some say it was lifted four hundred cubits. Rabbi Joshua spoke for the majority: "No proof can be brought from a carob tree." Then Rabbi Eliezer said, "If the law is as I say, let this stream of water prove it." And the stream immediately began to flow backwards. But Rabbi Joshua said, "No proof can be brought from a stream of water." Again, Rabbi Eliezer: "If the law is as I say, let the walls of this schoolhouse prove it." And the walls began to fall. But Rabbi Joshua rebuked them, saying that they had no business interfering in a dispute among scholars over the moral law; and they stopped falling and to this day still stand, although at a sharp angle. And then, Rabbi Eliezer called on God Himself: "If the law is as I say, let it be proved from heaven." Whereupon a voice cried out, "Why do you dispute with Rabbi Eliezer? In all matters the law is as he says." But Rabbi Joshua stood up and exclaimed, "It is not in heaven!"

Morality, in other words, is something we have to argue about. The argument implies common possession, but common possession does not imply agreement. There is a tradition, a body of moral knowledge; and there is this group of sages, arguing. There isn't anything else. No discovery or invention can end the argument; no "proof" precedence over the (temporary) majority of sages.²⁴ That is the meaning of "It is not in heaven." We have to

²⁴Compare a midrashic commentary on Psalm 12:7: "The words of the Lord are . . . silver tried in the open before all men, refined seven times seven." "Rabbi Yannai said: The words of the Torah were not given as clear-cut decisions. For with every word which the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke to Moses, He offered him forty-nine arguments by which a thing may be proved clean, and forty-nine other arguments by which it may be proved unclean. When Moses asked: Master of the universe, in what way shall we know the true sense of a law? God replied: The majority is to be followed. . . ." The majority does not, of course, make an arbitrary decision; its members search for the best of the ninety-eight arguments. *The Midrash on Psalms*, trans. by William G. Braude, vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 173.

continue the argument: perhaps for that reason, the story doesn't tell us whether, on the substantive issue, Rabbi Eliezer or Rabbi Joshua was right.

On the procedural issue, however, Rabbi Joshua was exactly right. That at least is the central claim of this lecture. The question now is whether Rabbi Joshua, who gave up revelation, and his contemporary descendants who have given up discovery and invention, can still say something useful, that is, something critical, about the real world.

II. *THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL CRITICISM*

1

Social criticism is such a common activity — so many people, in one way or another, participate in it — that we must suspect from the beginning that it doesn't wait upon philosophical discovery or invention. Consider the phrase itself: "social criticism" is not like "literary criticism," where the adjective tells us only the object of the enterprise named by the noun. The adjective "social" also tells us something about the subject of the enterprise. Social criticism is a social activity. "Social" has a pronominal and reflexive function, rather like "self" in "self-criticism," which names subject and object at the same time. No doubt, societies do not criticize themselves; social critics are individuals, but they are also, most of the time, members, speaking in public to other members who join in the speaking and whose speech constitutes a collective reflection upon the conditions of collective life.

This is a stipulative definition of social criticism; I want now to defend and elaborate it. I don't mean to argue that it is the single possible or correct definition, only that if we imagine the dictionary's usual list, this one should come first. The argument that I shall oppose denies that reflection-from-within belongs on the list at all. For how can it ever be a satisfactory form

of reflection? Don't the conditions of collective life — immediacy, closeness, emotional attachment, parochial vision — militate against a critical self-understanding? When someone says "our country," emphasizing the possessive pronoun, isn't he likely to go on to say "right or wrong"? Stephen Decatur's famous toast is often taken as an example of the sort of commitment that precludes criticism. It isn't, of course, since one can still say "wrong" — as Carl Schurz did in the U.S. Senate in 1872: "Our country, right or wrong! When right to be kept right; when wrong to be put right!" When our country behaves badly, it is still ours, and we are, perhaps, especially obligated to criticize its policies. And yet the possessive pronoun is a problem. The more closely we identify with the country, so we are commonly told, the harder it is for us to recognize or acknowledge its wrongs. Criticism requires critical distance.

It's not clear, though, how much distance critical distance is. Where do we have to stand to be social critics? The conventional view, I think, is that we have to stand outside the common circumstances of collective life. Criticism is an external activity; what makes it possible is radical detachment — and this in two senses. First, critics must be emotionally detached, wrenched loose from the intimacy and warmth of membership: disinterested and dispassionate. Second, critics must be intellectually detached, wrenched loose from the parochial understandings of their own society (standardly taken to be self-congratulatory): open-minded and objective. This view of the critic gains strength from the fact that it matches closely the conditions of philosophical discovery and invention and so seems to suggest that only discoverers or inventors, or men and women armed by discoverers or inventors, can be properly critical.

Radical detachment has the additional and not insignificant merit of turning the critic into a hero. For it is a hard business (though harder in some societies than in others) to wrench oneself loose, either emotionally or intellectually. To walk "alone . . .

and in the dark” is bound to be frightening, even if one is on the road to enlightenment. Critical distance is an achievement, and the critic pays a price in comfort and solidarity. It has to be said, however, that the difficulty of finding a properly detached position is compensated for by the ease of criticism once one is there.

Not surprisingly, radical detachment doesn’t seem to me a prerequisite of social criticism, not even of radical social criticism. It’s only necessary to put together a list of critics, from the prophets of ancient Israel onward, to see how few people it actually fits. The description has become conventional in part because of a confusion between detachment and marginality. The prophets, as I will suggest in the last of these lectures, were not even marginal men, but many of their successors were. Marginality has often been a condition that motivates criticism and determines the critic’s characteristic tone and appearance. It is not, however, a condition that makes for disinterest, dispassion, open-mindedness, or objectivity. Nor is it an external condition. Marginal men and women are like Simmel’s stranger, in but not wholly of their society.¹ The difficulties they experience are not the difficulties of detachment but of ambiguous connection. Free them from those difficulties and they may well lose the reasons they have for joining the critical enterprise. Or, criticism will look very different than it looks when it is worked up on the margins by “alienated intellectuals,” or members of subject classes or oppressed minorities, or even outcasts and pariahs. Now we have to imagine not a marginal critic but a critic detached from his own marginality. He might still be critical of any society in which groups of men and women were pushed to the margins (or he might not, seeing that the margins are so often a setting for creative activity). But his own marginality, if he remembered it, would only be a distorting factor, undercutting his capacity for objective judgment. So would his centrality, his close involvement, if he were involved, with the

¹George Simmel, “The Stranger,” in *The Sociology of George Simmel*, trans. and ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), pp. 402-8.

rulers of society. Detachment stands to the marginal and the central in exactly the same way: free of the tensions that bind the two together.

On the conventional view, the critic is not really a marginal figure; he is — he has made himself into — an outsider, a spectator, a “total stranger,” a man from Mars. He derives a kind of critical authority from the distance he establishes. We might compare him (I shall suggest other comparisons later on) to an imperial judge in a backward colony. He stands outside, in some privileged place, where he has access to “advanced” or universal principles; and he applies these principles with an impersonal (intellectual) rigor. He has no other interest in the colony except to bring it to the bar of justice. We must grant him benevolence, I suppose; he wishes the natives well. Indeed, let’s make the analogy tighter and say that he is a native himself, one of the Queen’s Chinese, for example, or a westernized and Anglophile Indian, or a Parisian Marxist who happens to be Algerian. He has gone to school at the imperial center, at Paris or Oxford, say, and broken radically with his own parochialism. He would have preferred to stay at Paris or Oxford, but he has dutifully returned to his homeland so that he can criticize the local arrangements. A useful person, possibly, but not the only or the best model of a social critic.

I want to suggest an alternative model — though I don’t mean to banish the dispassionate stranger or the estranged native. They have their place in the critical story but only alongside, and in the shadow of, someone quite different and more familiar: the local judge, the connected critic, who earns his authority, or fails to do so, by arguing with his fellows — who, angrily and insistently, sometimes at considerable personal risk (he can be a hero too), objects, protests, and remonstrates. This critic is one of us. Perhaps he has traveled and studied abroad, but his appeal is to local or localized principles; if he has picked up new ideas on his travels, he tries to connect them to the local culture, building on

his own intimate knowledge; he is not intellectually detached. Nor is he emotionally detached; he doesn't wish the natives well, he seeks the success of their common enterprise. This is the style of Alexander Herzen among nineteenth-century Russians (despite Herzen's long exile from Russia), of Ahad Ha-am among East European Jews, of Gandhi in India, of Tawney and Orwell in Britain. Social criticism, for such people, is an internal argument. The outsider can become a *social* critic only if he manages to get himself inside, enters imaginatively into local practices and arrangements. But these critics are already inside. They see no advantage in radical detachment. If it suits their purposes, they can play at detachment, pretend to see their own society through the eyes of a stranger — like Montesquieu through the eyes of Usbek. But it is Montesquieu, the well-connected Frenchman, not Usbek, who is the social critic. Persian naivete is a mask for French sophistication.

Now this alternative description fits the great majority of men and women who are plausibly called social critics. But it isn't philosophically respectable. I shall try to defend its respectability by responding, as best I can, to two legitimate worries about the connected critic. Does his connection leave room enough for critical distance? And are standards available to him that are internal to the practices and understandings of his own society, and at the same time properly critical?

2

I will take the second question first. Social criticism must be understood as one of the more important byproducts of a larger activity — let's call it the activity of cultural elaboration and affirmation. This is the work of priests and prophets; teachers and sages; storytellers, poets, historians, and writers generally. As soon as these sorts of people exist, the possibility of criticism exists. It's not that they constitute a permanently subversive "new class," or that they are the carriers of an "adversary culture." They

carry the common culture; as Marx argued, they do (among other things) the intellectual work of the ruling class. But so long as they do *intellectual* work, they open the way for the adversary proceeding of social criticism.

The argument that Marx first worked out in *The German Ideology* is helpful here. Marxist social criticism is based on a grand discovery — a “scientific” vision of the end of history. But this vision is only possible because the end is close at hand, its principles already apparent within bourgeois society. Criticism in other societies has been based on other visions, other principles, and Marxism is intended to provide a general account, not only of itself but of all other critical doctrines. What makes criticism a permanent possibility, according to this account, is the fact that every ruling class is compelled to present itself as a universal class.² There is no legitimacy in mere self-assertion. Trapped in the class struggle, seeking whatever victories are available, the rulers nevertheless claim to stand above the struggle, guardians of the common interest, their goal not victory but transcendence. This presentation of the rulers is elaborated by the intellectuals. Their work is apologetic, but the apology is of a sort that gives hostages to future social critics. It sets standards that the rulers will not live up to, cannot live up to, given their particularist ambitions. One might say that these standards themselves embody ruling class interests, but they do so only within a universalist disguise. And they also embody lower class interests, else the disguise would not be convincing. Ideology strains toward universality as a condition of its success.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci provides a useful if somewhat sketchy analysis of this double embodiment. Every hegemonic culture, he argues, is a complex political construction.

²Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, R. Pascal, ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1947), pp. 40–41: “For each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality. . . .”

The intellectuals who put it together are armed with pens, not swords; they have to make a case for the ideas they are defending among men and women who have ideas of their own. "The fact of hegemony," Gramsci writes in his *Prison Notebooks*, "presupposes that one takes into account the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony will be exercised, and it also presupposes a certain equilibrium, that is to say that the hegemonic groups will make some sacrifices of a corporate nature."³ Because of these sacrifices, ruling ideas internalize contradictions, and so criticism always has a starting point inside the dominant culture. Upper class ideology carries within itself dangerous possibilities. Gramsci's comrade in the Italian Communist Party, Ignazio Silone, describes the origins of radical criticism and revolutionary politics in exactly these terms: we begin, he writes,

by taking seriously the principles taught us by our own educators and teachers. These principles are proclaimed to be the foundations of present-day society, but if one takes them seriously and uses them as a standard to test society as it is organized . . . today, it becomes evident that there is a radical contradiction between the two. Our society in practice ignores these principles altogether But for us they are a serious and sacred thing . . . the foundation of our inner life. The way society butchers them, using them as a mask and a tool to cheat and fool the people, fills us with anger and indignation. That is how one becomes a revolutionary.⁴

Gramsci himself describes a somewhat more complex process, and one seemingly without the motivating force of indignation; it begins, however, at the same place. Radical critics initiate, he

³Quoted in Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in Mouffe, ed., *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 181.

⁴*Bread and Wine*, trans. by Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), pp. 157–58. Silone's example suggests that one ceases to be a revolutionary in the same way: by comparing the creed of the revolutionary party to its actual practice.

says, “a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of the old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate . . . is now taken to be primary and becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex.”⁵ So new ideologies emerge from old ones by way of interpretation and revision. Let’s look at a concrete example.

Consider the place of equality in bourgeois and then in later critical thought. Conceived in Marxist terms as the credo of the triumphant middle classes, equality has a distinctly limited meaning. Its reference, among French revolutionaries, say, is to equality before the law, the career open to talents, and so on. It describes (and also conceals) the conditions of the competitive race for wealth and office. Radical critics delight in “exposing” its limits: it guarantees to all men and women, as Anatole France wrote, an equal right to sleep under the bridges of Paris. But the word has larger meanings — it wouldn’t be so useful if it didn’t —subordinated within but never eliminated from the ruling ideology. These larger meanings are, to use a Gramscian term, “concessionary” in character; with them or through them the middle classes gesture toward lower class aspiration. We are all citizens here, they claim, no one is better than anyone else. I don’t mean to underestimate the sincerity of the gesture on the part, at least, of some of the people who make it. If it weren’t sincere, social criticism would have less bite than it does have. The critic exploits the larger meanings of equality, which are more mocked than mirrored in everyday experience. He condemns capitalist practice by elaborating one of the key concepts with which capitalism had originally been defended. He shows the rulers the idealized pictures their

⁵The same argument can be made with regard to the bourgeois creed itself. Thus Tocqueville on the radicals of 1789: “. . . though they had no inkling of this, they took over from the old regime not only most of its customs, conventions, and modes of thought, but even those very ideas which prompted [them] to destroy it” Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), p. vii (Foreword).

artists have painted and then the lived reality of power and oppression. Or, better, he interprets the pictures and the reality, for neither one is straightforwardly revealed. Equality is the rallying cry of the bourgeoisie; equality reinterpreted is (in the Gramscian story) the rallying cry of the proletariat.⁶

It is entirely possible, of course, that the critic's reinterpretation won't be accepted. Perhaps the greater number of workers believe that the equality realized in capitalist society is genuine equality or that it is equality enough. Marxists call such beliefs "false consciousness"—on the assumption that equality has a single true meaning, if not for all of us then at least for the workers, namely, the meaning that corresponds to their "objective" interests. I doubt that this view can be satisfactorily defended. The workers can indeed be wrong about the facts of their case, the actual extent of income differentials, say, or the real chances of upward mobility. But how can they be wrong about the value and significance of equality in their own lives? Here criticism depends less on true (or false) statements about the world than on evocative (or unevocative) renderings of a common idea. The argument is about meaning and experience; its terms are set by its cultural as well as its socioeconomic setting.

But not all arguments are similarly internal. Imagine the social critic as a Marxist militant or a Christian preacher who comes (like my imperial judge) to a foreign country. There he finds natives whose conception of the world or of their own place in the world, so the newcomer believes, is radically mistaken. He measures the mistake by a wholly external standard, carried, as it were, in his luggage. If he challenges local practices, he does so in terms likely to be, at least at first, incomprehensible to the natives. Understanding waits upon conversion, and the primary task of the newcomer is a missionary task: to offer a persuasive account

⁶Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 195.

of a new moral or physical world. He must appear to the natives like an eagle at daybreak; they have their own owls. It is only after the new ideas have been naturalized in their new setting, woven into the fabric of the already existing culture, that native critics (or the missionary himself, if he has been naturalized too) can put them to use. Conversion and criticism are different activities — rather like conquest and revolution. What marks off the latter terms in each of these pairs is their partly reflexive character. In the language of the police, they are both of them, at their best, “inside jobs.”

The newcomers might also criticize local practices in terms of what I called, in the first of these lectures, the minimal code — and this sort of criticism, though it might require explanation, would presumably not require conversion. Consider the example of the Spaniards in Central America, who claimed sometimes to speak for Catholicism, sometimes only for natural law: they had, to be sure, a Catholic understanding of natural law, but they may still have been right to oppose human sacrifice, for example, not because it was contrary to orthodox doctrine but because it was “against nature.” The Aztecs probably did not understand, and yet the argument didn’t have the same degree of externality as did arguments about the blood and body of Christ, Christian communion, and so on (and it may well have connected with the feelings, at least, of the sacrificial victims).⁷ In the event, however, the naturalistic critique of human sacrifice by Spanish missionaries seems to have been largely ideological in character, a justification for external conquest, not internal reform or revolution. I will consider a purer example of minimalist criticism in my last lecture.

⁷See Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A study of the political ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suarez, and Molina* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 125ff. Vitoria argues that Spain has no right to enforce natural law in Central America since the Indians do not “acknowledge” any such law, but it does have a right under natural law to defend the innocent: “No one can give another man the right to kill him either for food or sacrifice. Besides, it is unquestionable that in most cases these people are killed against their wills — children for example — so it is lawful to protect them.” Quoted p. 128.

If missionary work and conversion are morally necessary, if Marxism or Catholicism or any other developed creed is the only correct standard of social criticism, then correct social criticism has been impossible in most actually existing moral worlds. Nevertheless, the resources necessary for criticism of some sort, and more than a minimalist sort, are always available — available because of what a moral world is, because of what we do when we construct it. The Marxist account of ideology is only one version of this construction. Another version, more familiar to contemporary philosophers, might go like this. Men and women are driven to build and inhabit moral worlds by a moral motive: a passion for justification. Sometimes only God can justify us, and then morality is likely to take shape as a conversation with God or a speculation on the standards that he might, reasonably or unreasonably, apply to our behavior. These will, in any case, be high standards, hence highly critical standards; the feeling of sin arises in part from the sense that we will never manage to live up to them.

In a secular age God is replaced by other people. Now we are driven, as Thomas Scanlon has written, by a “desire to be able to justify [our] actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.”⁸ (We won’t tolerate unreason in our peers.) It’s not only rulers who want to be justified in the eyes of their subjects; each of us wants to be justified in the eyes of all the others. Scanlon suggests that this desire is triggered by the moral beliefs we already have. So it is, but it is also itself the trigger of moral belief — and then of moral argument and creativity. We try to justify ourselves, but we can’t justify ourselves by ourselves, and so morality takes shape as a conversation with particular other people, our relatives, friends, and neighbors; or it takes shape as a speculation on what arguments might, or should, persuade such

⁸“Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 116.

people of our righteousness. Because we know the people, we can, we have to, give these arguments some specificity: they are more like “love thy neighbor” (with a suitable gloss on all three words) than “don’t be indifferent to the suffering of others.” They are worked out with reference to an actual, not merely a speculative, moral discourse: not one person but many people talking.

We experience morality as an external standard because it is always, necessarily, the standard of God or of other people. That’s also why it is a critical standard. I suggest in my first lecture that discovered and invented moralities were critical “from the beginning”— else there would be no cachet in discovery or invention. But our everyday morality is also critical from the beginning: it only justifies what God or other people can recognize as just. We want that recognition, even if we also want, sometimes, to do things that we know can’t be justified. Morality doesn’t fit these other wants, though it is always possible to interpret it in a way that makes it fit. We might think of such an interpretation as the private version of an ideology. But we live anxiously with our ideologies; they are strained and awkward; they don’t ring true, and we wait for some angry or indignant neighbor or friend or former friend, the private version of a social critic, to tell us so.

This account of private morality can be recapitulated at the level of collective life. Every human society provides for its members — they provide for themselves through the medium of justification — standards of virtuous character, worthy performance, just social arrangements. The standards are social artifacts; they are embodied in many different forms: legal and religious texts, moral tales, epic poems, codes of behavior, ritual practices, and so on. In all their forms, they are subject to interpretation, and they are interpreted in both apologetic and critical ways. It is not the case that the apologetic interpretations are the “natural” ones, that moral standards readily fit social practices and make for smoothness and comfort, as in some functionalist utopia. The standards have to be interpreted to fit. A sustained apologetic interpretation

is, again, an ideology. Since social practices, like individual practices, are morally recalcitrant, ideologies are always problematic. We know that we don't live up to the standards that might justify us. And if we ever forget that knowledge, the social critic appears to remind us. It's his critical interpretation that is the "natural" one, given what morality is. Like Shaw's Englishman, the social critic "does everything on principle." But he is a serious, not a comic, figure because his principles are ones we share. They are only apparently external; they are really aspects of the same collective life that is perceived to require criticism. The same men and women who act badly create and sustain the standards by which (at least sometimes) they know themselves to act badly.

3

But how can we recognize better and worse interpretations of moral standards? The critic can, of course, get things wrong; good social criticism is as rare as good poetry or good philosophy. The critic is often passionate, obsessive, self-righteous; his hatred for the hypocrisy of his fellows may well outmeasure hypocrisy itself — "the only evil that walks/Invisible, except to God alone." How can we judge the proper measure? Or again, some critical interpretations of the existing morality look backward, like Cato's; some forward, like Marx's. Is the one way of looking better than the other? I have already suggested my own answer, or non-answer, to such questions: they set the terms of moral argument, and the argument has no end. It has only temporary stopping points, moments of judgment. In a passive and decadent society, looking back may well be the best thing to do; in an activist and progressive society, looking forward may be best. But then we will argue about the meaning of decadence and progress. Can't the critic step back from such endless arguments? Can't he detach himself from the conditions that make for obsession and self-righteousness? Can't he provide some objective reading of moral experience? And if he can't do these things, mightn't it be better

to say of him that he is angry or resentful rather than to credit him with the qualification — since it is an honorable qualification — of *critical*?

Criticism requires critical distance. But what does that mean? On the conventional view, critical distance divides the self; when we step back (mentally), we create a double. Self₁ is still involved, committed, parochial, angry, and so on; self₂ is detached, dispassionate, impartial, quietly watching self₁. The claim is that self₂ is superior to self₁, at least in this sense, that his criticism is more reliable and objective, more likely to tell us the moral truth about the world in which the critic and all the rest of us live. Self₃ would be better still. This view is plausible, at least for self₂, because we have all had the experience of remembering with embarrassment, chagrin, or regret occasions on which we behaved badly. We form a certain picture of ourselves (from a distance), and the picture is painful. But this is most often a picture of ourselves as we are seen or think we are seen by people whose opinion we value. We don't look at ourselves from nowhere in particular but through the eyes of particular other people — a morally but not an epistemologically privileged position. We apply standards that we share with the others to ourselves. Social criticism works differently: we apply standards that we share with the others *to the others*, our fellow citizens, friends and enemies. We don't remember with embarrassment, we look around with anger. It may be that a critic from the ruling classes learns to see society through the eyes of the oppressed, but one of the oppressed who sees through his own eyes is no less a social critic. He will, of course, find himself caught up in arguments about what he claims to see and what he says the standards are. But he can't win these arguments by stepping back; he can only speak again, more fully and more clearly.

The hope implicit in the conventional view is that the argument can be won once and for all. Hence that heroic figure, the perfectly disinterested spectator, imagined as a kind of all-purpose,

general service social critic. We might ask, though, why such a person would be a critic at all, rather than a radical skeptic or a mere spectator or a playful interventionist, like the Greek gods. Perhaps self_i and self_o don't represent different degrees of moral authority but only different orientations toward the world. Arthur Koestler makes an argument of this sort in his autobiography. There are "two parallel planes in our minds," he writes, "which should be kept separate: the plane of detached contemplation in the sign of infinity, and the plane of action in the name of certain ethical imperatives." Koestler believes that the two coexist in contradiction. He bravely announces, for example, that European civilization is doomed: "This is, so to speak, my contemplative truth. Looking at the world with detachment . . . I find it not even disturbing. But I also happen to believe in the ethical imperative of fighting evil. . . ." Social criticism, a matter of ethical imperatives, clearly belongs to "the plane of action." It is curious that the plane of contemplation is so much more melodramatic. Still, contemplative men and women, on Koestler's reading, are not critics.

In his defense of detachment, Thomas Nagel has insisted that the detached observer, self_o, need not be undisturbed by the doom of civilization or by anything else happening in the real world because he need not abandon the moral beliefs and motivations of self_i. But I don't see how he can experience those beliefs and motivations in the same way once he has evacuated the moral world within which they have their immediate reality and distanced himself from the person for whom they are real. "When we take up the objective standpoint," writes Nagel, as if to confirm this skepticism, "the problem is not that values seem to disappear, but that there seem to be too many of them, coming from every life and drowning out those that arise from our own."¹⁰

⁹*Arrow in the Blue* (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 133.

¹⁰"Limits of Objectivity," p. 115.

I will concede that this is still an experiencing of values, though not quite in the common mode, and that self₂ is somehow motivated to choose out of the flood of conflicting values those that now seem to him best — which may or may not be the values of self₁. But would he establish any very passionate commitment to defend those values in a particular time and place? Surely one of the standard motives for detaching oneself is to escape passionate commitment (for the sake, as with Koestler, of contemplation in the sign of infinity). And if that is so, then a critic looking at society is bound to be more critical than a critic looking at himself looking at society.¹¹

But there is an alternative possibility. If the effect of detachment is literally the “drowning out” of the values that arise from the critic’s own life in his own time and place, then the way may be opened for an enterprise far more radical than social criticism as I have been describing it — an enterprise more like conversion and conquest: the total replacement of the society from which the critic has detached himself with some (imagined or actual) other. Replacement obviously depends upon the criticism of what is to be replaced; I won’t attempt a definitional exclusion: this is social criticism. I shall want to argue later on, however, that it is most often a morally unattractive form of social criticism and not one whose “objectivity” we should admire.

It will be useful at this point to consider, if only briefly, some historical examples. (My third lecture is an extended historical argument.) I have chosen to begin with John Locke and his well-known and rightly admired *Letter Concerning Toleration*. This is obviously a critical text even though it was published in 1689, the year of the Toleration Act, whose principles it vindicates. The *Letter* was written some years earlier, while Locke was living in exile in Holland, and it was aimed at what were still the conven-

¹¹This suggests that self₂ would be the preferred author of a history or sociology of criticism, perhaps even of a philosophy of criticism (it is my own self who is writing these words). But self₁ is the preferred critic.

tional views of England's political elite. Moreover, it defends a revolutionary idea; it marks a significant turning point — for Europe after the long centuries of religious persecution is a different place from Europe before. How does criticism work at moments like this?

Locke's exile might be taken as a kind of detachment from English politics, at least from established and conventional politics. Exile, we might say, is a literal enacting of critical distance. On the other hand, Holland was hardly a realm of objectivity, and Locke's presence there did not represent anything like a philosophical "stepping back." Holland must have appeared to Locke as a (slightly) more advanced England, securely Protestant and committed to toleration. Political refugees don't escape to nowhere in particular; if they can, they choose their refuge, applying standards they already know, looking for friends and allies. So Locke's exile tied him more closely than ever before to the political forces fighting against Stuart "tyranny." It committed him to a cause. And when he defended religious toleration he did so in terms familiar to his political associates. The *Letter* is a partisan tract, a whiggish manifesto.

But it's not only that. Locke's arguments are said to have set the terms of political discourse for the next century or more, and yet at the most crucial point in the *Letter*, he looks resolutely backward and invokes an idea that doesn't figure much in Whig politics or in the philosophies of the Enlightenment — the idea of personal salvation. Locke appeals to the meaning of salvation in Protestant thought and practice. "It is in vain," he writes, "for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God."¹² The *Letter* provides a particular reading, but not an idiosyncratic or outlandish reading, of Lutheran and Calvinist theology. In no sense does it call for a replacement

¹²A *Letter Concerning Toleration*, intro. by Patrick Romanell (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. 34.

of that theology or of the moral world of English Protestantism. Locke moves on to a powerful conclusion (which Rousseau seems to have copied and misunderstood): “Men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no [T]hey must be left to their own consciences.”¹³ He doesn’t speak here in the new language of natural rights; this is very much the old language of “salvation by faith alone.” But Locke’s lines suggest how one might move from old to new — not so much by discovering rights as by interpreting faith, “inward sincerity,” and conscience. (Hence Locke’s use of rights language was never a surprise sprung on his contemporaries.) Given what salvation is, he says, or, better, given what we mean by salvation (where the pronoun doesn’t refer only to Locke’s fellow exiles), persecution cannot serve the purposes claimed by its defenders. It is an injury to the moral self, also to the physical self, and nothing more.

Arguing for toleration is likely to seem to us today the ideal type of a dispassionate enterprise. Religious belief, so we believe, makes for passion, fanaticism, and then for persecution; toleration is the product of skepticism and disinterest. In practice, toleration is more often the product of exhaustion: all passion spent, there is nothing left but co-existence. But one can readily imagine a philosophical defense, starting from a detached observation of the folly of religious war. The theological zeal for persecution seems somehow diminished once we recognize, from a distance, the value of each and every human life. For many seventeenth-century Englishmen, however, Locke probably among them, the value of each and every human life was closely tied to the idea of conscience, the divine spark within each of us. Toleration was itself a theological matter, a position defended with as much zeal as any other in the ongoing wars. Detachment might provide a (distanced) reason for endorsing that position; it doesn’t provide a reason — at any rate, it doesn’t provide Locke’s reason — for taking it up. Indeed, an emphasis on critical distance may be a mis-

¹³Ibid., p. 12.

take here, if it leads us to miss the substantive character of Locke's argument and to disregard its intellectual location: within and not outside a tradition of theological discourse; within and not above the political fray.

It is opposition, far more than detachment, that determines the shape of social criticism. The critic takes sides in actual or latent conflicts; he sets himself against the prevailing political forces. As a result he is sometimes driven into exile in foreign lands or into that internal exile that we call "alienation." It isn't easy, I admit, to imagine John Locke as an alienated intellectual; he is so central to our own political tradition. Although he wrote anonymously on politics and religion, and thus carved out room for his own radicalism, he nevertheless cultivated centrality, referring himself in the *Second Treatise*, for example, to that "judicious" conservative, Richard Hooker, and always inviting readers to admire his own judiciousness. A matter of prudence, no doubt, and of temperament, and of luck: Locke's political associates were powerful men, and he may have sensed that his exile would be, as it was, short. Judiciousness was a wise choice. When his *Letter* was published, his friends were in power. So we need to look at less lucky critics, whose opposition was more prolonged and embittered. It's not the case that such people achieve detachment, far from it, but their connection to common values and traditions of discourse is far more problematic than Locke's was. They are tempted by a kind of leave-taking very different from that suggested by the philosophical idea of stepping back and different too from Lockean exile. They are tempted to declare a state of war — and then to join the other side.

The easiest examples come from the history of war itself, especially from interventionist and colonial war. But before considering an example of that sort, I want to return briefly to the Marxist account of ideology and class struggle. It is one of the major failures of Marxism that neither Marx himself nor any of his chief intellectual followers ever worked out a moral and political theory

of socialism. Their arguments assumed a socialist future — without oppression or exploitation — but the precise shape of that future was rarely discussed. When Marxists wrote social criticism (rather than learned analyses of the laws of capitalist development), this assumption provided a reassuring background. The force of their criticism derived, however, from the exposure of bourgeois hypocrisy — as in Marx’s caustic comment on English apologists for the twelve-hour working day and the seven-day week: “and that in a country of Sabbatarians!”¹⁴ Marxists never undertook the sort of reinterpretation of bourgeois ideas that might have produced Gramsci’s “new ideological and theoretical complex.” The reason for this failure lies, I think, in their view of the class struggle as an actual war in which their task, as intellectuals, was simply to support the workers. Implicitly, sometimes explicitly, they rejected the idea of social criticism as a collective reflection on collective life — because they denied the reality of collective life, of common values and a shared tradition. Even Marx’s brief appeal to the idea of Sabbath rest is enough to suggest the foolishness of this denial, but the denial is nonetheless a major force within Marxism. It accounts for the essentially polemical and agitational character of the Marxist critique and the ever-present readiness to abandon “the arm of criticism” for the “criticism of arms.”

In a sense, Marxists are not properly called critics of bourgeois society, for the point of their politics is not to criticize but to overthrow the bourgeoisie. They are critics of the workers instead, insofar as the workers are ideological prisoners and so prevented from fulfilling their historical role as the agents of overthrow. Hence the theory of false consciousness, which we might think of as a Marxist gesture toward common values. The theory acknowledges the commonality but treats it as a kind of collective mistake — and so misses a critical opportunity to describe socialism

¹⁴ *Capital*, ed. by F. Engels, trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), vol. I, p. 264.

in socially validated and comprehensible terms. The only alternative is not to describe it at all. To discover or invent a set of socialist values doesn't seem to have been a practical possibility. Why should the workers stake their lives for *that*? Marx would have done better to take seriously his own metaphorical account of the new society growing in the womb of the old.

But at least Marxist writers have, fairly consistently, been critics of working class ideology and then of the organization and strategy of working class movements. There is another way of going over to the other side that abandons criticism altogether. Consider the case of Jean-Paul Sartre and the Algerian war. Sartre professed to believe that the intellectual is a permanent critic. Set loose from his own class by his search for universality, he joins the movement of the oppressed. But even here he is unassimilable: "he can never renounce his critical faculties if he is to preserve the fundamental meaning of the ends pursued by the movement." He is the "guardian of fundamental ends," which is to say, of universal values. The intellectual achieves this guardianship by a Sartrean version of "stepping back," that is, "by constantly criticizing and radicalizing [himself]."¹⁵ But this path to universality is a dangerous one. Having "refused" what Sartre calls his "petty bourgeois conditioning," the intellectual is likely to find himself with no concrete and substantive values at all. Universality turns out to be an empty category for de-conditioned men and women — and so their commitment to the movement of the oppressed is (as Sartre at one point says it should be) "unconditional." Once committed, they are supposed to rediscover tension and contradiction: theirs is "a divided consciousness, that can never be healed." In practice, however, unconditional commitment can feel like healing; at least, it can produce the symptoms of wholeness. We can see this clearly in Sartre's own life, for after he committed himself to the Algerian FLN he seemed incapable of a critical word about

¹⁵ "A Plea for Intellectuals," in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, trans. by John Mathews (New York: Pantheon, 1983), p. 261.

its principles or policies. Henceforth he aimed his ideas, as a soldier with more justification might aim his gun, in only one direction.

Of course, Sartre was a critic, and a consistent and brave critic, of French society — of the Algerian war and then of the conduct of the war, both of these viewed as necessary consequences of French colonialism. But since he described himself as an enemy and even a “traitor,” as if, with characteristic hauteur, to accept the charge of his right-wing foes, he cut the ground from under his own enterprise.¹⁶ An enemy is not recognizable as a social critic; he lacks standing. We accept and simultaneously discount criticism from our enemies. And the discount is especially easy if the criticism is made in the name of “universal” principles that are applied only to us. But perhaps we should think of Sartre’s self-description, and of his elaborate account of the critic’s “role,” as a kind of theoretical smokescreen behind which he and his friends engaged in a familiar politics, a politics of internal opposition. Certainly the principles he applied were well-known in France; that, indeed, is where the leaders of the FLN had learned them. French intellectuals hardly had to step back or subject themselves to all that much self-criticism in order to discover, say, the idea of self-determination. The idea was already theirs; they had only to apply it, that is, to extend its application to the Algerians. What prevented Sartre from adopting this view of his own activity was his conception of criticism as war. The war was real enough, but the critique of the war was a distinct and separate enterprise. Join the two, and the critique is, as it was in Sartre’s case, corrupted.

¹⁶Compare the following passage from an even more hard-pressed critic of his own society, the Afrikaner writer Andre Brink: “If the Afrikaner dissident today encounters such a vicious reaction from the Establishment, it is because he is regarded as a traitor to everything Afrikanerdom stands for (since apartheid has usurped for itself that definition) — whereas, in fact, the dissident is fighting to assert the most positive and creative aspects of his heritage. . . .” Brink, *Writing in a State of Siege: Essays on Politics and Literature* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 19. Brink is a connected critic, but that is not to deny that he might one day be driven into physical exile or even into a kind of moral exile, as it were, beyond his brave “whereas.”

There are then two extremes (the description is convenient if inexact): philosophical detachment and a “treasonous” engagement, stepping back and going over. The first is a precondition of the second; under-commitment to one’s own society makes, or can make, for over-commitment to some theoretical or practical other. The proper ground of social criticism is the ground that the detached philosopher and the Sartrean “traitor” have alike abandoned. But does this ground allow for critical distance? It is obvious that it does, else we would have far fewer critics than we do. Criticism does not require us to step back from society as a whole but only to step away from certain sorts of power relationships within society. It’s not connection but authority and domination from which we must distance ourselves. Marginality is one way of establishing (or experiencing) this distance; certain sorts of internal withdrawal provide other ways. I am inclined to think that something like this is a requirement of intellectual life generally — as in the following piece of advice given by a Talmudic sage to would-be sages: “Love work, do not domineer over others, and never seek the intimacy of public officials.”¹⁷ The actual wielding of power and the Machiavellian ambition to whisper in the ear of the prince: these are real obstacles to the practice of criticism because they make it difficult to look with open eyes at those features of society most in need of critical scrutiny. But opposition is not a similar obstacle, though we are no more objective in opposition than in power.

Think for a moment of critical distance in the caricatured and slightly comic categories of age. The old are critics rather as Cato was, who believe that things have gone steadily downhill since their youth. The young are critics rather as Marx was, who believe that the best is yet to be. Age and youth both make for critical distance; the uncritical years presumably come in between. But note that the principles of the old and the young are not distant, and they are certainly not objective, principles. The old remember

¹⁷*Pirke Avot* (Sayings of the Fathers) 1:10.

a time that is not so long ago. The young are newly socialized: if they are also (sometimes) radical and idealistic, that says something about the intellectual content of socialization. What makes criticism possible, or what makes it relatively easy, for both these groups is a certain quality of not being involved, or not fully involved, in the local forms of getting and spending, not being responsible for what happens, not being politically in control. The old may have relinquished control reluctantly; the young may be eager to win it. But, willingly or not, they stand a little to the side. They are, or they can be, kibitzers.

A little to the side, not outside: critical distance is measured in inches. Though old and young are not in control of the major economic or political enterprises of their society, they are also not without some commitment to the success of those enterprises, at least to their eventual success. They want things to go well. This is also, I think, the common stance of the social critic. He is not a detached observer, even when he looks at the society he inhabits with a fresh and skeptical eye. He is not an enemy, even when he is fiercely opposed to this or that prevailing practice or institutional arrangement. His criticism doesn't require either detachment or enmity because he finds a warrant for critical engagement in the idealism, even if it is a hypocritical idealism, of the actually existing moral world.

4

But this, it might be said, is a picture of the social critic as he commonly is; it's not a picture of the ideal social critic. I confess immediately that I can't imagine such a person — not, at least, if we have to imagine him as a single type of person, with a single (objective) standpoint and a single set of critical principles. Nevertheless, I have managed to smuggle into my picture a certain idealism of my own, which is different from the local and various idealisms of actual social critics. I have, not at all surreptitiously, attached value to the critic's connection to his own society. But why should connection be generally valuable, given that societies

are so different? Of course, criticism works best if the critic is able to invoke local values, but it's not the case that it doesn't work at all if he isn't able or doesn't want to do that. Consider the case of the Bolshevik intellectuals in Russia, which Gramsci has summed up in a nice couple of sentences:

An elite consisting of some of the most active, energetic, enterprising and disciplined members of the society emigrates abroad and assimilates the cultural and historical experiences of the most advanced countries of the West, without however losing the most essential characteristics of its own nationality, that is to say without breaking its sentimental and historical ties with its own people. Having thus performed its intellectual apprenticeship it returns to its own country and compels the people to an enforced awakening, skipping historical stages in the process.¹⁸

The reference to "sentimental ties" is necessary to explain why these enterprising intellectuals, having assimilated Western culture, don't just remain in the West. They see the sun but nevertheless go back to the cave. Once back, however, they don't seem to have been animated much by sentiment. They brought with them a great discovery — more scientific than moral in character — for the sake of which they had traveled a great distance, not only in space: they had also gone forward in time (far more so than Locke in Holland). Theoretical advancement was the form of their detachment from Old Russia. Now they confronted Russia with a true doctrine that had no Russian roots. Bolshevik social criticism draws heavily, to be sure, on Russian circumstances and arguments. It was necessary, Lenin wrote, "to collect and utilize every grain of every rudimentary protest," and rudimentary protest, unlike doctrinal discovery, is always a local phenomenon.¹⁹ But this kind of criticism was crudely instrumental in character.

¹⁸Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁹Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), p. 101.

The Bolshevik leaders made no serious effort to connect themselves to the common values of Russian culture. And that is why, once they had seized power, they were compelled to “compel the people to an enforced awakening.”

I am tempted to say of Lenin and his friends that they were not social critics at all — since what they wrote was narrowly analytical in character or narrowly agitational. But it is probably better to say that they were bad social critics, looking at Russia from a great distance and merely disliking what they saw. Similarly, they were bad revolutionaries, for they seized power through a coup d'état and ruled the country as if they had conquered it. The group of Russian radicals who called themselves Social Revolutionaries makes for a useful comparison. The SR's labored hard to recover the communal values of the Russian village and so to construct a Russian argument against the new rural capitalism. They told a story about the *mir*. I suspect that this story, like most such stories, was largely fanciful. The values, though, were real — that is, recognized and accepted by many Russians, even if they were not, even if they had never been, institutionally embodied. And so the SR's developed a critique of social relations in the Russian countryside that had some (I don't want to exaggerate) richness, detail, and nuance — and that was comprehensible to the people whose relations those were. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, were either incomprehensible or insincere, moving erratically back and forth between Marxist theory and an opportunistic politics.

The problem with disconnected criticism, which is also to say, with criticism that derives from newly discovered or invented moral standards, is that it presses its practitioners toward manipulation and compulsion. Many, of course, resist the pressure; detachment and dispassion are built-in defenses against it. But insofar as the critic wants to be effective, wants to drive his criticism home (though the home is, in a sense, no longer his own), he will find himself driven to one or another version of an unattractive politics. It is for this reason that I have tried to distinguish his

enterprise from collective reflection, criticism from within, or as it is sometimes called, “immanent critique.” His is a kind of asocial criticism, an external intervention, a coercive act, intellectual in form but pointing toward its physical counterpart. Perhaps there are some societies so closed in upon themselves, so rigidly confined even in their ideological justifications, that they require asocial criticism; no other kind is possible. Perhaps; but it is my own belief that such societies are more likely to be found in social science fiction than in the real world.²⁰

Sometimes though, even in the real world, the critic will be driven into a kind of asociability, not because he has discovered new moral standards but because he has discovered a new theology or cosmology or psychology, unknown, even outrageous, to his fellows, from which moral arguments seem to follow. Freud is the best modern example — and for now my last example. His critique of sexual morality might have been based, as similar critiques were later based, on liberal ideas of freedom and individuality. Freud argued instead from his newly discovered psychological theory. He was indeed a great discoverer, an eagle among discoverers, and then a heroic critic of repressive laws and practices. And yet a Freudian or therapeutic politics would be as unattractive, as manipulative, as any other politics founded on discovery and disconnected from local understandings. It is a good thing, then, that neither criticism nor oppositional politics depends upon discoveries of this sort. Social criticism is less the practical offspring of scientific knowledge than the educated cousin of common complaint. We become critics naturally, as it were, by elabo-

²⁰It is easier to think of sub-groups within larger societies that might meet this description: tightly-knit orthodox religious communities, for example, like the Amish or like Hasidic Jews in the United States today. Orthodoxy itself is no bar to internal criticism, as the endless heresies of medieval Christendom or the dissidence of dissent among Protestants clearly suggest. But the smaller and more beleaguered the community, the less likely it is to offer resources to the connected critic. He will have to appeal to some wider political or religious tradition within which his own is (uneasily) located — as a critic of Amish or Hasidic society might appeal to Protestantism or Judaism more generally or to American liberalism.

rating on existing moralities and telling stories about a society more just than, though never entirely different from, our own.

It is better to tell stories, better even though there is no definitive and best story — better even though there is no last story that, once told, would leave all future storytellers without employment. I understand that this indeterminacy prompts, not without reason, a certain philosophical apprehension. And from this there follows the whole elaborate apparatus of detachment and objectivity, whose purpose is not to facilitate criticism but to guarantee its correctness. The truth is that there isn't any guarantee, any more than there is a guarantor. Nor is there a society, waiting to be discovered or invented, that would not require our critical stories.

III. BACK TO THE BEGINNING: THE PROPHET AS SOCIAL CRITIC

1

The contrasts and contradictions that I have been discussing — discovered or invented morality, on the one hand, and interpreted morality, on the other; external and internal criticism; shared values and everyday practices; social connection and critical distance — all these are very old. They aren't the property of the modern age; although I have described them in what is undoubtedly a modern idiom, they have in other times and places been described in other idioms. They are fully visible in the very earliest examples of social criticism, and I want in this last lecture to see how they look in what may well have been their first appearance, at least in Western history, I have had occasion up until now only for quick references and briefly elaborated illustrations. But with my argument laid out, I can now attempt a more careful and detailed demonstration of its reality, add historical flesh, as it were, to the theoretical bones. And how better to prove that the connected critic is flesh of our flesh than to give him the name of

Amos, the first and possibly the most radical of Israel's literary prophets?

I shall try to understand and explain the practice of prophecy in ancient Israel. I don't mean the personality of the prophet; I am not interested in the psychology of inspiration or of ecstasy. Nor do I mean the prophetic texts; these are painfully obscure at many points, and I don't possess the historical or philological knowledge necessary to decipher them (or even to offer speculative readings of disputed passages). I want to understand prophecy as a social practice: not the men or the texts but the message—and also the reception of the message. Of course, there were prophets before the ones we know, seers and soothsayers, oracles, diviners, and clairvoyants; and there is nothing very puzzling about their messages or about their audiences. Foretellings of doom and glory will always find listeners, especially when the doom is for enemies, the glory for ourselves. The people say, says Isaiah, “Speak unto us smooth things” (30:10), and that's what the professional prophets of courts and temples commonly do.¹ It's only when these foretellings are set, as Amos first sets them, within a moral frame, when they are an occasion for indignation, when prophecies are also provocations, verbal assaults on the institutions and activities of everyday life, that they become interesting. Then it's a puzzle why people listen — and not only listen but copy down, preserve, and repeat the prophetic message. It's not a smooth message; it can't be happily heard or readily followed; the people, most of them, don't do what the prophet urges them to do. But they choose to remember his urging: why?

It is here, writes Max Weber, “that the demagogue appears for the first time in the records of history.”² But that's not quite

¹On the professional prophets, see the opening chapters of Johannes Lindblom, *Prophecy in Ancient Israel* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), and Joseph Blenkinsopp, *A History of Prophecy in Israel* (London: SPCK, 1984).

²*Ancient Judaism*, trans. by H. H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 268–69.

right (as Weber himself suggests later on in his *Ancient Judaism*), for though the prophets spoke to the people and, arguably, on their behalf, and though they spoke with the fierceness and anger we conventionally attribute to demagogues, they do not seem to have sought a popular following, nor ever to have aspired to political office. Weber is closer to the truth when he argues that the prophecies, written down and circulated in the cities of Israel and Judah, represent the earliest known example of the political Pamphlet.³ But that suggestion is too narrow. Prophetic religion embraced not only politics but every aspect of social life. The prophets were (the term is only mildly anachronistic) social critics. Indeed, they were the inventors of the practice of social criticism — though not of their own critical messages. And so we can learn from reading them and studying their society something about the conditions that make criticism possible and give it force, and something too about the place and standing of the critic among the people he criticizes.

2

The first thing to notice is that the prophetic message depends upon previous messages. It isn't something radically new; the prophet is not the first to find, nor does he make, the morality he expounds. We can detect a certain theological revisionism in some of the later prophets, but none of them presents an entirely original doctrine. For the most part, they disclaim originality—and not only in the obvious sense that they attribute their message to God. It is more important that they continually refer themselves to the epic history and the moral teaching of the Torah: “He hath showed thee, O man, what is good . . .” (Micah 6:8). The past tense is significant. The prophets assume the previous messages, the divine “showings,” the immediacy of history and law in the minds of their listeners. They have no esoteric teach-

³Ibid., p. 272.

ing, not even for their closest disciples. They speak to a large audience and, for all their anger, they seem to take that audience for granted; they assume, writes Johannes Lindblom, “that their words could be [not, however, that they would be — M. W.] immediately understood and accepted”⁴

This assumption finds its sociological correlate in the political and communal structure of ancient Israel: a loose, localized, and conflict-ridden set of arrangements that stood at some distance from the unified hierarchies of Egypt to the west and Assyria to the east. In Israel, religion was not the exclusive possession of priests, and law was not the exclusive possession of royal bureaucrats. Prophecy in the form we know it, in critical form, would not have been possible except for the relative weakness of priesthood and bureaucracy in the everyday life of the country. The necessary background conditions are indicated in the prophetic texts: justice is done (or not done) in the “gates” of the city, and religion is discussed in the streets.⁵ The Bible clearly suggests the existence among the Israelites of a strong lay and popular religiosity. This had two aspects, individual piety and a more or less common, though fiercely disputed, covenantal creed; taken together, the two made for a culture of prayer and argument that was independent of the more formal religious culture of pilgrimage and sacrifice. Sustained no doubt, as Weber says, by “circles of urban intellectuals,” this informal religiosity also reached beyond such circles.⁶ Had it not done so, the prophet would never have found his audience.

Or, prophecy would have taken a wholly different form. I will try to illustrate one alternative possibility out of the book of Jonah, a tale about a prophet sent by God to the city of Nineveh, where the appeal to Israel’s history and law would obviously make

⁴*Prophecy in Ancient Israel*, p. 313.

⁵On the importance of “the court in the gates,” see James Luther May, *Amos: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), pp. 11, 93.

⁶*Ancient Judaism*, p. 279.

no sense. But first I need to say something more about the conditions under which the appeal does make sense — most crucially, about the strength and legitimacy of lay religion. In part, this is a matter of popular practices, like the practice of spontaneous prayer that Moshe Greenberg has recently revealed to us.⁷ But there is also what we might call an idea or even a doctrine of lay religiosity. The doctrine is entirely appropriate to a covenantal creed, and it is most clearly set forth in Deuteronomy, the crucial exposition of Israel's covenant theology. The precise relation of Deuteronomy to the prophetic movement is a subject of ongoing scholarly debate. Did the prophets influence the Deuteronomic writers, or the writers the prophets? It seems likely that influence worked in both directions and in ways that we shall never wholly understand. In any case, a large number of passages in the prophetic books echo (or anticipate?) the Deuteronomic text as we now have it, and the covenantal tradition that Deuteronomy elaborates is surely older than Amos, though the "discovery" of the text did not take place until a century and a half after Amos' prophecies.⁸ So I shall take the book to suggest the doctrinal background of prophecy: a normative account of the informal and unpriestly culture of prayer and argument.

I want to look briefly at two passages, the first from the end of the book, the second from the beginning. Whether either of these was part of the manuscript that turned up in Jerusalem in the year 621, I can't say; nor can anyone else. But they share the spirit of the original as a covenantal document. The first passage is already familiar to you since it formed the basis of the Talmudic story with which I concluded my first lecture.

For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee [Hebrew: *felah*, alternatively translated, it is

⁷*Biblical Prose Prayer as a Window to the Popular Religion of Ancient Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

⁸See Anthony Phillips, "Prophecy and Law," in R. Coggins, A. Phillips, and M. Knibb, eds., *Israel's Prophetic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 218.

not too hard for thee]; neither is it far off, It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.

[Deut. 30: 11–14]

Moses, indeed, climbed the mountain, but no one need do that again. There is no longer any special role for mediators between the people and God. The law is not in heaven; it is a social possession. The prophet need only show the people their own hearts. If his is a “voice in the wilderness” (Isaiah 40:3), it is not because he has embarked on a heroic quest for God’s commandments. The image recalls the history of the people themselves, their own wilderness time, when God’s voice was the voice in the wilderness, and reminds them that they already know the commandments. And though they may need to be reminded, the knowledge is readily renewed — for the Torah is not an esoteric teaching. It isn’t hidden, obscure, difficult (the Hebrew word has all these meanings; also, marvelous and “set aside,” as a sacred text might be set aside for a body of specially trained priests). The teaching is available, common, popular, so much so that everyone is commanded to speak about it:

And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thine heart: And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down and when thou risest up.

[Deut. 6:6-71]

Prophecy is a special kind of talking, not so much an educated as an inspired and poetic version of what must have been at least sometimes, among some significant part of the prophet’s audience, ordinary discourse. Not only ritual repetition of key texts, but heartfelt prayer, storytelling, doctrinal debate: the Bible provides

evidence for all of this, and prophecy is continuous with it, dependent upon it. Although there is conflict between the prophets and the established priesthood, prophecy does not in any sense constitute an underground or, as we shall see, a sectarian movement. In the dispute between Amos and the priest Amaziah, it is the prophet who appeals to religious tradition, the priest only to reason of state (7:10–17). Prophecy aims to arouse remembrance, recognition, indignation, repentance. In Hebrew, the last of these words derives from a root meaning to turn, to turn back, to return, and so it implies that repentance is parasitic upon a previously accepted and commonly understood morality. The same implication is apparent in prophecy itself. The prophet foretells doom, but it isn't only fear of coming disasters but also knowledge of the law, a sense of their own history, and a feeling for the religious tradition that motivate his listeners. Prophetic admonition, writes Moshe Greenberg,

presupposes common ground on which prophet and audience stand, not only regarding historical traditions but religious demands as well. The prophets seem to appeal to their audience's better nature, confronting them with demands of God that they know (or knew) but wish to ignore or forget. . . . There is more than a little optimism underlying the generations-long succession of reforming prophets; it reflects the prophets' confidence that, in the final analysis, they had advocates in the hearts of their audience.⁹

3

Contrast this view, now, with the example provided by the book of Jonah. This is a late (post-exilic) tale commonly taken to argue for the universalism of divine law and divine concern — though universalism is, as we will see, an ancient argument. Perhaps Jonah is an ancient tale, retold sometime after the return from Babylonia as an attack upon the parochialism of the Judean

⁹*Prose Prayer*, p. 56.

restoration. The immediate issue of the story is the reversibility of divine decree, an issue raised, at least implicitly, in the earliest prophets.¹⁰ That God Himself is capable of “repentance” is suggested by Amos (7:3), and there is a striking example even earlier, in the Exodus story. But I want to stress another feature of the book of Jonah, and contrast the content of Jonah’s message with that of the prophets in Israel. The contrast would be sharper if the Jonah of the tale could be identified with the prophet Jonah son of Amitai mentioned in II Kings 14:25, a contemporary of Amos, but it does not depend upon the identification. For my immediate purposes the provenance of the tale and its author’s intentions matter less than the tale itself. I shall take the “plot” literally and pass over its obvious ironies (the fact, for example, that the Ninevans actually repented, while none of Israel’s own prophets could report a similar success). When he prophesies doom in Nineveh, Jonah is necessarily a different sort of prophet than Amos in Beth-El or Micah in Jerusalem — for doom is the entire content of his prophecy. He can’t refer to a religious tradition or a moral law embodied in covenantal form. Whatever the religion of the inhabitants of Nineveh, Jonah appears to know nothing about it and to take no interest in it. He is a detached critic of Ninevan society, and his prophecy is a single sentence: “Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown” (3:4).

Now, “overthrown” is the verb used in Genesis to describe the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, and it serves to assimilate Nineveh to these two cities. All three are condemned because of the “wickedness” of their inhabitants. Nahum Sarna suggests a further comparison, based on another repeated word. Nineveh is charged with the crime of “violence,” echoing the charge that explains the flood: “and the earth was filled with violence” (Genesis 6:11).

¹⁰Yehezkel Kaufmann, *The Religion of Israel*, trans. by Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 282–84, argues that the book of Jonah as we have it dates from the eighth century, but few scholars agree with him.

In neither case is anything more specific said.¹¹ Sodom's wickedness is at least minimally specified: its immediate form is the sexual mistreatment of guests and strangers. But we actually know very little about the internal life of Sodom or the moral history or commitments of its citizens. And we know even less about the world before the flood or about the faraway city of Nineveh. Jonah tells us nothing at all: this is prophecy without poetry, without resonance, allusion, or concrete detail. The prophet comes and goes, an alien voice, a mere messenger, unconnected to the people of the city. Even the regard for the people that God teaches him at the end is only a rather abstract "pity" for the "six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand . . ." (4:11).

This last phrase probably refers to the children of Nineveh; the adults, it appears, have some discernment, for they do repent. Though Jonah does not say anything about it, there is some moral knowledge to which they can return, some basic understanding that God and his prophet alike presuppose. Of course, Nineveh has its own moral and religious history, its own creed, its own code, its own shrines and priests — its own gods. But it's not Jonah's purpose to remind the people of what is their own; only a local prophet (a connected critic) could do that. Try to imagine Jonah in conversation with the Ninevans: what could he have said? Conversation is parasitic on commonality, and since commonality is minimal here, we can imagine only a minimal conversation. It's not that there is nothing to say, but the talk would be thin, centered on those moral understandings that don't depend upon communal life; there would be little room for nuance or subtlety. Thus Jonah's prophecy, and his achievement: the people recognize and turn away "from the violence that is in their hands" (3:8). Now, what is this "violence" whose recognition does not depend upon a particular moral or religious history?

¹¹Nahum Sarna, *Understanding Genesis: The Heritage of Biblical Israel* (New York: Schocken, 1970), p. 145.

The first two chapters of the book of Amos provide an answer to this question. Here the prophet “judges” a group of nations with which Israel has recently been at war, and he provides a brief, though sometimes obscure, account of their crimes. Damascus “threshed Gilead with sledges of iron” — a reference, apparently, to extreme cruelty in warfare; Gaza “carried away captive a whole captivity”; Tyre violated a treaty; Edom pursued “his brother with the sword, and did cast off all pity”; Ammon “ripped up the women with child of Gilead”; Moab burned the bones of the king of Edom — denying him honorable burial. All these are crimes of “violence,” and in all of them the victims are enemies and strangers, not fellow citizens. These are the only crimes for which the “nations” (in contrast to Israel and Judah) are punished. The prophet judges Israel’s neighbors only for violations of a minimal code, “a form of international religious law,” Weber suggests, “presupposed as valid among the Palestine peoples.”¹² Of the substantive social morality of these peoples, their domestic practices and institutions, Amos, like Jonah in Nineveh, has nothing to say.

Amos’ judgment of the nations suggests not a late and innovative but an early and familiar universalism. The existence of a kind of international law, fixing the treatment of enemies and strangers, seems to be presupposed in the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, to which Amos refers casually (4:11) as if his audience knows it well, and some such minimal code may also underlie the story of the flood. The author of the book of Jonah, centuries later, adds nothing to the argument. God will punish “violence” wherever it occurs. But alongside this universalism there is a more particularist message, delivered only (at least by Israelite prophets) to the children of Israel:

You only have I known of all the
families of the earth;
Therefore I will visit upon you all
your iniquities [3:2].

¹² *Ancient Judaism*, p. 302.

All your iniquities, domestic as well as international: the elaboration of this phrase constitutes the particular morality, the substantive argument of the prophets.

4

The concern of the prophets is for *this* people, their own people, the “family” that came up out of Egypt (2:10). (I will ignore for my present purposes the political division between the rival kingdoms of Israel and Judah; the two share a history and a law, and prophets like Amos go back and forth between them.) Jonah has no personal interest in Nineveh and no knowledge, as I have already argued, of its moral history. Hence Martin Buber is wrong to call the Jonah story a “paradigm of the prophetic nature and task.”¹³ The paradigmatic task of the prophets is to judge the people’s relations with one another (and with “their” God), to judge the internal character of their society) which is exactly what Jonah does not do. Prophetic teaching, writes Lindblom more accurately) “is characterized by the principle of solidarity. Behind the demand for charity and justice . . . lies the idea of the *people*, the people as an organic whole, united by election and covenant”—singled out, we might say, by a peculiar history.¹⁴ Committed to this solidarity, the prophets avoid sectarianism just as they avoid any larger universalism. They attempt no further singling out; they make no effort to gather around themselves a band of “brethren.” When they address their audience they always use inclusive proper names — Israel, Joseph, Jacob; their focus is always on the fate of the covenanted community as a whole.

For the same reason, the message of the prophets is resolutely this-worldly. Theirs is a social and workaday ethic. Two points are crucial here, both of which I take from Weber, whose com-

¹³Martin Buber, *The Prophetic Faith* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 104.

¹⁴*Prophecy in Ancient Israel*, p. 344 (emphasis in the original).

parative perspective is especially illuminating.¹⁵ First, there is no prophetic utopia, no account (in the style of Plato, say) of the “best” political or religious regime, a regime free from history, located anywhere or nowhere. The prophets don’t have philosophical imaginations. They are rooted, for all their anger, in their own societies. The house of Israel is here, and it needs only to be ordered in accordance with its own laws. Second, the prophets take no interest in individual salvation or in the perfection of their own souls. They are not religious adepts or mystics; they never advocate asceticism or world-rejection. Wrong-doing and right-doing are alike social experiences, and the prophet and his listeners are involved in these experiences in accordance with the principle of solidarity, whether or not any given right or wrong act is their own. Utopian speculation and world-rejection are two forms of escape from particularism. The two always take culturally specific forms, of course, but they are in principle available without regard to cultural identity: anyone can leave the world behind, anyone can come to “nowhere.” The prophetic argument, by contrast, is that this people must live in this way.

The prophets invoke a particular religious tradition and a particular moral law, both of which they assume their audience to know. The references are constant, and while some of them are mysterious to us, they were presumably not mysterious to the men and women who gathered at Beth-El or Jerusalem to listen. We need footnotes, but prophecy is not, like some modern poetry, meant to be read with footnotes. Consider, for example, these lines from Amos, which follow close upon the famous passage about selling the righteous for silver and the needy for a pair of shoes:

And they lay themselves down beside
every altar
Upon clothes taken in pledge [2 :8].

¹⁵*Ancient Judaism*, pp. 275, 285, 313-14.

The reference here is to the law of Exodus 22:26-27 (part of the Book of the Covenant) : “If thou at all take thy neighbor’s raiment to pledge, thou shalt deliver it unto him by the time the sun goeth down: For that is his covering only, it is his raiment for his skin: wherein shall he sleep”? The prophet’s complaint makes no sense without the law. Whether the law was already written down (as seems likely in this case) or known only through an oral tradition, the point is that it was known — and, judging from the form of the reference, commonly known. It’s also worth saying that it isn’t universally known, not the law and not the morality behind the law. We have different ideas about the pledge (the pawn), and it’s not obvious that our ideas are unjust.

But the prophets don’t only recall and repeat the tradition, they also interpret and revise it. I have sometimes encountered efforts to deny the value of the prophetic example for a general understanding of social criticism by arguing that Israel possessed an unusually coherent moral tradition — whereas we, by contrast, have only competing traditions and endless disagreements.¹⁶ But the coherence of Israelite religion is more a consequence than a precondition of the work of the prophets. Their prophecies, together with the writings of the Deuteronomic school, begin the creation of something we might call normative Judaism. It is important to stress, as I have done, the pre-existing moral and legal codes, the sense of a common past, the depth of popular religiosity. But all this was still theologically inchoate, highly contentious, radically pluralistic in form. In fact, the prophets pick and choose among the available materials. What priests like

¹⁶Or, alternatively, it is pointed out that Amos can speak in the name of God, while we can claim no such authority. This makes a difference, of course, but not of a relevant kind. Criticism is an adversarial proceeding, and the relevant comparison is between the critic and his adversary, not between critics from one culture and critics from another. And Amos’ adversaries also spoke in God’s name, while the adversaries of contemporary social critics make no such claim. What is similar across cultures is the similarity within cultures: the same resources — authoritative texts, memories, values, practices, and conventions — are (always) available to social critics and to defenders of the status quo.

Amaziah take to be “secondary and subordinate” in Israelite religion, the prophets take “to be primary . . . the nucleus of a new . . . theoretical complex.” Or, to put the same point differently, the prophets try to work up a picture of the tradition that will make sense to, and connect with the experience of, their own contemporaries. They are parasitic upon the past, but they also give shape to the past upon which they are parasitic.¹⁷

Even here, they probably don’t act alone. Just as we need to resist the portrayal of ancient Israel as a special case of moral coherence, so we need to resist the portrayal of the prophets as peculiar, eccentric, and lonely individuals. They are no more alone when they interpret the Israelite creed than they are when they repeat the creed. Interpretation as I have been describing it, as the prophets practiced it, is a common activity. The new emphasis upon the social code of Exodus, for example, is almost certainly rooted in discussions and arguments that went on — they are easy to imagine — in the cities of Israel and Judah. Amos can hardly have been the first person to realize that the law of the pledge was being violated. He speaks against a background of urban growth and class differentiation that gave that law, and all the Exodus laws, a new relevance. Similarly, the prophetic de-emphasis of ritual sacrifice is rooted in popular piety, in the rejection or avoidance of priestly mediation, in a spontaneous acting out, through individual prayer, of the ancient dream that all Israel would be “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.”¹⁸ Still, it is the proph-

¹⁷Some commentators have argued that the prophets break more radically with the past than this last paragraph suggests. Walther Zimmerli, for example, writes that the prophetic “proclamation” overwhelms, even as it exploits, traditional material and therefore cannot be captured under the rubric of “interpretation.” Tradition, he writes, “in the salutary sense of the term, shatters and becomes an empty shell of mere historical recollection. . . .” But this ignores the content of the prophetic proclamation, the terms or standards to which Israel is held. Judgment would be entirely arbitrary if it did not refer to standards with which the people were, or were supposed to be, familiar. Amos makes that reference systematically. See “Prophetic Proclamation and Reinterpretation,” in *Tradition and Theology in the Old Testament*, Douglas Knight, ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, n.d.), p. 99.

¹⁸Greenberg, *Prose Prayer*, p. 52.

ets who most clearly establish the link between piety and conduct and who most explicitly use the Exodus laws as a weapon of social criticism.

As I have already been doing, I shall follow here the argument of Amos, in whose work both the new emphasis and the new de-emphasis are dramatically displayed. We must assume the social changes that precede and motivate his prophecy: the introduction of greater and greater inequalities into what had been, and still was ideally, an association of freemen. No doubt, inequality of some sort was already ancient, else there would have been no ancient social code aimed at ameliorating its effects. But by the eighth century, the years of monarchic rule had produced in and around the court and in the growing cities a new upper class feeding on a new lower class. Archaeological finds, more explicit in this case than they usually are, confirm the development: "the simple, uniform houses of the earlier centuries had been replaced by luxurious dwellings of the rich on the one hand, by hovels on the other."¹⁹ Amos is, above all, a critic of this new upper class, whose members were increasingly capable of and committed to what we now call a high standard of living, with winter houses and summer houses (3:15), couches of ivory (6:4), sumptuous feasts, and costly perfumes:

That drink wine in bowls
And anoint themselves with the chief
ointments. . . [6:6].

The prophet's caustic description of all this is often characterized as a kind of rural puritanism, the dislike of a countryman for city fanciness.²⁰ Perhaps there is something to this view,

¹⁹Martin Smith, *Palestinian Parties and Politics that Shaped the Old Testament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 139.

²⁰For example, Blenkinsopp, *History of Prophecy*, p. 95, and Henry McKeating, *The Cambridge Bible Commentary: Amos, Hosea, Micah* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 5.

though I have already suggested that prophecy draws upon urban experience and argument. If the prophet sometimes looks at the city from a distance, he more often looks only at the city's rich and powerful citizens from a distance, that is, from the perspective of the men and women they oppressed. And he then invokes values that even the oppressors pretend to share. Amos' main charge, his critical message, is not that the rich live well but that they live well at the expense of the poor. They have forgotten not only the laws of the covenant but the bond itself, the principle of solidarity: "They are not grieved for the hurt of Joseph" (6:6). More than this: they are themselves responsible for the hurt of Joseph; they are guilty of the Egyptian crime of oppression.

Amos' word for "oppress" is *'ashok*; he uses the Exodus word *lahatz* only once (6:14), when he is describing what will happen to Israel at the hands of an unnamed foreign power. The shift in terminology suggests nicely how Amos (or unknown speakers or writers before him) responds, within the tradition, to a new social experience. *Lahatz* means to press down, to squeeze, to crush, to constrain, to coerce. The range of meanings evoked by *'ashok* is quite different: to maltreat, to exploit, to wrong, to injure, to extort, to defraud. *Lahatz* has political, *'ashok* economic connotations. Of course, Egyptian oppression was also economic in character, and in eighth-century Israel and Judah the oppression of the poor was upheld by the monarchic regimes. Amos condemns both the "great houses" and the "palaces." But the primary experience was of tyranny in the first case, extortion and exploitation in the second. The new bondage had its origin in commerce — usury, indebtedness, default, and confiscation; its setting was more significantly the market than the state. Amos addresses himself specifically to avaricious merchants:

Hear this, O ye that would swallow
the needy
And destroy the poor of the land,
Saying, When will the new moon be
gone, that we may sell grain?

And the Sabbath, that we may set
forth corn?
Making the ephah small and the
shekel great?
And falsifying the balances of
deceit;
That we may buy the poor for silver,
And the needy for a pair of shoes,
And sell the refuse of the corn [8:4-6].

The address, indeed, is doubly specific: avaricious *Israelite* merchants, who can hardly wait for the end of Israel's holy days, when business dealings were forbidden, so that they could return to the business of extortion and fraud. Amos suggests a hard question: what kind of religion is it that provides only temporary and intermittent restraints on avarice and oppression? What is the quality of worship if it does not direct the heart toward goodness? As the prophet describes them, the oppressors of the poor and needy are scrupulously "orthodox." They observe the festival of the new moon, they keep the Sabbath, they attend the religious assemblies, offer the required sacrifices, join in the hymns that accompany the priestly rites. But all this is mere hypocrisy if it doesn't translate into everyday conduct in accordance with the covenantal code. Ritual observance alone is not what God requires of Israel. Pointing toward the real requirement, Amos evokes the memory of the Exodus: "Did ye bring unto Me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" (5:25). In the Exodus story as we have it, they did; perhaps Amos had access to an alternative tradition." But the practice of sacrifice is not, in any case, what was to be learned from the experience of liberation. Indeed, if oppression continues, nothing has been learned, however many animals are sacrificed.

This is the standard form of social criticism, and though later critics rarely achieve the angry poetry of the prophets, we can

²¹McKeating, *Amos, Hosea, Micah*, p. 47.

recognize in their work the same intellectual structure: the identification of public pronouncements and respectable opinion as hypocritical, the attack upon actual behavior and institutional arrangements, the search for core values (to which hypocrisy is always a clue), the demand for an everyday life in accordance with the core. The critic begins with revulsion and ends with affirmation:

I hate, I despise your feasts,
And I will take no delight in your
solemn assemblies.
Yea, though ye offer me burnt-
offerings and your meal-
offerings,
I will not accept them. . . .
Take thou away from me the noise of
thy songs;
And let me not hear the melody of
thy psalteries.
But let justice well up as waters,
And righteousness as a mighty
stream [5:21-24].

The only purpose of the ceremonies is to remind the people of their moral commitments: God's law and the wilderness covenant. If that purpose is not served, then the ceremonies are of no use. Less than no use: for they generate among rich and avaricious Israelites a false sense of security—as if they were safe from divine wrath. The prophecies of doom, which make up so much of Amos' message, are designed to dispel that sense, to shatter the confidence of the conventionally pious: "Woe to them that are at ease in Zion" (6:1). Neither "woe" nor "hate" constitutes the substance of Amos' argument, however; the substance is "justice" and "righteousness,"

But how does the prophet know that justice and righteousness are the core values of the Israelite tradition? Why not pilgrimage

and sacrifice, song and solemnity? Why not ritual decorum and deference to God's priests? Presumably if Amaziah had offered a positive defense of his own activities at Beth-El, he would have given us a different picture of Israelite values. How then would the argument between Amaziah and Amos move toward closure? Both priest and prophet could cite texts — there is never a lack of texts — and both would find supporters in the crowd that gathered at the shrine. I have been arguing that disagreements of this sort don't in fact move toward closure, not, at least, definitive closure. Nor would they even if God Himself were to intervene: for all He can provide is another text, subject to interpretation exactly like the earlier ones. "It is not in heaven." Still, we can recognize good and bad arguments, strong and weak interpretations along the way. In this case, it is significant that Amaziah makes no positive claims at all. His silence is a kind of admission that Amos has provided a convincing account of Israelite religion — also, perhaps, that he has found, as Greenberg says, advocates in the hearts of the people. That doesn't end the disagreement, and not only because the prophet is apparently forced to leave Beth-El, while Amaziah continues his priestly routines. The claim that God is better served by scrupulous worship of Himself than by just dealings with one's fellows, even if it is only made implicitly, has an enduring appeal: worship is easier than justice. But Amos has won a kind of victory, the only kind that is available: he has evoked the core values of his audience in a powerful and plausible way. He suggests an identification of the poor in Israel with the Israelite slaves in Egypt, and so makes justice the primary religious demand. Why else did God deliver the people, *this people*, from the house of bondage?

5

Amos' prophecy is social criticism because it challenges the leaders, the conventions, the ritual practices of a particular society and because it does so in the name of values recognized and shared

in that same society.²² I have already distinguished this sort of prophecy from the sort represented by Jonah in Nineveh: Jonah is a mere messenger who makes no appeal to social values, though he may appeal, without saying so, to a minimal code, a kind of international law. He isn't a missionary, carrying with him an alternative doctrine; he doesn't try to convert the people of Nineveh to Israel's religion, to bring them into the Sinai covenant. He just represents the minimal code (and God, its minimal author, who can have for the Ninevans none of the historical specificity that he has for the Israelites). We can think of Jonah as a minimalist critic; we don't really know what sorts of changes he required in the life of Nineveh, but they were presumably nowhere near so extensive as those required by Amos in Israel.

What makes the difference is Amos' membership. His criticism goes deeper than Jonah's because he knows the fundamental values of the men and women he criticizes (or because he tells them a plausible story about which of their values ought to be fundamental). And since he in turn is recognized as one of them, he can call them back to their "true" path. He suggests reforms that they can undertake while still remaining fellow members of the same society. Amos can, of course, be read differently: the prophecies of doom are so powerful and unrelenting that, on some interpretations, they overwhelm any possible argument for repentance and reform. And then the pleas for justice and the promises of divine comfort at the end seem unconvincing — as if they come (as many commentators believe, at least of the promises) from another hand.²³ The animating passion of the book as a whole, however, is surely a deep concern for "the hurt of

²²It is useful to compare this account of prophecy with Raymond Geuss's preferred version (it isn't the only version) of critical theory: "A critical theory is addressed to members of *this* particular social group . . . it describes *their* epistemic principles and *their* ideal of the 'good life' and demonstrates that some belief they hold is reflectively unacceptable for agents who hold their epistemic principles and a source of frustration for agents who are trying to realize this particular kind of 'good life,'" *Idea of a Critical Theory*, p. 63 (emphasis in the original).

²³May, *Amos*, pp. 164-65, but see McKeating, *Amos, Hosea, Micah*, pp. 69-70.

Joseph,” a powerful sense of solidarity, a commitment to the covenant that makes Israel . . . Israel. It isn’t only his anger but also his concern and commitment that make Amos a critic. He aims at an internal reformation that will bring the new oppression of Israel, or of poor and needy Israelites, to an end. That is the social meaning he has in mind when he repeats (or anticipates) the Deuteronomic injunction, “Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live” (5:15; cf. Deut. 30:15-20).

Amos also prophesies, as we have seen, against nations other than Israel. Here he is a critic from the outside, like Jonah, and he limits himself to external behavior, violations of some sort of international law. I don’t mean to suggest, however, that the provisions of Israel’s covenant have no general validity. No doubt, one could abstract universal rules from them — above all, one universal rule: *don’t oppress the poor* (for oppression is, as Weber writes, “the pre-eminent vice” in the eyes of the Israelite prophets).²⁴ And then one could judge and condemn the oppression of Syrians, or Philistines, or Moabites by their avaricious fellows in the same way that the prophets judge and condemn the oppression of Israelites. But not, in fact, in the same way; not with the same words, images, references; not with regard to the same practices and religious principles. For the power of a prophet like Amos derives from his ability to say what oppression means, how it is experienced, in this time and place, and to explain how it is connected with other features of a shared social life. Amos has an argument to make about oppression and religious observance, for example, and it is one of his chief arguments: that it is entirely possible to trample upon the poor and to observe the Sabbath. And from this he concludes that the laws against oppression take precedence over the Sabbath laws. The hierarchy is specific; it invites the prophet’s listeners to remember that one of the purposes of the Sabbath was “that thy manservant and thy maid-

²⁴ *Ancient Judaism*, p. 281.

servant may rest as well as thou” (Deut. 5:14). Prophecy would have little life, and little effect, if it could not evoke memories of this sort. We might think of it then as an academic exercise. In a strange country, Amos would resemble Samson in Gaza. Not eyeless, but tongueless: he might indeed see the oppression, but he would not be able to give it a name or speak about it to the hearts of the people.

Of course, other nations can read and admire the Israelite prophets, translate the prophecies into their own language (footnoting the references), and find analogies in their own society for the practices the prophets condemn. Just how wide the actual range of reading and admiration is, I am not sure. It obviously doesn’t coincide with the possible range, and it may well be limited to those nations whose history is in some significant sense continuous with the history of Israel. In principle, though, it could extend further than that. What would it mean if it did? It’s unlikely, I think, that what distant readers would learn from the prophets would be a set of abstract rules — or, again, a single rule: *don’t oppress the poor*. If they knew what oppression was (if they could translate the Hebrew word *’ashok*), they would already know that much. The rule, though it might have different references and applications, would be familiar. More likely, distant readers would be moved to imitate the practice of prophecy (or, perhaps, to listen in a new way to their own prophets). It is the practice, not the message, that would be repeated. Readers might learn to be social critics; the criticism, however, would be their own. Indeed, the message would have to be different if the practice was to be the same — else it would lack the historical reference and moral specificity that prophecy (and social criticism) requires.

The case is different with regard to Amos’ prophecies against the nations. Here it is precisely the message, the minimal code, that gets repeated: don’t violate treaties, don’t kill innocent women and children, don’t transport whole nations into involun-

tary exile. Confirmed from many sides, these rules are incorporated into a law of nations that isn't all that more extensive than the "international" law of Amos' time. But their prophetic utterance is quickly forgotten. For the utterance is a mere assertion and not an interpretation or elaboration of the law; reference and specificity, though Amos provides a brief version of both, are in fact unnecessary. Can a useful distinction be drawn between these two sorts of rules — those against violence and those against oppression? The two have the same linguistic form; each of them extends toward the other and there will always be considerable overlap between them. The minimal code is relevant to and presumably plays a part in the development of more substantive social values; and then the code itself takes on some particular form depending on how those values develop. And yet the two are not the same. The rules against violence arise from the experience of international as well as internal relations, the rules against oppression from internal relations alone. The first regulate our contacts with all humanity, strangers as well as citizens; the second regulate only our common life. The first are stereotyped in form and application; they are set against a background of standard expectations, based on a narrow range of standard experiences (war the most prominent among them). The second are complex in form and various in application; they are set against a background of multiple and conflicting expectations, rooted in a long and dense social history. The first tend toward universality, the second toward particularity.

It is a mistake, then, to praise the prophets for their universalist message. For what is most admirable about them is their particularist quarrel, which is also, they tell us, God's quarrel, with the children of Israel. Here they invested their anger and their poetic genius. The line that Amos attributes to God, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth," could have come from his own heart. He knows one nation, one history, and it's that knowledge that makes his criticism so rich, so radical, so

concrete. We can, again, abstract the rules and apply them to other nations, but that's not the "use" that Amos invites. What he invites is not application but reiteration. Each nation can have its own prophecy, just as it has its own history, its own deliverance, its own quarrel with God.

Have I not brought up Israel out of
the land of Egypt,
And the Philistines from Caphtor,
And Aram from Kir? [9:7]

DISSENT

Anti-Semitism and the Left that Doesn't Learn

Books

By Mitchell Cohen

I.

A DETERMINED offensive is underway. Its target is in the Middle East, and it is an old target: the legitimacy of Israel. Hezbollah and Hamas are not the protagonists, the contested terrains are not the Galilee and southern Lebanon or southern Israel and Gaza. The means are not military. The offensive comes from within parts of the liberal and left intelligentsia in the United States and Europe. It has nothing to do with this or that negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians, and it has nothing to do with any particular Israeli policy. After all, this or that Israeli policy may be chastised, rightly or wrongly, without denying the legitimacy of the Jewish state, just as you can criticize an Israeli policy—again, rightly or wrongly—without being an anti-Semite. You can oppose all Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (as I do) and you can also recognize that Benjamin Netanyahu, not just Yasir Arafat, was responsible for undermining the Oslo peace process without being an anti-Semite or anti-Zionist. You don't have to be an anti-Semite or anti-Zionist to think that some American Jewish organizations pander to American or Israeli right-wingers.

The assault today is another matter. It is shaped largely by political attitudes and arguments that recall the worst of the twentieth-century left. It is time to get beyond them. But let me be clear: I am "left." I still have no problem when someone describes me with the "s" word—socialist—although I don't much care if you call me a social democrat, left-liberal, or some other proximate term. My "leftism" comes from a commitment to—and an ethos of—democratic humanism and social egalitarianism.

What I care about is the reinvention of the best values of the historical left—legacies of British Labour, of the Swedish Social Democrats, of Jean Jaurès and Léon Blum in France, of Eduard Bernstein and Willy Brandt in Germany, of what has always been the relatively small (alas!) tribe in the U.S. associated with names like Eugene V. Debs, Norman Thomas, Michael Harrington, and Irving Howe. It's not so much a matter of political programs, let alone labels, as it is of political sensibility. I care about finding a new basis for that old amalgam of liberty, equality, and solidarity, a basis that makes sense for our "globalizing age." But I also want a left that draws real, not gestural, conclusions from the catastrophes done in the name of the left in the 20th century.

There is a left that learns and there is a left that doesn't learn. I want the left that learns to inform our Western societies (a difficult task in George W. Bush's America) and to help find ideas that actually address poverty in what used to be called the third world—rather than romanticizing it.

After 1989, the left that doesn't learn was in retreat. It was hushed up by the end of all

those wretched communist regimes, by images broadcast worldwide of millions in the streets demanding liberation from dictatorships that legitimized themselves in left-wing terms. You know who I mean by the left that never learns: those folks who twist and turn until they can explain or ‘understand’ almost anything in order to keep their own presuppositions—or intellectual needs—intact. Once some of them were actual Leninist; now they more regularly share some of Leninism’s worst mental features—often in postmodern, postcolonial, or even militantly liberal guise. Sometimes they move about on the political spectrum, denouncing their former selves (while patting their moral backs). You can usually recognize them without too much difficulty: same voice, that of a prosecuting commissar, even if their tune sounds different. It’s a voice you can often hear as well in ex-communists turned neoconservative.

Their explanations, their “understandings,” often rewrite history or re-imagine what is in front of their eyes to suit their own starting point. Since their thinking usually moves along a mental closed circuit, it is also the end point. Sometimes it is an idea, sometimes a belief system (which they refuse to recognize in themselves), sometimes really a prejudice, and sometimes just ambition. Goblins were often part of the story for the older left that never learned, and so too is the case today. If things don’t work out as you know they must, some nefarious force must lurk. After all, the problem couldn’t possibly be your way of thinking, or your inability to see the world afresh, or that you got something very wrong in the past. No, it is much easier to announce that you, unlike anyone who could disagree with you, engage in ‘critical’ thinking. And if your critical thinking is criticized in any way, denounce your foe immediately for “McCarthyism.” Pretend that your denunciation is an argument about the original subject of dispute. That’s easier than answering any of the criticism.

Consider the collateral damage done by such cries of “McCarthyism” from professors with lifetime job security: their students will never understand the evils of McCarthyism. Consider how an understanding of the evils of McCarthyism is subverted when its characteristic techniques—innuendo, for example—are used by opinionated journalists in magazines with wide circulations. Take, for instance, the case of Adam Shatz, once literary editor of the *Nation* and now with the *London Review of Books*. He published an article half a year before the beginning of the Iraq war suggesting that people around *Dissent* were busy hunting for a “new enemy” following the end of the cold war, and that they found it in a combination of militant Arab nationalism and Saddam Hussein.

“Though rarely cited explicitly,” Shatz also explained, “Israel shapes and even defines the foreign policy views of a small but influential group of American liberals” (the *Nation*, September 23, 2002). In other words, these liberals composed the Israel lobby within the left, and they sought the American war in Iraq for the sake of the Jewish state. True, Shatz didn’t hold up a file and say, “I have a list of names of liberals who are really dual loyalists.” Instead he pointed to Paul Berman “and like-minded social democrats,” even though the overwhelming majority of *Dissent*’s editorial board including co-editor Michael Walzer was opposed to the war.

Shatz didn’t deign to engage any of Berman’s actual points. And those Berman advanced in the actual run-up to the Iraq invasion did not focus on Israel, but on liberalism, democracy, and totalitarianism. Arguments made by the author of the words you now read, who was a left hawk (and is now an unhappy one), likewise had nothing to do with Israel and were different—significantly so—from those made by Berman. Nothing that appeared in *Dissent* before or after Shatz’s article lends credence to his innuendos.

II.

HISTORY MAY not progress but sometimes it regurgitates. Over the last decade, a lot of the old junk has come back. The space for it opened for many reasons. They range from the sad failures of the social-democratic imagination in the era of globalization to the postmodern and postcolonial influence in universities to George W. Bush's ascendancy with its many, many miserable consequences (not only in Iraq). The left that never learns often became the superego of the twentieth century's left. Its attempt to play that same role in the twenty-first century needs to be frustrated.

Nothing exemplifies the return of old junk more than the 'new' anti-Semitism and the bad faith that often finds expression in the statement: "I am anti-Zionist but not anti-Semitic." The fixation on Israel/Palestine within parts of the left, often to the exclusion of all other suffering on the globe, ought to leave any balanced observer wondering: What is going on here? This fixation needs demystification.

In theoretical terms, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are pretty easy to distinguish. Anti-Semitism is a form of race or national prejudice that crystallized in the nineteenth century. In part, it displaced or reinvented anti-Jewish religious prejudice (although centuries of religious prejudice easily wafted into racial and national bigotry). Its target was clearly Jews, not simply "Semites." It also, for some, mixed matters up further by identifying Jews with capitalism. Sadly, this became a steady feature within parts of the left that would later, habitually, conflate Jews, capitalism, and Zionism. Oddly enough, that is also what Jewish neoconservatives have tried to do in recent decades.

Anti-Zionism means, theoretically, opposition to the project of a Jewish state in response to the rise of anti-Semitism. Let's be blunt: there have been anti-Zionists who are not anti-Semites, just as there have been foes of affirmative action who are not racists. But the crucial question is prejudicial overlap, not intellectual niceties.

Remember the bad old days, when parts of the left provided theoretical justifications of things like "democratic dictatorship." In fact, if you understood—especially if you bought into—all sorts of assumptions and especially Leninist definitions, the justification works. Any professor of political theory can construct it for you and it will make perfect theoretical sense. But if you lived in a "democratic dictatorship," it was intellectual poison. It was also poison if you were committed to the best values of the left.

They are again at stake when we ask: To what extent does much anti-Zionism replicate the mental patterns of anti-Semitism? And to what extent do demagogic articulations of anti-Zionism enhance anti-Semitism? There is a curious thing about anti-Semitism, and it was captured in a remark by British novelist Iain Pears that ought to be quoted and re-quoted these days: "anti-Semitism is like alcoholism. You can go for 25 years without a drink, but if things go bad and you find yourself with a vodka in your hand, you can't get rid of it." (*International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 2003).

Much may be gleaned from the fact that the recent campaign by some British academic unions to boycott Israel was thwarted because it was found to violate anti-discrimination laws.

LAST YEAR, Denis MacShane, British Labour Parliament Member, chaired a committee of parliamentarians and ex-ministers that investigated rising [anti-Semitism in Britain](#) and beyond. “Hatred of Jews has reached new heights in Europe and many points south and east of the old continent,” he wrote recently in a very brave article in the *Washington Post* (September 4, 2007). He describes a wide array of incidents. “Militant anti-Jewish students fueled by Islamist or far-left hate” seek on campuses “to prevent Jewish students from expressing their opinions.” There is “an anti-Jewish discourse, a mood and tone whenever Jews are discussed, whether in the media, at universities, among the liberal media elite or at dinner parties of modish London. To express any support for Israel or any feeling for the right of a Jewish state to exist produces denunciation, even contempt.”

MacShane points out that this sort of behavior is distinct from specific disputes about this or that Israeli politician. Criticism, the investigatory committee “made clear,” was “not off-limits.” Rightly so; the same should be true with the policies and office-holders of every government on the globe. But MacShane also warns that something else has been going on, that old demons are reawakening and that “the old anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism have morphed into something more dangerous.” The threat, he says eloquently, doesn’t only concern Jews or Israel, but “everything democrats have long fought for: the truth without fear, no matter one’s religion or political beliefs.” What is “truth without fear” when we speak of the relation between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism? Is it to be found in Tony Judt’s declaration to the *New York Times* that “the link between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is newly created”? (January 31, 2007). How a historian—or anyone else—could assert this is astonishing. Consider what it airbrushes out of the twentieth century—the anti-Semitic binge of Stalin’s later years, just for starters.

And surely Judt, who is based at New York University and is now taking what has turned into obsessive anti-Zionist campaigning to the École Normale Supérieure in Paris [\[1\]](#) recalls the arrests and assassinations of the leading Jewish cultural figures of Soviet Russia on the grounds that they were “Zionist agents of American imperialism.” Surely a historian of Europe like Judt—who was once a hard leftist but then rose to intellectual celebrity in the United States in the 1980s (that is, during the Reagan era) by attacking all French Marxists for not facing up to Stalinism—recalls the charges of “Zionist conspiracy” against Jewish communists who were victimized in the Czech purge trials in the early 1950s.

If he doesn’t recall them when he speaks to the *New York Times*, he might check them out in his own book *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. There he cites Stalin’s secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, urging Czech Communists to investigate the “Zionist plot” among their comrades. Surely a historian of Europe, especially one who now refers to himself as an “old leftist,” recalls the campaign in 1967 and 1968 to cleanse Poland of “Zionist” fifth columnists (I suppose they were the Israel Lobby of the Polish Communist Party). If Judt doesn’t recall it when he talks to the *New York Times*, he might again look at his own book which cites Polish Communist chief Wladyslaw Gomulka’s conflation of his Jewish critics with Zionists. Since he is a historian of Europe and not the Middle East, perhaps Judt hasn’t noticed how “anti-Zionism” in broad swaths of the Muslim and Arab media has been suffused by anti-Jewish rhetoric for decades—rhetoric against “al-Yahud” not Ehud Olmert or Ehud Barak.

Remember how air-brushing was done in the bad old days? Trotsky (or someone else) would suddenly disappear from a photo. Lenin or Stalin and the cheering crowds would still be there. The resulting picture is not entirely false. Does all this make Judt an anti-Semite? The answer is simple: no. It does make his grasp of the history of anti-Semitism tendentious. And tendentious history can be put to all sorts of pernicious use.

Judt's political judgment complements his historical perceptions, especially when it comes to a declared concern about Palestinian suffering. Recall his article in the *New York Review of Books* (October 23, 2003) advocating a binational state to replace Israel. A Jewish state, he explained, is an anachronism. But since then, Hamas, a political movement of religious fanatics, won the Palestinian elections, and later seized power—by force—in Gaza. Israel, in the meantime, had withdrawn entirely from Gaza and torn down all Jewish settlements there in summer 2005. Yet if you follow Judt's logic, Israel should not have withdrawn but instead integrated Gaza into itself. Obviously this would have enabled a new, better life for Palestinians, perhaps even have prevented them from turning to Hamas. And it would have taken a first happy step toward saving Israel from its anachronistic status by affording Israelis, together with Palestinians, a domestic future of perpetual ethnic civil war—a feature of modern politics that farsighted historians, but perhaps not policymakers, who have to worry about real lives, will imagine is also an anachronism. Likewise, I suppose India can save itself from being an unfortunate anachronism by a reintegration with Pakistan.

A FEW YEARS ago I sought to outline commonalities between anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist discourses in a scholarly journal. It is worth reproducing. Here are major motifs that inform classical anti-Semitism:

- 1) **Insinuations:** Jews do not and cannot fit properly into our society. There is something foreign, not to mention sinister about them.
- 2) **Complaints:** They are so particularistic, those Jews, so preoccupied with their “own.” Why are they so clannish and anachronistic when we need a world of solidarity and love? Really, they make themselves into a “problem.” If the so-called “Jewish problem” is singular in some way, it is their own doing and usually covered up by special pleading.
- 3) **Remonstrations:** Those Jews, they always carp that they are victims. In fact, they have vast power, especially financial power. Their power is everywhere, even if it is not very visible. They exercise it manipulatively, behind the scenes. (But look, there are even a few of them, guilty-hearted perhaps, who will admit it all this to you).
- 4) **Recriminations:** Look at their misdeeds, all done while they cry that they are victims. These ranged through the ages from the murder of God to the ritual slaughter of children to selling military secrets to the enemy to war-profiteering, to being capitalists or middlemen or landlords or moneylenders exploiting the poor. And they always, oh-so-cleverly, mislead you.

Alter a few phrases, a word here and there, and we find motifs of anti-Zionism that are popular these days in parts of the left and parts of the Muslim and Arab worlds:

1) **Insinuations:** The Zionists are alien implants in the Mideast. They can never fit there. Western imperialism created the Zionist state.

2) **Complaints:** A Jewish state can never be democratic. Zionism is exclusivist. The very idea of a Jewish state is an anachronism.

3) **Remonstrations:** The Zionists carp that they are victims but in reality they have enormous power, especially financial. Their power is everywhere, but they make sure not to let it be too visible. They exercise it manipulatively, behind people's backs, behind the scenes – why, just look at Zionist influence in Washington. Or rather, dominance of Washington. (And look, there are even a few Jews, guilty-hearted perhaps, who admit it).

4) **Recriminations:** Zionists are responsible for astonishing, endless dastardly deeds. And they cover them up with deceptions. These range from the imperialist aggression of 1967 to Ehud Barak's claim that he offered a compromise to Palestinians back in 2000 to the Jenin "massacre" during the second Intifadah. [2]

No, anti-Zionism is not in principle anti-Semitism but it is time for thoughtful minds—especially on the left—to be disturbed by how much anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism share, how much the dominant species of anti-Zionism encourages anti-Semitism.

And so:

If you judge a Jewish state by standards that you apply to no one else; if your neck veins bulge when you denounce Zionists but you've done no more than cluck "well, yes, very bad about Darfur";

if there is nothing Hamas can do that you won't blame 'in the final analysis' on Israelis;

if your sneer at the Zionists doesn't sound a whole lot different from American neoconservative sneers at leftists;

then you should not be surprised if you are criticized, fiercely so, by people who are serious about a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians and who won't let you get away with a self-exonerating formula—"I am anti-Zionist but not anti-Semitic"—to prevent scrutiny. If you are anti-Zionist and not anti-Semitic, then don't use the categories, allusions, and smug hiss that are all too familiar to any student of prejudice.

It is time for the left that learns, that grows, that reflects, that has historical not rhetorical perspective, and that wants a future based on its own best values to say loudly to the left that never learns: You hijacked "left" in the last century, but you won't get away with it again whatever guise you don.

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] NYU's Remarque Center, which defines its goal as "the study and discussion of Europe, and to encourage and facilitate communication between Americans and Europeans" is opening a center there and Judd, its director, will,

according to its website, inaugurate it not with an address European or French politics or transatlantic relations but rather: "Is Israel Still Good for the Jews?"

[2] These sketches of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, with just some variation, were originally in Mitchell Cohen, "Auto-Emancipation and Anti-Semitism: Homage to Bernard-Lazare," *Jewish Social Studies* (Fall 2003).



Building a Political Firewall Against Israel's Delegitimization Conceptual Framework

Version A

Submitted to the
10th Herzliya Conference

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Glossary / Concepts

Use-of-Military-Force Doctrine²	Operating principles for the optimization of military resources in the service of military defense or offense.
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Doctrine	Cluster of operating principles for the optimization of political and diplomatic resources to ensure Israel's basic legitimacy and advance its international status in the political, economic, trade, and academic arenas.
Security and Foreign Policy Doctrine	Cluster of military, security, political, and diplomatic principles to ensure the state's existence, the personal safety of its citizens and residents, and its identity.
National Security Doctrine	Cluster of principles relating to the preservation and development of the state's overall security and well being. This doctrine comprises security and foreign policy principles, as well as strategic issues such as demography and human capital, environment, technology, and infrastructure.
Conceptual Superiority / Inferiority	A situation in which one side's conceptual system and operating principles prove more relevant and effective than that of the other. This enables the former to achieve greater operational success and often overcome quantitative inferiority.
Resistance Network	A network of countries, organizations, movements, and individuals – which includes, <i>inter alia</i> , Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and additional Palestinian factions – that reject the Jewish people's right to self-determination and Israel's existence, on the basis of Islamic or Arab / Palestinian nationalist ideology. These groups operate with the political or military logic of 'resistance' in order to precipitate Israel's destruction and replace it with an Arab / Palestinian / Islamic state.
Convergence Phenomenon	The coalescence of unaffiliated movements and organizations around an outstanding issue relating to Israel in order to delegitimize Israel.

² By 'doctrine' we mean a body of principles or strategies established explicitly by a statement of fundamental government policy or through past decisions. For further reference, see: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine>.

Fundamental Legitimacy	Legitimacy of a sovereign entity's right of being. Israel's fundamental legitimacy was recognized by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (11/29/1947) and by the ensuing recognition by leading nations.
Israel's Fundamental Delegitimization / Anti-Zionism³	Negation of Israel's right to exist or of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination based on philosophical or political arguments (for a list of the arguments, see chapter 4). When certain conditions are met – such as when demonization or blatant double-standards (see below) are employed – fundamental delegitimization represents form of anti-Semitism.
Demonization	Presenting Israel as being systematically, purposefully, and extensively cruel and inhumane, thus denying the moral legitimacy of its existence. Examples include association with Nazism or apartheid or accusations of blatant acts of evil.
Double Standards / Singling Out	Applying a unique and unjustified standard to Israel which is harsher than the common international practice; expressing frequent and disproportional criticism of Israel, which deviates in scope and character from criticism of other countries in similar contexts; applying a general principle of international law or human rights to Israel, while ignoring similar or worse violations by other countries.
Two-State Solution	A framework for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by partition of the former area of Mandatory Palestine into two separate nation states based on the principle of two-states-for-two-peoples. This framework was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947.
One-State Solution	A framework for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that calls for establishing one bi-national state in the former area of Mandatory Palestine, where all residents Jews and Palestinians would share political power on the basis of the principle of 'one person, one vote.' This framework requires the dissolution of Israel as the expression of the Jewish people's right for self-determination.

³ For more on these definitions, see Denis McShane et. al. **The All Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism**, (the Stationary Office 2006); Natan Sharansky, 3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization, **Jerusalem Political Studies Review**, Fall 2004, and Irwin Cotler, [Identifying the New Anti-Semitism](#) Jewish People Policy Planning Institute.

**Israel's Foreign
Affairs
Establishment**

Cluster of Israeli government offices and agencies entrusted with formal international relationships, including: the Bureau of the Prime Minister; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; units within the Ministry of Defense; Foreign Trade Administration of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Labor; International Department of the Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Tourism; and intelligence agencies.

**Technical
Problem**

A situation in which the challenge is clearly defined, as is the response, within the framework of existing expertise and knowledge.⁴

**Adaptive
Challenge**

A challenge requiring a change in mindset, values, or models of behavior. Existing experience and routine procedures are insufficient and a process of learning and adaptation is essential.⁵

⁴ Ronald Heifetz, **Leadership without Easy Answers** (Harvard University Press 2003), p. 74

⁵ Ibid. p. 35

Executive Summary

Background and Introduction

1. **In the past few years, Israel has been subjected to increasingly harsh criticism around the world, resulting in an erosion of its international image, and exacting a tangible strategic price.** The Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the 'engine' driving this criticism, which peaked with and around the Goldstone report on Operation Cast Lead. In some places, criticism has stretched beyond legitimate discourse regarding Israeli policy to a fundamental challenge to the country's right to exist.
2. **Two forces and dynamics link these phenomena and the frustrating outcomes of the Second Lebanon War (07/06) and Operation Cast Lead (01/09):**
 - **The Resistance Network**, based in the Middle East – and comprising nations, organizations, and individuals – rejects Israel's right to exist on the basis of Islamist or Arab-nationalist ideology under the leadership of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas;
 - **The Delegitimization Network**, primarily comprising organizations and individuals in the West – mostly elements of the radical European left, Arab and Islamic groups, and so-called post or anti-Zionist Jews and Israelis – negate Israel's right to exist based on a variety of political and philosophical arguments.

Both groups derive their inspiration from the collapse of the Soviet Union, East Germany, or apartheid South Africa.

Diagnosis: Systemic and Systematic Assault on Israel's Political Model

3. Israel's recent diplomatic and military frustrations are driven by the maturation of two parallel processes:
 - **The Resistance Network advances the 'implosion strategy'** that aims to precipitate Israel's collapse based on three principles: 'Overstretching' Israel by undermining attempts to end its control over the Palestinian population; delegitimizing Israel; and conducting asymmetric warfare in the battlefield and against Israel's civilian population to counter IDF military superiority;
 - **The Delegitimization Network** that aims to supersede the Zionist model with a state that is based on the 'one person, one vote' principle by turning Israel into a pariah state and by challenging the moral legitimacy of its authorities and existence.
4. **The dynamics of each of these processes derive from a set of ideas that are increasingly sophisticated, ripe, lucid, and coherent**, even if inconsistencies persist and debates continue, and notwithstanding that the above-mentioned logic has not matured into a 'strategy' that has operational objectives, timelines, or milestones.

5. **Asymmetrical approaches of Israel and its delegitimizers to Israel's fundamental legitimacy:**

- Israel tends to work 'from the center to the periphery' or 'top-down,' emphasizing formal relations with political and business elites; focusing on mainstream media; and often being guided by the mindset that "if you are not with me you are against me"; meanwhile
- Israel's delegitimizers work 'from the periphery to the center' and 'bottom-up,' focusing on non-governmental organizations, academia, grassroots movements, and the general public; using social networks over the internet; and being guided by the mindset that "if you are not against me, you are with me."

Hence, while Israel's formal diplomatic position remains relatively strong and solid, its standing among the general publics and elites is eroded.

6. **The effectiveness of Israel's delegitimizers, who represent a relatively marginal political and societal force in Europe and North America, stems from their ability to engage and mobilize others by blurring the lines with Israel's critics.** They do so by branding Israel as a pariah and 'apartheid' state; rallying coalitions around 'outstanding issues' such as the 'Gaza blockade'; making pro-Palestinian activity trendy; and promoting grassroots activities such as boycotts, divestments, and sanctions (BDS) as a way to 'correct Israel's ways.'
7. **The maturation and convergence of these two processes is exacerbating Israel's predicament in the Palestinian arena:**
- While the Resistance Network undermines the separation between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the Two-State Solution;
 - The Delegitimization Network tarnishes Israel's reputation, constrains its military capabilities, and advances the One-State Solution.
8. **The Resistance Network and Israel's delegitimizers leverage the Palestinian condition to advance their cause,** yet they do *not* seek its resolution or accept ideas such as 'co-existence' or 'peace' that embody an acceptance of Israel's existence. Their objectives dictate that any compromise with Israel should be temporary, and even borders that are based on the June 4, 1967 lines would only be provisional.
9. **A tipping point in this context would be a paradigm shift from the Two-State Solution to the One-State Solution** as the consensual framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
10. **Clearly, an Israeli and Palestinian comprehensive Permanent Status Agreement** that establishes a Palestinian state and brings about an 'end of conflict' or 'finality of claims' **would weaken the grounds of Israel's delegitimization. However, even given such an agreement, the logic of the delegitimization campaign would persist.**

11. **The issue of Israel's Arab citizens may become the next 'outstanding issue' driving delegitimization in the event that an Israeli-Palestinian Permanent Status Agreement is secured.** In fact, the Resistance Network has already attempted to mobilize this community albeit with very limited success.

Here too, **credible and persistent commitment for full integration and equality of Israel's Arab citizens would weaken the grounds of Israel's delegitimizers, but will not end their campaign**, whose logic is rooted in challenging Israel's existence and not its policies.

12. **Similarly, while public relations (*Hasbara*) are critically important, they cannot and will not neutralize the delegitimizers.**
13. Therefore, Israel is likely to experience setbacks in its attempts to ensure its security and identity, which merges its Jewish and democratic character, unless it is able to meet the challenge of Israel's fundamental delegitimization effectively.

Prognosis: Strategic Challenge, Potentially Existential

14. **Israel faces a systemic, systematic, and increasingly effective assault on its political and economic model. Its inadequate response reflects a crisis in its foreign policy and security doctrine, as well as its conceptual inferiority.**
15. **Strategic implications are already apparent:** Increased international interference in Israel's domestic affairs; greater limitations on Israel's ability to use its military force; economic boycotts and sanctions; and travel restrictions on officers, officials, and politicians due to application of universal legal jurisdiction (known as lawfare). In addition, in many places Israel has been successfully branded by its adversaries as a pariah state that deserves the fate of South Africa's apartheid regime.
16. **The working assumptions underlying Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine – viewing military capabilities as the only potential existential threat facing Israel – have stagnated for decades.** These assumptions yield the conclusion that the security establishment constitutes Israel's primary response mechanism, and resources are allocated accordingly.
17. **Meanwhile, Israel's foreign affairs establishment is ill-structured and ill-equipped:** Resources are meager: budgets are scarce and diplomats are few in number; there is no clear responsibility for key foreign policy issues, and thus no clear policy; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is organized according to geographic regions and designed to operate vis-à-vis countries, and therefore lacks the ability to wage a global campaign on the non-governmental level.
18. **Hence, there is a mismatch between Israel's foreign policy and security doctrine, on the one hand, and the challenge Israel faces in the diplomatic and political arena, on the other hand.**
19. **Such political, diplomatic, and economic dynamics may pose an existential threat.** They have brought down militarily powerful nations, some of them even nuclear superpowers. With the effective mobilization against apartheid South

Africa as inspiration, and given the significant strides they have made against Israel, the Resistance Network and Israel's delegitimizers are increasingly emboldened.

20. Hence, **Israel's diplomacy and foreign policy doctrine requires urgent overhaul.**

Treatment: Policy Directions

21. **This document focuses on Israel's structural response to its delegitimization.** Its scope does *not* cover a discussion of closely related issues such as Israel's policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians or its Arab citizens; the battle of narratives, i.e. the substantive response to delegitimizers' arguments; or the relation between Israel's delegitimization and anti-Semitism.
22. **Neither changing policy nor improving public relations will suffice in the battle against delegitimization.** Clearly, a credible and persistent commitment by Israel to reaching peace and ending control over the Palestinian population, as well as to full integration and equality of Israel's Arab citizens, are essential for effectively battling Israel's delegitimization. In addition, *hasbara* has great significance in articulating Israel's positions. Nonetheless, the logic of delegitimization stems from a rejection of Israel's existence, and therefore can not be made to disappear by PR or policy.
23. **Israel's foreign policy and security doctrine must seek 'synchronized victories'** in a number of arenas simultaneously, i.e. not just on the military front, but also on the home front, in politics and diplomacy, and in the media. As these arenas are intertwined within a complex system, they should be addressed as systemic whole.
24. **Faced with a potentially existential threat, Israel must treat it as such** by focusing its intelligence agencies on this challenge; allocating appropriate resources; developing new knowledge, designing a strategy, executing it; and debriefing itself.
25. **It takes a network to fight a network⁶** – The power of human networks is determined by their 'hubs' and 'catalysts':
 - Hubs are units of the network that have extraordinary influence on the values, priorities, and patterns of conduct of the network due to a very high number of links to other units;
 - Catalysts are units of the network that dedicate themselves to its cause by mobilizing financial and human resources, collecting information and turning it into knowledge, and developing the ideology.

⁶ This is a known principle in the world of networks. See: Dr. Boaz Ganor, **It Takes a Network to Beat a Network**; John Arquilla, **It Takes a Network**; or Dr. Pete Rustan, in **Building an Integral Intelligence Network**.

Hence, in order to effectively face the Delegitimization Network, **Israel must embrace a network-based logic and response by:**

- **Focusing on the hubs of delegitimization** – such as London, as well as potentially Paris, Toronto, Madrid, and the Bay Area – and on **undermining its catalysts;**
 - **Cultivating its own network by strengthening its hubs and developing its own catalysts.**
26. **Clash of brands: Israel's re-branding is strategically important.** As mentioned, Israel has been successfully branded by its adversaries as a violent country that violates international law and human rights. With such a brand, even the most outrageous accusations may stick. A different brand would not only make Israel's communication more effective, but would also make it more immune to attacks by its offenders. **Finally, it is equally important to brand the other side by** associating them with values that reflect their actions and reality.
 27. **Relationship-based diplomacy with elites** – The hearts and minds of the elites – individuals with influence, leadership, or authority – are the battleground between Israel and its foes. The most effective barrier against the spread of delegitimization in these communities is a network of strong personal relationships. Israel and its allies should maintain thousands of personal relationships with political, financial, cultural, media, and security-related elites, particularly in the hubs.
 28. **Engage the critics; isolate the delegitimizers** – Obviously, criticism of Israeli policy, even if harsh or unfair, is legitimate as long as it does not amount to demonization and delegitimization, and does not blatantly deploy double-standards. Often, Israeli government policy fails to differentiate between critics and delegitimizers, and thus, pushes the former into the arms of the latter. Reut recommends the opposite: Israel should engage its critics, while isolating the delegitimizers.
 29. **NGOs to engage with NGOs** – Israel's governmental agencies will have a hard time dealing effectively with non-governmental organizations that criticize Israel's policies. NGOs are more likely to do a better job in this respect. Many of them can be mobilized toward this task. In this context, it is particularly important that **the International Department of the Histadrut, Israel's labor union, be reinvigorated to engage labor unions around the world.**
 30. **Mobilizing Jewish and Israeli Diaspora communities; let the local pro-Israel community lead** – Israeli Diaspora, as well as Israelis who travel overseas, can be mobilized by Israel. Additionally, because Israel's delegitimization is often a modern form of anti-Semitism, Jewish communities can and should be mobilized toward this cause as well. Finally, the local pro-Israel community is more likely to have a nuanced understanding of the local dynamics and the appropriate response than the Israeli delegation.

31. **Re-organization of the foreign affairs establishment** – As mentioned, Israel's foreign policy establishment is ill-structured and ill-equipped to meet the challenge of delegitimization. Its meager resources fall short of the bare minimum, and its structure, mode of operation, incentive system, and human capital are not designed to meet this challenge. Hence, meeting the delegitimization challenge requires instituting a zero-based budget that is based on a comprehensive assessment of needs, as well as conducting a comprehensive reform within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Building a Political Firewall against Israel's Delegitimization⁷ A Conceptual Framework

Guidelines for Quick Reading / Note on English Translation

This document can be skimmed by reading the bolded phrases. Each paragraph contains only one idea, captured in the bolded sentences. Footnotes do *not* contain new ideas, but examples, sources, and references.

This document is a non-verbatim translation to English of the Hebrew original. It was adapted to a non-Israeli readership, and includes clarifications based on initial feedback that we received after the publication of the Hebrew version.

Background and Introduction

The Reut Institute: Fundamental Impact in the National Security Field

32. **The Reut Institute (Reut) is a non-profit organization founded to support Israel's adaptive process in meeting 21st century challenges.** Our mission is to sustain significant and substantive impact on the State of Israel. Our strategy is based on three pillars: Generating fundamental impact in subjects critical to Israel's prosperity and security; grooming a cadre of strategic leaders for positions of leadership, authority, and influence in the Israeli and Jewish public spheres; and serving as a model for the government's strategic planning branches.
33. **Reut's unique added value stems from its focus on Israel's strategic realms:** From our capacity to identify potential strategic opportunities or surprises presented to Israel, develop related knowledge, and mobilize communities of individuals in positions of authority, leadership, and influence to implement the required changes. For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix B of this paper.⁸
34. **This document represents the culmination of a team effort lasting several years.** Serving Israel's national security has been central to Reut's mission since its inception in January 2004. In this context, the Second Lebanon War in 2006 represented a turning point in our efforts, and this document constitutes a culmination of our work that aims to understand its dynamics and provide a response for the gaps exposed. Throughout this time, **the team leader has been**

⁷ Israel's National Security Council frames this challenge as The Global Campaign (*HaMa'aracha HaGlobalit* or MAGAL).

⁸ Also see: www.reut-institute.org.

Eran Shayshon, and other team members have included Calev Ben-Dor, Daphna Kaufman, Gil Murciano, Liran Bainvol, and Talia Gorodess.⁹

35. **Frustration with the conduct and outcome of the Second Lebanon War led the Government of Israel (GOI) to initiate a thorough internal examination.** The GOI established in the order of 63 different commissions of inquiry, mostly within the IDF, and including the famous Winograd Commission. Many of their recommendations have been implemented, and in some areas, such as in the home front arena, real transformations have occurred. Academic institutions, independent researchers, and journalists also contributed to this process.¹⁰
36. **In this vein, Reut also mobilized its resources** and its unique methodological tools in order to understand the events of summer 2006.
37. **Our conclusion was that the GOI did not fully explore the conceptual crisis that was exposed in 2006, and instead framed Israel's frustrations as an outcome of a confluence of technical problems.** These included the interface between the political and military echelons, as well as various aspects of the IDF's operations, such as in intelligence, logistics, preparedness, and command-and-control. Technical solutions were thus furnished for technical problems.
38. **As a result, Reut called for updating Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine in order to restore Israel's conceptual superiority over its adversaries.** The primary campaigns in this journey included:
 - **First campaign (11/06-04/07): Impacting the Winograd Commission** – During this period, Reut focused its efforts on impacting the conclusions and recommendations of the Winograd Commission by submitting three memorandums (04/07). These memorandums called for updating Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine and re-organizing the foreign affairs establishment.¹¹ While these issues were beyond the Commission's mandate, Reut hoped it would decide to focus on them nonetheless.

Ultimately (01/08), the Winograd Commission chose not to contend with conceptual issues of this nature, and included a non-binding

⁹ For greater detail, see the ["Team" section of the Reut Web site](#).

¹⁰ Four books provide illustrative examples: **Friendly Fire** by Amir Rappoport, **POW's in Lebanon – The Truth about the Second Lebanon War** by Ofer Shelach and Yoav Limor, **Spider Webs - The Story of the Second Lebanon War** by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, and **War Story, Love Story** by Gal Hirsh.

A prominent multi-faceted project dealing with this topic was carried out by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) led by researchers such as General (Res.) Giora Eiland, Dr. Gabriel Siboni, Brigadier General (Res.) Shlomo Brom, Michael Milstein, Dr. Meir Elran, and Ron Tira. See for example: Ron Tira, **The Struggle over the Nature of War**, Memorandum No. 96, Tel Aviv: INSS; or Meir Elran and Shlomo Brom, **The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions**, Yediot Aharonot. See also a document by Council for Peace and Security, [Analysis of Second Lebanon War: Events, Mishaps, and Failures](#), 06/06/09 (Hebrew).

¹¹ See Reut Memos to Winograd: [Updating Israel's National Security Strategy](#), [Strategic Support Unit for the Prime Minister](#), and [Re-organization of Foreign Policy in Israel's National Security Strategy](#).

recommendation to reassess Israel's national security concept. The Commission did, however, institutionalize an obligation for the Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consult on the issue of national security in order to improve the synergy between military, political, and diplomatic considerations.

- **Second campaign (10/07-9/08): To precipitate a 'Seminar'** – During this period, Reut aimed to encourage a reassessment of the fundamental assumptions underlying Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine through a new 'Seminar' in the spirit of Ben-Gurion's 'Self Seminar' in 1947 (see below). Reut presented its work to bodies within the security establishment and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), but this effort did not bear fruit either.
- **Third campaign (11/08 to present): Proposing a conceptual framework** – Once new elections were announced in Israel, Reut decided to design its own conceptual framework in key arenas:
 - **The political-diplomatic arena**, in which the delegitimization threat is strategic, and that serves as the focus of this document;
 - **The home-front arena**, in which Israel is vulnerable to local collapses in the event of a national crisis.¹²

Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead Exposed Strength of Delegitimization

39. **In recent years, a significant gap has been exposed between Israel's status among the world's political leaders, on the one hand, and within civil society, on the other.**
 - **On the surface, Israel's political standing in the international community appears to be strong** – Despite criticism of Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue and regarding its Arab citizens, Israel is one of the U.S.'s closest allies; holds a unique relationship with Germany; maintains close ties with all leading countries including the UK, France, Italy, Russia, Australia, and Canada; has signed peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan; enjoys relative quiet on its borders with Lebanon and Gaza; and is expected to join the OECD as early as summer 2010;
 - **In parallel, Israel is under continuous attack within the same countries with which it maintains close relations** – In recent years, Israel has been subjected to an assault on the very legitimacy of its existence. For example, this year saw several attempts to advance academic boycotts against Israel in the UK,¹³ there was an attempt to boycott the Toronto Film Festival

¹² See Reut Institute document written in collaboration with the Israel Trauma Coalition (initiated by the UJA-Federation of New York) – [Civil Resilience Network: Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local and National Resilience](#).

¹³ See: Canaan Liphshiz, [Haaretz](#), 10/20/09.

because it thematically spotlighted Tel Aviv,¹⁴ and Belgian municipalities boycotted a bank due to its business dealings in Israel.

40. **This erosion of Israel's standing already has strategic implications**, such as in compromising its freedom to use military force even when provoked or attacked, increasing international involvement in the status of the country's Arab citizens, questioning the legitimacy of Israel's legal system, and exercising universal jurisdiction proceedings against Israelis (see Appendix A: [Eroding Israel's Legitimacy in the International Arena](#)).

Something New Under the Sun: A New Strategic-Existential Challenge

41. **Dynamics of resistance and delegitimization have always accompanied Israel** – For example, in 1968-1970 Israel found it difficult to obtain military victory during the War of Attrition with Egypt. Also, the fundamental legitimacy of Israel and Zionism was previously attacked when Israel was boycotted by countries of the Arab League,¹⁵ and when in 1975 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution – later revoked – that equated Zionism with racism (11/75).¹⁶

42. **Despite this, recent events represent a coalescence of two processes:**
- **The crystallization of the Resistance Network's 'Implosion Strategy,' which aims to precipitate Israel's internal collapse** through its 'overstretch' and delegitimization, as well as by developing an asymmetric use-of-force doctrine against its military and home front;
 - **The emboldened Delegitimization Network operating in the international arena**, with the ultimate aim of dissolving Israel as a Zionist

¹⁴ The decision of the Toronto Film Festival to feature Tel Aviv as a central theme provoked intense controversy. As a result, several high-profile artists signed a petition supporting a director who decided not to participate in the festival in protest.

Another example of a cultural boycott occurred in the context of the 2009 Edinburgh International Film Festival, which decided to return a £300 gift from the Israeli embassy following protests. See: Ben Walters, [The Guardian](#), 07/09/09.

¹⁵ The boycott, which began in 1948, represents an international anti-Zionist effort targeting Israel's existence by isolating it and undermining its ability to survive economically. In the framework of the boycott, a special office was set up in Damascus, a full boycott of all Israeli goods was initiated, foreign corporations conducting trade with Israel were sanctioned, and steps were taken against companies transporting goods to Israel. See: Donald Losman, The Arab Boycott of Israel, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (2), April 1972, 99-122.

¹⁶ UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 from November 1975 equating Zionism with racism represents a significant milestone for international anti-Zionist efforts. The resolution created a parallel between Israel's political essence and the South African apartheid regime: "that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being." Then-Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin characterized the resolution as an "assault on the State of Israel's right to exist." See: Lital Levin, [Haaretz](#) 10/11/09 (Hebrew).

state that embodies the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. The pillar of their strategy is to turn Israel into a pariah state.

43. **The convergence of these two forces and processes creates an explosive political-diplomatic mix that may existentially threaten Israel's and Zionism's political and economic model in the coming years.**
44. **This assault on Israel's right to exist – which has been called 'Fundamental Delegitimization,' or simply, 'delegitimization' – has evolved into one of the main challenges facing Israel in the seventh decade of its existence.**

Aim of the Document: Definition, Characterization, and Suggested Response

45. **This document aims to offer a conceptual framework regarding Israel's delegitimization** based on the following inputs:
 - **Historical review** of Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine, and specifically the role of diplomacy and foreign policy in it;
 - **Interviews and meetings** with more than 100 professionals and experts from a variety of related fields in Israel and abroad;
 - **Three roundtable discussions** at Reut attended by dozens of relevant experts and professionals;
 - **Two study visits to London**, which enabled meetings with journalists, intellectuals, human rights activists, diplomats, international law experts, and representatives of the Jewish and Arab / Muslim communities;
 - **Review of professional literature from Israel and abroad** (see bibliography).
46. **The document addresses the following issues:**
 - **The essence of the fundamental delegitimization campaign:** Its goals, logic, structure, and modus operandi;
 - **The significance of the fundamental delegitimization campaign for Israel.** How and why it can become a strategic threat with potentially existential implications;
 - **The Israeli response:** Its organizing logic, principles, structure, etc.
47. **The structure of the document is as follows:**
 - **Chapter 1 traces the development of Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine**, its traditional view of the threat to the state's physical existence as the only existential threat, and the perception of the IDF as primarily responsible for protecting the nation;
 - **Chapter 2 describes the development of the Resistance Network's Strategy of Implosion**, born of the failure of its Logic of Destruction, which dominated from 1948-1967;

- Chapter 3 introduces the development of the primarily Europe-based network of fundamental delegitimization, which aims to affect the disappearance of Israel as a Zionist state, by turning it into a pariah state. In this context, the document draws upon London as a case study of the delegitimization dynamics at play;
 - Chapter 4 focuses on the Palestinian issue in order to highlight the potentially existential implications resulting from the dynamics between the Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network. This chapter also includes the Delegitimization Network's 'Mid-Term Report';
 - Chapter 5 demonstrates the relevancy gap between the dynamics described and Israel's mindset and current response;
 - Chapter 6 proposes policy directions for effective response to the challenge of delegitimization.
48. The document will not address the following topics – In its commitment to offering unique policy value to decision makers, Reut decided *not* to deal with the following issues in this paper, as they have been widely covered by others:
- **The Israeli-Palestinian conflict** – The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides the main leverage for Israel's fundamental delegitimization. **Clearly, Israel's earnest and consistent commitment to ending 'occupation' is critical to combating delegitimization and failure to exhibit such a commitment adds fuel to its fires.** However, this document does *not* address the shape such a resolution should take, or advise regarding the structure of the political process;¹⁷
 - **Equality and integration of Arab-Israelis** – Both the Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network view the status of Israel's Arab citizens in a Zionist state as future leverage for fundamental delegitimization. Therefore, the hearts and minds of this community will be a future battleground between Israel and its adversaries. Clearly, here too **Israel's credible commitment to the equality and integration of its Arab citizens is vital to combating delegitimization, while failure to exhibit such a commitment will create fertile grounds for its cultivation.** Nonetheless, this document does not offer a strategy for such equality and integration;¹⁸
 - **Answering the critics** – The document does not contain answers and arguments with which to counter main criticisms leveled at Israel as part of the delegitimization process, e.g. regarding violations of international law, the 'Gaza blockade,' or excessive use of force;

¹⁷ Reut has extensively addressed this issue. See: [Reassessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Build a Palestinian State in the West Bank](#).

¹⁸ Reut has previously written about this issue: See [Integrating Israel's Arab citizens into the ISRAEL 15 Vision](#).

- **Old and new anti-Semitism** – The document does *not* deal with the roots of the phenomenon of anti-Semitism; its evolution in recent years; or the distinction, connection, and overlap between criticism of Israel, fundamental delegitimization, and anti-Semitism.

49. **This document is 'Version A,'** in that it presents Reut's conclusions from its work over the past year. Reut will present the document to relevant organizations, agencies, and individuals in order to expand and improve it, and to explore additional critical issues, before formulating 'Version B,' expected later this year.

Caveat: Fundamental Delegitimization vs. Criticism

50. Criticism of Israeli Policy or Delegitimization?

- **Criticism of Israeli policy** challenges the ensemble of considerations and values underlying its formulation and implementation. **Such criticism should be viewed as legitimate, even when harsh and unfair;**
- **Fundamental delegitimization challenges Israel's right to exist** as an embodiment of the Jewish people's right to self-determination. In many cases, as previously explicated, this phenomenon represents anti-Semitism manifested as anti-Zionism.¹⁹

The line between criticism of Israeli policies and delegitimization of its existence is not always clear, and sometimes even purposefully blurred by the delegitimizers. However, criticism against Israel clearly becomes delegitimization when it exhibits blatant double standards, singles out Israel, denies its right to exist as the embodiment of the self-determination right of the Jewish people, or demonizes the state.²⁰

¹⁹ Cotler, [Identifying the New Anti-Semitism](#), Jewish People Policy Planning Institute. November 2002; Rivka Shapak Lisk, [The New Anti-Semitism in European Intellectual Circles](#), e-mago, 06/24/09 (Hebrew).

²⁰ For guidelines that may help drawing the line between criticism of policy and delegitimization, see: Denis McShane et. al. **The All Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism**, (the Stationary Office 2006); Sharansky, **3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization**; Cotler, [Identifying the New Anti-Semitism](#), Jewish People Policy Planning Institute; and Shapak Lisk, [The New Anti-Semitism in European Intellectual Circles](#).

Chapter 1:

Israel's Security and Foreign Policy Doctrine: Let the Army 'Win'

Ben-Gurion's Seminar and Israel's National Security Doctrine

51. **The security doctrine of the *Yishuv* in the days of a 'state in the making'** was, to a large extent, based on the formative experience of the Great Arab Revolt (1936-39), and on the development of the Jewish defensive force from the times of the *Bar-Giora* and *HaShomer* organizations before the First World War. During the Arab revolt, the *Yishuv* was forced to contend with mostly disorganized and uncoordinated Arab militias that threatened individuals and isolated communities, but not the entire Jewish population. In practice, apart from a short period in which Nazi General Rommel threatened to invade the area, the Jewish *Yishuv* did not face an existential physical threat during the British mandate.
52. **During the first half of the 20th century, Zionism's main challenge was achieving fundamental legitimacy** – From the beginning of the 20th century until the establishment of Israel, the political and diplomatic arena was key for the success of Zionism and for the security and development of the *Yishuv*. The main challenge was to convince the then-superpowers – primarily the Ottomans and later the British – to recognize the right of the Jewish people to a national home in its land. Indeed, the Balfour Declaration (11/17) was a historical event in this context. Accordingly, **during this period the political-diplomatic arena took center stage, and the Zionist movement was led by master diplomats**, such as Ben-Gurion and Weizman.
53. **The 1947 UN Partition Plan bestowed fundamental legitimacy upon Zionism, which was then considered irreversible** – The passing of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan 29/11/47), in which the world accepted the idea of a Jewish state alongside an Arab State in Mandatory Palestine, followed by the immediate recognition of Israel by the U.S. and USSR, granted Israel its fundamental legitimacy. This event was seen as historical and irreversible.

The Inversion: From Foreign Affairs to Security

54. **The revolution in Israel's security doctrine following Ben-Gurion's Seminar (3-5/47): From a militia to an army, and from political to military leadership.** In 1947, after it became clear that the British Mandate was coming to a close and that the *Yishuv* would become the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion took charge of its security file.

Despite being head of the Jewish Agency and leader of the *Yishuv* for many years, Ben-Gurion had no significant prior security experience. In order to prepare himself for the new role, he set aside three months for a personal seminar, later known as the 'Seminar.' Within the framework of this seminar, Ben-Gurion

visited units of the *Hagana*, interviewed senior and junior officers, and delved into the relevant literature, documenting the entire process in his diary.

During the Seminar, Ben-Gurion concluded that the *Yishuv* was not organized or prepared to defend itself against an Arab invasion of one army, or a coalition of armies, that would follow the British departure. Therefore, the *Yishuv's* entire defense doctrine had to be transformed within a very short period. His conclusions led to the formulation of the basic principles of Israel's security doctrine that later shaped the IDF, rendering Ben-Gurion's Seminar a formative event in the history of Israel's defense.²¹

Importantly, Ben-Gurion concluded that Zionism's priority had shifted from diplomacy to defense and security. This shift was reflected in every level of his activities, in the allocation of resources, and in his own time and attention.

55. **The process of designing Israel's security doctrine continued after the 1948 War until the early 1950s** under the political leadership of Ben-Gurion.²² **The perception was that the existential threat to Zionism and to the newly established State of Israel stemmed from a coalition of Arab states and armies that would seek Israel's physical destruction.**
56. **Therefore, the logic at the heart of Israel's security doctrine became that of an 'Iron Wall' (*Kir HaBarzel*),²³** based on the assumption that the Arab side would only accept Israel's existence if the Jewish state was so strong that it could not be destroyed. Many view Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan as testament to this doctrine's success.
57. **The IDF and the security establishment were thus trusted with ensuring the existence of the state.** This was reflected in the IDF's dominance in the national security community, allocation of budgets, focus of the political leadership, and even in the level of financial compensation to personnel. **Often, Israel's security doctrine and its national security doctrine were erroneously considered to be synonymous.**
58. **Over time, the essence of Israel's security doctrine was distilled into three main pillars,** notwithstanding the fact that it was never formulated into a formal document:

²¹ See: **David Ben-Gurion: Memories from the Estate: March-November 1947**; Mordechai Naor; The Old Man's Black Book, [Haaretz](#), 04/22/07; Michael Bar-Zohar, **Ben-Gurion: A Biography** (Adama Books 1986).

²² A prominent participant was Yigal Allon, former leader of *PALMACH* and former head of IDF Southern Front in the 1948 War. See: Yigal Allon, **A Curtain of Sand** (Hebrew), United Kibbutz Movement (1959).

²³ The origins of the concept of Iron Wall are from an article by Ze'ev Jabotinsky in 1923, in which he contends that there is no chance that Arabs living in the Land of Israel will come to terms with Zionism and therefore the *Yishuv* should create an iron wall until the Arab side realizes that it will not be able to defeat Zionism. See: [The Iron Wall](#) (published 04/11/23 in a Russian newspaper).

- **Detering** the enemy from initiating war by maintaining a large army in relative and absolute terms, and ensuring its superior training and endowment with a technological edge;
- **Early warning** to ascertain the enemy's intentions and capabilities by an intelligence establishment unique in its relative and absolute size;
- **Quick and decisive victory** in the event of war, by developing strong offensive capacities.

These concepts influenced Israel's use-of-force doctrine, the structure of the IDF and the security establishment, and the division of resources within the national security realm.²⁴

59. **This doctrine successfully provided Israel security** – Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel's adversaries have initiated no serious attempt to build conventional military capabilities with the capacity to decisively defeat Israel. The 1979 peace agreement with Egypt crippled the existential conventional threat to Israel's existence.
60. **While the use-of-force doctrine evolved in light of new military challenges, the fundamental working assumptions of the security doctrine remained solid. The security doctrine has been stable for several decades: The existential threat remains military and the security establishment constitutes the primary response** – Over the years, a series of attempts were made to check and update Israel's security doctrine, the most recent and famous of which was the Meridor Commission (4/06). Yet, the basic assumptions of Israel's security doctrine were consistently reaffirmed,²⁵ with one notable exception: The Meridor Commission suggested adding a fourth pillar – defense – to counter the systematic targeting of Israeli civilian population.²⁶ In addition, updates to the use-of-force doctrine, particularly regarding asymmetric warfare, were frequently made.

²⁴ See: Israel Tal, **National Security** (Hebrew) (Zemura Bitan 2006); Avi Bitzur, **The Home Front in the Israeli National security strategy between 1948-1956**, Thesis submitted to the Bar-Ilan University for the PhD degree in philosophy, Bar-Ilan University, 2003 (Hebrew); Dan Horowitz, "The fixed and changing in Israel's Security Doctrine," in *Milhemet Breira* (Hakibutz Hameuchad 1985); Micha Bar, **Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy**, (Ma'arachot 1990); Avner Yaniv, **Politics and Strategy in Israel**, (Poalim 1994); Avi Kober, "What Happened to Israel's Military Concept? IDF Preparedness for Future Challenges," Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, (Bar-Ilan University 2008); Efraim Inbar, **Israel's National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War**, (Routledge 2008); Efraim Inbar, **Israel's Strategic Agenda**, (Routledge 2007); Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew, **Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias**, (Columbia UP 2006); Daniel Byman, **Deadly Connections**, (Cambridge UP 2005); Robert Rothberg, **When States Fail**, (Princeton UP 2004).

²⁵ See: Amos Harel, Where has the Meridor Report gone? [Haaretz](#), 10/02/08.

²⁶ It should be noted that the Meridor Commission recommendations were never formally adopted by the GOI.

61. **Meanwhile, Israel's diplomatic capabilities remained secondary in importance due to the following reasons:**
- **Military Activism was adopted as a strategic principle** – A formative debate took place in the 1950s between Israel's first two prime ministers: While Moshe Sharett, who served as Israel's second prime minister and first foreign minister, advocated [Political Activism](#), which called for military restraint and diplomatic initiatives, Ben-Gurion believed in [Military Activism](#) based on the logic of the Iron Wall. Ultimately, it was Ben-Gurion's approach that shaped Israeli security and foreign policy.²⁷
 - **Israel's relations with the U.S. were dominant** – During the bi-polar Cold War, Israel's most important set of relations was with the U.S. Moreover, Israel conducted no official diplomatic relations with many states, and the importance of the UN and other international organizations was relatively small.
 - **The PMO dominated key foreign policy issues** such as the strategic relations with the U.S., the activities of the Mossad and Israel's intelligence network, and the management of the political process vis-à-vis the Arab states.
62. **Israel's special relations with the U.S. turned into a pillar of its national security**, especially following the French embargo of 1967. Some claim that that this issue is the only *political* aspect that constitutes a pillar of Israel's *security doctrine*. The foundations of this relationship are considered to be shared interests, shared values, and the political and economic power of the American Jewish community. Indeed, Israel has three embassies in North America and eleven consulates.²⁸
63. **The collapse of the USSR and the ensuing disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, as well as the peace process in the 1990s, increased the size of Israel's foreign affairs establishment but did not fundamentally change its status or conceptual approach** – In this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruited more diplomats and opened new embassies in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the developing world. Despite this, Israel's approach to diplomacy and foreign policy did not fundamentally change.
64. **The gaps between the perceived insignificance of the foreign affairs establishment relative to the military and defense establishment have far-reaching budgetary implications.** While the security establishment is allocated a

²⁷ In the 1950s, Israel promoted the 'alliance of the periphery' with countries including Turkey, Ethiopia, and Iran. The alliance was important both politically and in terms of security. The 1950s and 1960s were also known as the golden age of Israel's relations with France, which were formulated in the Ministry of Defense. However, these episodes were insufficient in changing the general frame in which the political arena played a relatively minor role.

²⁸ The embassies are situated in Washington, New York (the representative to the UN), and Ottawa. There are local consulates in Miami, Atlanta, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Houston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Montreal, and Toronto.

wealth of resources, the foreign affairs establishment is heavily under-resourced. As an example: Defense budgets grew over the years, while foreign policy budgets were cut; financial compensation levels at the defense establishment are more generous than in the foreign service; the culture and tradition of professionalism is more deeply embedded in the defense establishment; and the Winograd Commission devoted hundreds of pages to the IDF, but only a few to the foreign affairs establishment.

65. **In summary, the assumptions underlying Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine have remained largely unchanged since 1947: The principal existential threat is military and the security establishment is responsible for providing the response. The political-diplomatic arena is secondary in importance.**

Chapter 2:

The Assault on Israel's Political-Economic Model: The Resistance Network Aims for Israel's Implosion

From the Logic of Destruction to Logic of Implosion

66. **The aim to eliminate the Jewish community in pre-state Israel, and then the State of Israel itself, and to establish an Arab / Palestinian / Islamic entity in its place, has existed since the start of the 20th century.** It has manifested in three primary logics:

- **The Logic of Destruction** called for the use of force to physically destroy Israel and conquer it territorially. This logic cohered towards the end of the 1930s and was prevalent until the mid 1970s. The desire to destroy the *Yishuv* was among the considerations motivating the leadership of Mandatory Palestine's Arab leadership to support Nazi Germany. This was also the goal of their war in 1947-1949;
- **The Phased Approach** called for causing Israel's retreat in stages, in which every territorial achievement would provide a stepping stone for continuation of the struggle.²⁹ Use of force – 'armed struggle' – was the exclusive vehicle for this approach until the 1980s. At that time, some factions accepted that agreements with Israel, such as the Oslo Accords, could also serve the phased approach, provided that they would not create a formal 'end of conflict' or 'finality of claims,'³⁰ or include recognition of Israel's right to exist.³¹ This is the position held by some factions of Hamas that embrace the Phased Approach, and accept the notion of an agreement with Israel on borders based on the 1967 lines, so long as the boundaries remain provisional;³²

²⁹ Efraim Karsh, Oslo War: An Anatomy of self-Delusion (Hebrew), Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 55, **BESA Center for Strategic Studies**, Bar-Ilan University 09/03.

³⁰ The term '[finality of claims](#)' refers to the Israeli demand that in the framework of [Permanent Status Agreement](#) with the Palestinians, all outstanding issues relating to the historic conflict – such as refugees and borders – would be raised and debated. The signing of a Permanent Status Agreement would leave no possibility of raising additional claims related to the historic conflict, other than those regarding the agreement's implementation.

['End of conflict'](#) refers to the official termination of the state of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the ushering in of a new era of 'peace,' 'transition to peace,' 'permanent status,' or 'peaceful coexistence.'

³¹ When Hamas discussed establishing a Palestinian state with provisional borders (PSPB), its spokespeople emphasized that the state would be used as base to perpetuate the struggle against Israel. This accords both with the PLO's Phased Plan and with the ethos of the Palestinian struggle. See Reut Institute document: [Hamas and the Political Process](#).

³² Ali Waked, [YNET](#), 03/11/06 (Hebrew).

- **The Logic of Implosion** aims to facilitate the collapse of the Zionist entity by internal forces. These include a conflagration in the tensions between Arabs and Jews, or within the Jewish community in Israel – between *Ashkenazim* and *Sephardim*, 'hawks' and 'doves,' or religious and secular communities – which would lead to a civil war such as in Lebanon.

This logic, which has percolated since the 1950s, was passive in nature. It called for ending the military struggle against Israel in order to allow for internal factional tensions within Israeli society to erupt.³³

67. **Arab countries abandoned the Logic of Destruction in the 1970s** – Between 1947 and 1973, Israel succeeded in securing its existence to the extent that Arab countries effectively abandoned their efforts to build conventional military forces designed to defeat Israel on the battlefield. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the peace process with the Palestinians, and the U.S. occupation of Iraq solidified this logic's defeat.
68. **However, the desire for Israel to disappear persisted and has been translated into a new set of ideas** – Many in the Arab and Muslim world remained dedicated to a vision in which Israel would disappear to be replaced by an Arab / Palestinian / Islamic entity. The Resistance Network – an array of states, organizations, and individuals, led by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas – has been and remains the prominent voice calling for this vision's materialization.
69. **The Phased Approach has persisted in the Palestinian and Arab public spheres**, and is embodied in the debate between those that believe in a historical compromise with Israel and those that promote the continuation of the struggle based on the same logic as during the 1970s and 1980s.

70. **At the same time, the Logic of Implosion has been resurrected in recent years in a mutated form, which is more active and effective** – As mentioned, for decades, the Logic of Implosion was passive and was not translated into a coherent conceptual framework guiding activities and the appropriation of resources. However, in recent years this logic has reemerged as a set of ideas and principles for action that have proven effective.

The New Logic of Implosion: Assault on Israel's Political-Economic Model

71. **The Resistance Network's underlying assumption has been that direct military confrontation will not result in Israel's elimination.** The Logic of Destruction failed and the futility of developing military forces to destroy Israel was exposed. Furthermore, it became clear that a direct attack on Israel aimed at

³³ Habib Bourguiba, former President of Tunisia, was the clear spokesperson for this logic. He once said that the only way to destroy Israel was to establish full peace, which would then result in sectarian conflict between Jewish communities within Israel and ultimately cause the country's elimination without a battle.

its destruction would, in fact, afford Israel international support and unite the country internally.

72. **The Phased Approach also proved ineffective as its logic led to a direct confrontation with Israel's military might at a very high cost to the civilian population.** Furthermore, as Israel decreased its responsibility for the Palestinian population and its control over 'Palestinian territories,' the legitimacy of a struggle premised in a desire for Israel's elimination became eroded.
73. **It is no longer common for states to be destroyed militarily** – While in the past states would disappear as a result of military conquest by other nations, following the Second World War, the use of force to conquer countries and alter international borders has become unacceptable.

74. **However, in recent decades a number of countries have collapsed³⁴ as a result of failed political and economic structures.** Prominent examples include East Germany (1990), the Soviet Union (1991), and apartheid South Africa (1994). In fact, the number of countries that collapsed during this period is greater than the number of countries that were conquered and eliminated through military means.
75. **'Overstretch' represents the primary reason for countries' collapse.** This phenomenon occurs when a prolonged and unbridgeable imbalance is sustained between resources, on the one hand, and obligations and needs, on the other hand,³⁵ or between the reigning ideology and the prevailing reality.

76. **Since the 1967 Six-Day War, Zionism has been in a state of overstretch:**

- **The Zionist premise: Balance between foundational values** – Zionism claims to embody a balance between the desire for: (1) Sovereignty, ownership, or control of the Land of Israel, which represents the cradle of Hebrew civilization; (2) life in a society in which Jewish residents represent the clear majority; (3) security of the land and its population; (4) the state's Jewish character as reflected in, among other features, its symbols, language, culture, and laws; (5) democratic values; and (6) building a model society that is a light unto the nations and helps improve the world (*Or La'Goyim* and *Tikkun Olam*). **This delicate balance existed from the state's founding until the 1967 Six-Day War;**
- **The Zionist reality post-1967: Imbalance among its foundational values of demography, territory, security, and democracy** – The 1967 Six-Day War upset the above-mentioned balance between Zionism's foundational principles, and created disequilibrium among the composition of the

³⁴ There is no uniform definition of the term 'collapse' in relation to states. One example comes from Robert Rotberg who claims that states collapse when governments lose the ability to assert their authority as a result of a lack of legitimacy or a loss of ability to govern. Robert Rotberg, **When States Fail**, (Princeton UP 2004). See also an online chapter at the [Brookings Institute](http://www.brookings.edu).

³⁵ See: Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of Great Powers** (Vintage; 1989).

population controlled by Israel ('demography'), the country's democratic values ('democracy'), the territory under its control ('territory'), and its security needs ('security').

77. **This imbalance presents Israeli society with difficult dilemmas**, such as between the country's Jewish character and its democratic values; between the principle of two-states-for-two-peoples (Two-State Solution), which requires separation between Israelis and Palestinians and mandates territorial compromise, and the threat of one-state-for-two-peoples (One-State Solution), in which Jews may not be a majority; and between bilaterally agreed internationally recognized 'permanent borders' and unilaterally established internationally disputed 'defensible borders.'³⁶
78. **Nonetheless, Zionism and the State of Israel seem to have converged around the understanding that restoring the balance between Zionism's foundational values entails ending control over the Palestinian population and territorial compromise** – Every Israeli government since the first Rabin government was involved in political processes based on the logic of territorial compromise and ending control over the Palestinian population.³⁷
79. **Concurrently, the Resistance Network's logic has undergone an inversion: 'Occupation' transformed from being a 'burden' to an 'asset':**
 - **Until the 1990s, the Logic of Destruction and later the Phased Approach reigned: The essence of resistance to Israel was forcing Israeli withdrawal** – After recovering from the 1967 defeat, the Resistance Network regrouped and formulated actionable principles manifested, first and foremost, in the Palestinian Covenant and the Phased Plan. The fundamental logic aimed for Israel's retreat by means of armed struggle, which would be forced upon Israel in phases. As mentioned, some claim that the Oslo Accords expressed a political evolution of this logic, and contend that the future Palestinian state represents a future step of this phased approach.
 - **In recent years, the Logic of Implosion: The resistance aspires to draw Israel into Gaza and the West Bank** – This logic stems from a recognition that Zionism is faced with an overstretch resulting from its control over the Palestinian population. Its premise is that deepening Israeli control over, and responsibility for, the Palestinian population worsens Israel's position. Therefore, this logic calls for drawing Israel in by increasing the

³⁶ See: Dore Gold, Defensible Borders for Israel, [Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs](#).

³⁷ Prime Minister Rabin signed the Disengagement Agreements with Egypt (1974); Prime Minister Begin signed the Camp David Accords (1979); Prime Minister Shamir led the Israeli delegation to Madrid (1991); Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres (1993-1996) and Barak (1999-2001) led the Oslo process; Prime Minister Netanyahu (1996-1999) signed the Hebron Accord and the Wye River Memorandum where he ratified the Oslo Accords; Prime Minister Sharon led the Disengagement from Gaza (2005); Prime Minister Olmert led the Annapolis Process to a comprehensive offer on final-status (2007-09); and Prime Minister Netanyahu, accepted the principle of two states for two peoples (6/09).

demographic, administrative, economic, and military burden of its 'occupation.'

Consequently, some groups sabotage Israeli attempts to separate from the Palestinians, and even promote the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Logic of Implosion is based on demographic trends intensified by Israel's failure to separate from the Palestinian population and that in the long term undermine the character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.³⁸

80. **The 'return' to an 'upgraded' Logic of Implosion signifies the closing of a historical circle in the Resistance Network's struggle against Zionism** – Until Israel's establishment, the Arab struggle focused on resistance to Zionism, assuming that this would block the establishment of a Jewish state. After Israel's founding, the Arab side fought to physically destroy Israel, assuming that its elimination would eliminate Zionism. Currently, efforts are once again directed at combating the Zionist model, with the aspiration that victory in this realm will lead to Israel's implosion.

Implosion: From Logic to Strategy

81. **It is difficult to accurately ascertain the current state of the Logic of Implosion** – On the one hand, it is clear that a set of ideas and concepts has significantly evolved, achieving ripeness, clarity, and internal consistency. On the other hand, there is no proof of a clear strategy guiding the range of actors comprising the Resistance Network that establishes operational objectives, timelines, or milestones. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of simple and consistent action-oriented principles aimed at:³⁹

■ **Emphasizing political principles that represent rejection of Israel's right to exist:**

- **Recognition of Israel's de-facto existence? Perhaps. Recognition of Israel's right to exist? No!** – The Logic of Implosion does not negate recognition of the fact of Israel's existence, but does negate recognition of its right to exist and of any component of its Jewishness;⁴⁰

³⁸ See several related Reut Institute ReViews: [The Tipping Point of International Inversion towards the Two-State Solution](#), [The Trend of Palestinian and Arab Inversion toward the Two-State Solution](#), [Hamas Reveals Its True Colors](#).

³⁹ See Reut Institute reports: [Memo to Winograd Commission on the need to update Israel's national security doctrine](#), [Logic of Implosion: The Resistance Network's Political Rationale](#), [Battle for Control by the Resistance Network](#) and [Hamas Reveals Its True Colors](#);

See also Ehud Ya'ari, [Jerusalem Report](#), 11/13/06, Michael Milstein, [The Growing Challenge of Resistance and its Influence in Israel's Security Doctrine](#), Memorandum 102, INSS.

⁴⁰ In this context, see related Reut Institute analyses: [Hamas and the Political Process](#) and [The Hamas Movement Following the Elections](#).

- **Interim agreement? Maybe; Permanent Status Agreement? No!** – The Logic of Implosion fundamentally rejects ideas such as a Permanent Status Agreement, 'permanent borders,' 'end of conflict,' or 'finality of claims.' In contrast, there is no ideological barrier to an interim agreement with Israel that would enable the continuation of the struggle in the future.⁴¹ **This logic thus negates the Two-State Solution**, which would consolidate recognition of Israel's Jewish character and constitute a framework for permanent status.⁴²
- **Preventing separation between Israel and the Palestinians / Placing the weight of the 'occupation' on Israel:**
 - **Frustrating a political process** that advances the Two-State Solution;
 - **Preparing the ground for dissolving the PA** and placing full responsibility for the Palestinian population onto Israel (see trends for dissolving the PA below);⁴³
 - **Undermining any Israeli unilateral actions aimed at ending its control over the Palestinians.**
- **Reducing Israel's ability to utilize its military superiority ('tying Israel's hands'):**
 - **Lawfare: Mobilizing a legal struggle against Israel and Israelis in international forums** – Following Operation Cast Lead, Hamas launched a propaganda campaign in order to portray Israel and its leaders as 'war criminals';⁴⁴
 - **Preventing decisive Israeli victory** – The fact that the Resistance Network perceives victory as mere survival, and does not aspire to defeat the IDF militarily, makes it harder for the IDF to achieve clear victory;
 - **Using civilians as human shields** through fighting from within civilian areas and locating military installations there;

⁴¹ When Hamas discussed establishing a PSPB, its spokespeople emphasized that the state would provide a base for the struggle against Israel. See Reut document: [Hamas and the Political Process](#).

⁴² In this context, see Reut reviews [Hamas and the Political Process](#).

⁴³ See also: Reut document [Failure of the Political Process: Danger of the Dissolution of the PA](#).

⁴⁴ A document published by the [Intelligence and Information Center](#) in the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center exposed the fact that a commission under the authority of Hamas' law ministry called al-Tawthiq ('Documentation') was behind the arrest warrant against former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in Britain. They claim this initiative was carried out in the framework of a campaign aimed at prosecuting Israeli 'war criminals' in Europe on behalf of Operation Cast Lead's victims. The report concludes that the "broad scope of the committee's activities clearly indicates the magnitude of the resources the de-facto Hamas administration has invested in its efforts to slander Israel after Operation Cast Lead and exploit the findings of the Goldstone report. See also: [London Times](#), 12/21/09.

- **Hamastan / Hezbollahstan: Powers and authorities without responsibility; terrorist armies within a state** – Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy state-like powers and capacities – such as de-facto controlling territory and population, conducting independent foreign policy, maintaining military force, and even managing taxation – without assuming full sovereign responsibilities.
- **Systematically targeting Israel's civilian population in order to 'balance' Israel's military victory** – The Resistance Network has identified Israel's civilian population as its Achilles heel. Every military confrontation in recent years has included the systematic targeting of Israel's home front;⁴⁵
- **Converging around new 'outstanding' issues** – The Resistance Network stokes the flames of the struggle against Israel by focusing on a small number of issues that can be exploited as 'causes' to justify armed struggle and delegitimization. One example of this is Hezbollah's use of Shebaa Farms;⁴⁶
- **Turning Israel's Arab citizens into a 'bridgehead' for further struggle against Israel** by mobilizing them for armed struggle or for promoting delegitimization, and by challenging Israel's identity and its institutions. Thus far, these efforts have been largely unsuccessful;⁴⁷
- **Fundamental delegitimization of Israel** (see next chapter).⁴⁸

In summary,

82. **Various factions within the Resistance Network are serving an 'active' Logic of Implosion through a focused attack on Israel's political-economic model. Their ultimate goal is Israel's collapse in the footsteps of apartheid South Africa or the former USSR.**
83. **In this spirit, the Resistance Network has developed a series of concepts – which may be viewed as a strategy – aimed at outflanking the IDF's military superiority by attacking other arenas in which Israel can be defeated. This**

⁴⁵ The first Intifada (87-91); the first Gulf War (91); the wave of suicide bombings during the Oslo Process (96); the Second Intifada (00-05); the Second Lebanon War (06); and the rocket fire from Gaza, which preceded Operation Cast Lead.

⁴⁶ Following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon (5/2000), Hezbollah committed itself to perpetuating its struggle against Israel using the pretext of the Shebaa Farms and Seven Villages issues. See: Syria and the Shebaa Farms Dispute, [The Jewish Policy Center](#), Spring 2009.

⁴⁷ See Reut Institute analysis: [Between Adalah's 'New Constitution' and Annapolis](#).

⁴⁸ The Iranian logic leading to the 2006 Tehran-based conference on Holocaust denial can be understood in this context. See related: [Basic Delegitimization of Israel](#) and Gidi Grinstein, [Haaretz](#), 01/15/10.

approach aspires towards Israel's collapse through the simultaneous application of demographic, military, economic, political, and diplomatic pressures.

84. **There are three pillars to the Strategy of Implosion:** (1) **Overstretching** Israel by intensifying the burden of 'occupation'; (2) **fundamental delegitimization**; and (3) **asymmetric warfare in the military arena and against Israel's civilian population**.

Dozens of statements by the leaders of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah reflect this logic.⁴⁹

Summary Table: Conceptual Strategic Inferiority

85. **According to the Logic of Implosion, Israeli control over the Palestinians is an asset to Israel's adversaries.** This is a strategic revolution whose importance can not be exaggerated. Until the 1990s, the essence of resistance to Israel was forcing Israeli withdrawal with the ultimate aim of destroying it based on the Phased Plan. In recent years, the aim has been to intensify the burden of the 'occupation' by drawing Israel as deeply as possible into the West Bank and Gaza.
86. **The Resistance Network has created strategic asymmetry vis-à-vis Israel,** which provides it with a conceptual advantage that balances Israel's technological, military, and economic superiority. Main differences are summarized below:

	Israel's Mindset	The Resistance Network
Security Doctrine: Principle Threat & Response	The principle threat to Israel's physical existence is by Arab conventional forces. The core response is thus by the IDF. The foreign affairs establishment is secondary in importance to Israel's security.	The principle attack is on Israel's political-economic model, primarily using 'soft' tools. There is no military means of achieving Israel's physical destruction.
Objective	Victory and peace. In military confrontation, decisive victory; in the political process, 'end of conflict,' 'finality of claims,' peace, or Permanent Status Agreement.	Resistance. In military confrontation, steadfastness and resistance; in the political process, no 'end of conflict' or 'finality of claims.' There will always be an outstanding issue.
The Enemy	Countries. As Hezbollah is not a country, responsibility is placed on Lebanon.	Hamastan and Hezbollahstan: Authority and political capacities without the responsibilities of states.
Logic of Use-	Aim toward high-intensity direct	Aim toward protracted low-

⁴⁹ See Reut Institute analyses: [Logic of Implosion: The Resistance Network's Political Rationale](#) and [Iran's Terminology against Israel](#).

of-Force-Doctrine	confrontations, which favor size and firepower.	intensity conflict, while avoiding direct confrontation.
Israel's Arab Citizens	An Israeli domestic issue.	A strategic platform to be leveraged for undermining Israel's legitimacy from within and in the international arena.
Decisive Arena	The struggle will be determined through military confrontation on the battlefield.	The struggle will be determined in the international arena (through delegitimization and overstretch), and in Israel's home front.
Attitude to Citizens	Sensitivity to Israeli civilian casualties, and attempt to avoid harming civilians on the other side.	Systematic use of citizens as human shields and employment of terror tactics against Israel's civilian population.
Israel's Control over Palestinians	Security necessity existing in tension with Zionism's aspiration to end control over the Palestinian population and the accompanying responsibility for it.	Strategic asset. Israel's control over the Palestinians increases its overstretch and accelerates its implosion.
Relative Advantage	Technological, economic, and military superiority.	Conceptual superiority, willingness to cause and absorb civilian casualties, and palatable narrative in the international arena.

87. **Conclusion: Israel's security doctrine is in a position of strategic inferiority compared with the Resistance Network.** Israel's strategic inferiority renders Israeli military and political successes harder to attain, and thus makes it more difficult to secure Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state.

Chapter 3:

The Attack on Israel's Political-Economic Model:

Delegitimization Network Aims to Turn Israel into a Pariah State

Anti-Zionism is Gaining Momentum

88. **Anti-Zionism and fundamental delegitimization have existed in various forms since the advent of Zionism** – Zionism's legitimacy has been subject to debate since its inception. It has been attacked from several directions, rooted in a variety of political and moral orientations:

- Jewish groups, such as ultra-Orthodox communities or the Bund, negate Zionism for religious and ideological reasons;
- Some perceive Judaism as a religion, while rejecting the notion of a Jewish 'people.' Therefore, they do not recognize a Jewish right to self-determination;
- Various intellectual schools negate Zionism on the basis of a principled objection to states, which are defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion. Furthermore, they assume that in a country such as Israel, non-Jewish citizens will inevitably suffer discrimination;
- Those individuals who do not recognize the uninterrupted, tangible connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel view Zionism as a colonial project that led to the dispossession of local indigenous Arabs from their land;⁵⁰
- Some perceive the establishment of Israel as European 'compensation' to the Jews for the Holocaust at the expense of the local Arab population. In their view, because the Holocaust occurred in Europe, the Jewish issue should be resolved in Europe;
- Some argue that Israel has lost moral legitimacy due to its actions, such as the 'discrimination' against its Arab citizens, 'occupation' of Palestinians, and the building of settlements on Arab lands;
- Advocates of the One-State Solution challenge Israel's legitimacy as compared with their preferred political model, which is based on the principle of 'one person, one vote' in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea;
- While the argument that Israel can no longer be separated from the Palestinians due to the reality that was created by the settlements in the

⁵⁰ One claim, for example, is that European Jews are descended from the Khazar kingdom. See: Shlomo Sand, **The Invention of the Jewish People**, English Edition (Verso Books 2009); Arthur Koestler, **The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage** (Random House 1999); See also Amnon Rubenstein and Alexander Yakobson, **Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish nation-state and human rights** (Routledge 2008).

West Bank cannot be seen as delegitimization per se, some use this point to contend that Israel's moral legitimacy has been lost.

89. **Key milestones in anti-Zionist activities** include the Arab League boycott of Israel that began in 1948, and the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (11/75) equating Zionism and racism.
90. **In recent years, persistent trends bolster anti-Zionism, primarily in Europe:**
 - **Diminished memory of the Holocaust, and with it Europe's moral commitment to Israel.** The Holocaust inflicted upon European Jewry contributed to European moral commitment to Israel upon its establishment and during its first decades. As time passes, the foundation of this commitment is eroded;
 - **Post-nationalist trends conflict with Zionism** – The European Union embodies a general decline of the nation-state and nationalistic sentiments in favor of trans-nationalist frameworks. Zionism – which focuses on the self-determination of the Jewish people on the basis of its nationalism, religion, and peoplehood – stands in contradiction to the post-nationalist trend;⁵¹
 - **Quantitative growth in Europe's Muslim population** resulting from immigration from North Africa and the Middle East;
 - **Dormant anti-Semitism manifests as anti-Israel sentiment** – Many claim that inherent European anti-Semitism did not disappear following the Holocaust, but was suppressed for a few decades to be contemporarily resurrected as anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli sentiment;
 - **Opposition to the U.S.** – Israel is often framed as the long arm of the U.S. and as an extension of American imperialism in the Middle East. Anti-Israel sentiment rises in correlation with anti-Americanism, and it is also often easier to attack Israel than the U.S.;
 - **Search for a 'cause' in the vacuum following apartheid South Africa's implosion** – The success of the struggle against the South African apartheid regime in 1994 left a vacuum for activism in the European left. Radical elements converged upon Israel as the next political target to galvanize around.

⁵¹ See: Robert Cooper, **The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century**, (McClelland & Stewart 2005); Robert Kagan, **Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order**, (Vintage, 2003); Tony Judt, Israel the Alternative, **New York Review of Books**, 10/23/03.

Introduction to the Science of Networks: We live in a World of Networks

91. **We live in a world of networks**⁵² – Research on the topic of networks shows that many systems in areas as diverse as biology, economics, terrorism, and the internet, work according to laws of networks that are characterized by the following principles:

- **Flat and non-hierarchical structure** – Networks do not have a single node or unit that is *the* manager, commander, or leader; nor do they have a command-and-control center that issues instructions or orders. Networks instead operate through inspiration, mobilization, and vision;
- **The common denominator of human networks is consciousness** – Nodes of human networks are diverse in many aspects, such as structure, character, size, values, location, and seniority. Yet, they mobilize due to common underlying faith, values, vision, experience, sense of mission, utilitarianism, or purpose. Thus, a vast range of human networks exist, and many individuals and organizations belong to multiple networks simultaneously;
- **Independence of action, sensitivity to context, flexibility, and innovation** – Most nodes of a network operate primarily according to their own logic, will, discretion, and capacities. These nodes are generally very sensitive to changes in their immediate environment and adapt to them as an organic part of the local social fabric;
- **Networks are an efficient mechanism** – Because nodes are able to rapidly adjust their attributes and objectives, the network can divert resources across topical focuses and arenas with great dexterity. Therefore, networks possess 'efficient redundancy' in the sense that duplications do not amount to inefficiencies;
- **Protocols of communication, codes of conduct, and rituals** – Every network has written or unwritten protocols for communications; a value system that establishes right and wrong; codes of conduct that determine what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior; as well as symbols or art;
- **Hubs are nodes with great influence on the network** – The status of nodes in a network is 'meritocratic' in the sense that it is based on the quality and quantity of their connections with other nodes. It is not determined by decisions, ranks, or titles. Hubs are units of the network that have an

⁵² On social networks, see: Albert-László Barabási, **Linked: The New Science of Networks**, (Basic Books, 2002); Thomas L. Friedman, **The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century**, (Picador, 2007); Joshua Cooper Ramo, **The Age of the Unthinkable**, (Little, Brown and Company, 2009); Yochai Benkler, **The Wealth of Networks**, (Yale University Press, 2006); F. H Norris, "Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities and Strategy for Disaster Readiness", **American Journal for Community Psychology**, (Vol. 41, 2008); J.R.McNeill, **The Human Web, A Bird's Eye View of World History**, (Norton & Company, 2003); J. Surowiecki, **The Wisdom of Crowds**, (Anchor Books, 2005); Malcolm Gladwell, **The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference**, (Back Bay Books, 2002).

extraordinary number of links to other units and therefore great influence on the network's overall values, culture, strength, resilience, and other attributes;

- **Catalysts are nodes dedicated to developing the network, and possess the status and capacities to do so** – Catalysts are nodes that are mobilized to serve the 'cause' of the network. They operate by collecting information, turning it into relevant knowledge and disseminating it; by developing the ideology of the network; by preserving a sense of urgency; by mapping existing nodes, strengthening them, and connecting them to each other; by harnessing new nodes; by developing action plans; by educating, training and debriefing; by protecting the network; by connecting with other catalysts; and by branding and publicizing the network;
- **Networks are resilient** due to their dispersal and diversity. It is impossible to paralyze a decentralized network by removing only a small number of nodes. Experiments show that a few hubs sustain a network that has lost 80 percent of its nodes.⁵³ Therefore, to cultivate or dismantle a network it is necessary to focus on hubs and catalysts.

The Delegitimization Network

92. **Israel's delegitimization is perpetrated by a network** possessing most of the aforementioned attributes, which manifest in the following:

- **A range of bodies dispersed globally** – The nodes of the Delegitimization Network are countries, organizations, and individuals from a range of regions and of very diverse backgrounds. They are, *inter alia*, old and young; intellectuals and students; Muslims, Christians, and Jews; and mostly from Europe, but also from other continents;
- **The Delegitimization Network has no top executive** – There is no leader, commander, or manager; no headquarters or command-and-control centers; and no leadership mechanism that issues directives, guidelines, or orders. Most nodes advancing the delegitimization agenda are unrelated to each other organizationally, and communication among them is rarely consistent or continuous. They are harnessed to the effort on the basis of shared belief and cooperate on a local level and in a targeted manner;
- **The common denominator of this network is ideological: Opposition to Israel's existence as the state that realizes the right of the Jewish people to self-determination.** However, a range of factors motivate individual nodes to serve this logic (see above);
- **A relatively small number of hubs lead Israel's delegitimization** – These hubs are usually global metropolises that concentrate global media, international institutions, leading academic centers, international NGOs, and human rights organizations. **While all Delegitimization Network hubs**

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See: Barabási pp. 153-155, 287; Ramo, p.236.

possess similar characteristics, each hub is unique socially, economically, and politically. Examples of major delegitimization hubs may include, to varying degrees, London, Madrid, Paris, the San Francisco Bay Area, Toronto, and Brussels;

- **An array of individual initiatives around the world** – Nodes of the Delegitimization Network operate in their natural environments – based on their internal logic, free will, discretion, and abilities – while adapting to changing realities. This is why, for example, many prominent Israeli speakers are confronted with locally organized student protests, and demonstrations follow Israeli tennis player Shahar Peer around the world;
- **The Delegitimization Network has symbols, heroes, galvanizing events, etc.** – Heroes and symbols include Mohammed al-Durra, a 12-year old boy the IDF was accused of killing; Rachel Corrie, who was killed in Gaza by an Israeli bulldozer; and the *keffiyeh*, which has turned into a popular fashionable accessory. The Durban Conference represents a formative event for this network;⁵⁴
- **Delegitimization is orchestrated by catalysts** that collect information; develop new, actionable ideas (boycotts, lawsuits, etc.); initiate events and protests; mobilize additional nodes; increase awareness by building and managing Web sites, maintaining listservs, writing blogs, and publishing articles; conducting training; and branding and publicizing the network.

93. **Conclusion: Israel's fundamental delegitimization is perpetrated by a global network** that is galvanized by few catalysts and operates from within a few hubs.

Following Apartheid South Africa's Footsteps: One Person, One Vote

94. **As mentioned, one core argument of anti-Zionism stands on the principle that the identity of a state cannot be based on ethnicity or religion.** Hence, the idea of a 'Jewish State' is unacceptable in any way, shape, or form.
95. **No to the Two-State Solution; Yes to the One-State Solution** – A Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be seen as providing delegitimizers a satisfying response, since it embodies a recognition in a state for the Jewish people and thus fails to address their fundamental grievance against Israel. Therefore, only a One-State Solution will truly resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not just in Gaza and the West Bank, but also in 'Israel-proper.'

⁵⁴ The first Durban Conference (09/01) was a UN-sponsored conference convened in Durban, South Africa, which was intended to cultivate an international front opposing racism, xenophobia, and intolerance. The conference was transformed into a show of fundamental delegitimization of Israel, with the encouragement of participating NGOs.

96. **This is the ideological foundation for comparing Israel with apartheid South Africa** – Israel's delegitimizers claim that both cases involve a foreign minority – in both cases white, rich, and powerful – that took control of land belonging to local indigenous populations, dispossessed them of their property, and exploited them as labor while employing brute force. **In recent years, the Delegitimization Network has significantly succeeded in branding Israel as an apartheid state by deploying related terminology and using similar means to wage a global campaign against it.**

97. **Same problem, same solution** – According to this logic, what worked in bringing down white South Africa in 1994 can also work in Israel's case: Building a global grassroots movement for boycotts, sanctions and divestments that will eventually impact official policies in the leading nations of the world so that the political and economic model of Israel collapses under pressure, and surrenders to the principle of 'one person, one vote.'

Mainstreaming Delegitimization: Branding, Cooperation, and Simplicity

98. **Most people in hubs of delegitimization 'don't care'** enough about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to have an opinion about Israel, or to take action. Furthermore, **people that do care often have a more sympathetic view of Israel than of the Arab or Islamic world**, although to varying degrees in different constituencies and age groups.
99. Nonetheless, as described, **the Delegitimization Network has succeeded in accumulating significant achievements that peaked during Operation Cast Lead when hundreds of thousands of Europeans marched in various European capitals to show solidarity with Hamas.** How does the Delegitimization Network carry such considerable influence?

100. **The triangle of delegitimization operating on the margins: A Red-Green Alliance with a post-Zionist stamp of approval** – The forces and organizations within the Delegitimization Network are on the political fringes in their countries of origin. Their network often comprises groups of young people or anarchists, immigrants, radical activists, etc. However, the rise in the delegitimization of Israel in recent years results from the confluence of three forces:
- **The Radical Left (Reds), which underwent an inversion 'from *kibbutz* to *kibbush*,'** i.e. from regarding Israel as a model for progressive egalitarian society in the 1960s (the *kibbutz* model) to viewing it as an artificial imperialist implant that engages in brutal occupation (*kibbush*);⁵⁵

⁵⁵ On the causes of the radical left's inversion in its perception of Israel, see: Interview with Colin Schindler, [Jewish Chronicle](#), 10/29/09; Robin Shepherd, **A State Beyond the Pale: Europe's Problem with the Israel**, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2009).

- **Arabs and Islamists (Greens) in Europe and North America**, whose attitudes towards Israel have radicalized since the 1980s;⁵⁶
- **Post-Zionist and anti-Zionist Jewish and Israeli intellectuals** that operate in a supportive intellectual and academic environment in Europe and in some universities in North America and lend delegitimization efforts a 'stamp of authenticity.'

101. **The key to the success of Israel's delegitimizers is their ability to blur the difference between criticism of Israel and fundamental delegitimization, which allows them to gain sympathy for their cause among the elite and general public.**

In most cases, criticism of Israeli policy and actions from a human rights perspective does *not* amount to fundamental delegitimization or demonization. Criticism of Israeli policy is legitimate, even when it is harsh or unfair, such as in failing to acknowledge Israeli concerns.

However, such criticism may cross the line into delegitimization when it suffers from one or more of the following categories;

- **Fundamentally challenging Israel's right to exist** as an embodiment of the Jewish people's right to self-determination;⁵⁷
- Employing blatant **double standards**, or exclusively singling out Israel for criticism;
- **Demonizing the state**, often by evoking Nazism and apartheid.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ For example, in Britain, this process of radicalization occurred for a number of reasons. In the 1990s, the majority of Britain's Muslim community was not of predominantly Middle Eastern origin: Most came from Bangladesh and Pakistan and practiced a moderate form of Islam. The radicalization of Britain's Muslim community stems from: education in radical Saudi-funded mosques. See: Ed Husain, **The Islamist**, (Penguin, 2007); significant immigration from the Middle East; global events such as the war in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and violent events in the 'Palestinian territories' exacerbated hostilities (see: Michael Gove, **Celsius 7/7**, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2006); British reaction to terror attacks on its territory paradoxically strengthened Islamist elements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Ja'amat Islamiya. See: [Washington Post](#), 10/07/05 Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell, "[Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK](#)", **Micron Policy Working Paper 5/7/09**; Salma Yaqoob, "British Islamic Political Radicalism," **Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective**, Ed. Tahir Abbas, (Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

⁵⁷ Cotler, [Identifying the New Anti-Semitism](#); and Shapak Lisk, [The New Anti-Semitism in European Intellectual Circles](#).

⁵⁸ For guidelines that may help drawing the line between criticism of policy and delegitimization, see: McShane et al **The All Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism**; Sharansky, **3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization**, Cotler, [Identifying the New Anti-Semitism](#), and Shapak Lisk, [The New Anti-Semitism in European Intellectual Circles](#).

102. **Reut identifies a number of simple principles underlying this achievement:**

- **Israel is framed as ill-willed, uninterested in peace, and as trying to perpetuate occupation** – This is a powerful construct that draws primarily upon the settlement enterprise to reframe many Israeli actions. For example, Israel's disengagement from Gaza is reframed as 'continuing the occupation by new means'; and the Israeli field hospital in Haiti was framed as a deliberate distraction from Israel's actions in the 'Palestinian territories';
- **Israel is branded as the new apartheid South Africa, so it can do no right and its adversaries can do no wrong** – The Delegitimization Network ceaselessly equates Israel with apartheid South Africa as constituting two regimes based on discrimination and repression. Once Israel is successfully branded as violent, aggressive, discriminatory, and occupying, the most outrageous allegations, such as organ harvesting, can stick; aggressive actions against Israel and Israelis are justified and called for; and the entire political and economic model of Israel is framed as immoral;⁵⁹
- **Therefore, coercion is the only effective means of correcting Israel's ways** – Because Israel intends to perpetuate occupation, soft tools of persuasion and engagement – such as 'condemnation' or 'voicing concerns,' demonstrations, or petitions – are futile. Only concrete painful steps directed at Israel and Israelis will force Israel to change its ways;
- **Jews control politics, so only civil society can correct Israel's ways** – As Jews 'control' the political and economic centers of power, only civil society can force Israel to correct its ways. This must be done by mobilizing and using all available tools such as boycotts, divestments, and sanctions to force Israel's hand;
- **Pro-Palestinian activity and criticism of Israel is 'the right thing to do'** – Such activity and criticism is associated with other moral and liberal values such as protection of the environment and is symbolized by the wearing of the *keffiyeh*;
- **Single out Israel for alleged human rights violations; ignore comparative analyses** – The Delegitimization Network exploits criticism of Israel's alleged human rights violations to brand it as a pariah state. While singling Israel out, delegitimizers ignore comparative analysis of other

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As [Michael Ignatieff](#) noted, "International law defines 'apartheid' as a crime against humanity. Labeling Israel an 'apartheid' state is thus a deliberate attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state itself." In a similar vein, speaking at the 2009 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism, Irwin Cotler recently argued that branding Israel as apartheid or Nazi is part of a campaign aimed at causing its dismantlement. As Cotler said, "these are the two great evils of 20th century...If Israel is guilty of crimes against humanity, then it does not have a right to exist...and a moral and legal obligation to dismantle follows." Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

majority-minority relationships, doctrines of use of force or human rights records, which would compliment Israel, not only in comparison to Arab and Muslim countries, but even to some Western countries in similar situations;

- **A call for applying general principles of international law, only when and where it serves the delegitimizers' cause** – The Delegitimization Network claims to call for application of 'universally accepted principles of international law' such as 'the right of return of refugees.' However, even when their assertions regarding international law are accurate, they single Israel out. For example, their call for the right or return of Palestinian refugees to Israel based on the so called 'accepted norm of international law' only applies to Palestinian refugees and not to Germans, Bulgarians, Turks, Greeks, or Jews that were displaced in the last century;
- **Pretend to be about 'correcting Israel's ways,' not about eliminating Israel** – The Delegitimization Network pretends to focus on 'correcting' Israeli policy, hiding the true essence of its struggle that singles out the Jewish people as the only nation that does not deserve a right to self-determination;
- **Unbundle Israel's elimination** – Delegitimizers make a set of separate demands from Israel, that together, amount to its elimination of Israel or to the rejection of the right of Jews for self-determination. For example, they call for 'the return of individual Palestinian refugees to their homes' or for 'full and equal right of the Arab minority in Israel'.
- **Focus on the right of the minority, while ignoring the rights of the majority** – Delegitimizers focus exclusively on the rights of the Arab minority in Israel, while ignoring the rights of the collective Jewish identity of Israel's 80 percent majority.;
- **Criticism of Israel *now* without agreement on the ultimate goal** – The Delegitimization Network cooperates with anyone who criticizes Israel, especially if criticism is bold and harsh. Delegitimizers will stand shoulder-to-shoulder even with Israelis who define themselves as Zionist, as long as they are willing to voice criticism of Israel. In this way, a broad diverse coalition is formed, which on the surface criticizes Israel's policies, but whose strategies serve the agenda of delegitimizing Israel.

Delegitimization Dynamics in a Hub: London as a Case Study⁶⁰

103. **To better understand the dynamics of delegitimization, Reut selected London as a case study**, based on the prevalent perception that Israel's standing in the UK

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Reut acknowledges with gratitude Israel's Ambassador to the UK, Ambassador Ron Prosor, for suggesting the idea of analyzing London as a hub of delegitimization. Reut will publish a document focusing on delegitimization dynamics in London in the near future.

has been severely eroded in recent years.⁶¹ In the course of two study-visits to London, the Reut team met with journalists and leading media figures, international law experts, human rights activists, Israeli diplomats, and members of the Jewish and Muslim communities.⁶²

104. **The paradox:**

- **The polls say: Most Brits 'don't care'; of those that do, more tend to support Israel** – The Israeli-Palestinian conflict ranks low on the agenda of ordinary British citizens. Among those who do hold an opinion on the conflict, more tend to support Israel, and political support for Israel seems to be stable;⁶³
- **Yet, London is a leading hub of delegitimization with significant global influence.** This influence stems from London's role as a center of leading global media, international NGOs, human rights organizations, top academic institutions, and a sizable Muslim population. London's cultural influence amplifies its ability to impact the English-speaking world;⁶⁴
- **...and London is the capital of the One-State idea** – The concept of the One-State Solution is discussed and advanced in London more than anywhere else, and disseminated throughout the world. This concept may even enjoy greater popularity in London than it does in the West Bank or in Gaza.

105. **No organization or conspiracy, but clear processes of institutionalization** – The Red-Green Alliance in London is not a coherent organization or an established coalition with a management structure, formal leadership, or headquarters. However, since the [First Durban Conference](#) (2001), and especially following Operation Cast Lead (01/09), this alliance has undergone clear processes of institutionalization:

⁶¹ Structural and historical factors render the UK a convenient platform for anti-Zionism. For example: A sense of historical responsibility stemming from its colonial history, the Balfour Declaration, and the British Mandate; and London's tradition of being a center for radicalism.

⁶² See acknowledgement for partial list. In addition, we met with approximately 20 individuals in London who preferred not to be acknowledged.

⁶³ This is according to polls presented to us by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brand Israel Project Director Ido Aharoni.

⁶⁴ For example, London is home to the BBC, the Guardian, and Financial Times newspapers. In London, three of the most important newspapers in the Arab world are published: Asharq Alawsat, Al Hayat, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. London is home to major human rights organizations, such as Christian Aid, Amnesty, and Crisis Action. It is also home to important and influential universities, such as Oxford, Cambridge, SOAS, and the LSE.

- **Cooperation among a range of NGOs**, such as Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC),⁶⁵ Respect,⁶⁶ Socialist Action,⁶⁷ War on Want,⁶⁸ and the Muslim Association of Britain;⁶⁹
- **BDS movement: Boycotts, Divestments, and Sanctions** – The BDS campaign against Israeli entities and individuals is intensifying, seeking to consolidate tactics into a comprehensive civil struggle against Israel.⁷⁰ While the BDS movement claims to seek influence on Israeli policy and not to promote delegitimization,⁷¹ its affiliations and membership are clearly

⁶⁵ The PSC has become the largest and most active organization in the UK, and has expanded its activities to the U.S. and Australia. The organization is active on campuses and in trade and labor unions, and advances the boycott campaign against Israel by the BDS movement. Formally, the organization promotes justice for Palestinians, human rights, and international law. In practice, it seeks to eliminate Israel as represented by its organizational symbol, a map with no Israel.

⁶⁶ Respect, the radical leftist party headed by George Galloway, was established in 2004 to oppose British involvement in Iraq. The party advances an explicitly anti-Zionist agenda. The base of its support primarily comprises leftists and Islamic organizations such as: PSC; Friends of Al Aqsa; and the leftist anti-war movement, Stop the War Coalition.

⁶⁷ Socialist Action is active in the UK, and comprises, according to estimates, approximately [100 members](#) working to advance the concept of a '[global revolution](#).' Their strategy is characterized by 'entryist' tactics aimed at infiltrating political and media entities in the UK. Organization members are noted for their association with former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone. The organization is known for its connections with the Muslim Council of Britain, which is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement promotes an explicitly anti-Zionist agenda. See: Atma Singh, "Examination of the '[Entryist](#)' Tactics of the Hamas Front Organisations and the Extreme Left in the UK Gaza Protests in London," **Middle East Strategic Information**, 06/01/09.

⁶⁸ War on Want is a leftist-socialist oriented organization, with the stated mission of acting to eradicate poverty in underdeveloped countries and secure the economic welfare of citizens in conflict-ridden areas. On a practical level, the organization focuses substantial efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it uses as a platform from which to actively lead the boycott campaign against Israel, frequently framing Israel as an apartheid state. Additional information on the organization's anti-Israel activity can be found on the [NGO Monitor Web site](#).

⁶⁹ [The Muslim Association of Britain](#) was established in 1997 and describes itself as a "mainstream grassroots organization" that seeks to debunk misguided perceptions about Muslims and to foster mutual understanding by serving as a bridge between the UK and the Muslim world." The organization is closely connected to the Stop the War Coalition and with the UK movement to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is also associated with Hamas. See: Briggs and Birdwell, [Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK](#).

⁷⁰ The first manifestations of the movement's activities are apparently a joint statement publicized by the Durban Conference NGO forum. The statement called for Israel's absolute isolation as an apartheid state, by means of levying an embargo and enacting far-ranging coercive sanctions, and for all countries of the world to cut ties with Israel. For more information on the declaration and the conference, see the Reut Institute's '[Durban Conference](#).'

The Palestinian BDS National Committee, an umbrella organization for dozens of Palestinian organizations, published a declaration in July 2005 calling for deploying BDS against Israel until it conforms to the following conditions: Withdrawing from the 'occupied territories', establishing full equality for Israel's Arab citizens, and enabling Palestinian refugees from 1948 to return to Israel in accordance with UN Resolution 194. In November 2007, the first BDS conference was convened in Ramallah, with international participation.

⁷¹ A key leader in the movement has declared in the past that the movement has no formal policy on this topic. See: Omar Barghouti quoted in: Gal Beckerman, [The Forward](#), 09/19/09.

aligned with platforms that oppose Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state.⁷²

Although the BDS campaign enjoys marginal success in advancing boycotts against Israel, the principle damage it creates is in promoting an association between Israel and the discourse of boycott and isolation, which positions Israel as a pariah state;

- **Strong presence in campuses among students and faculty** – An overwhelmingly anti-Israeli line is common on London campuses, which often receive heavy funding from Iran and Saudi Arabia.⁷³ These campuses frequently feature prominent anti-Israel lecturers, though the clearest anti-Israel manifestation is 'Israel Apartheid Week.' (IAW). IAW has taken place since 2005 primarily in North American and European universities, with the purpose of condemning Israel and encouraging boycotts against it.

Additionally, Britain's academic union has repeatedly debated calls to impose an academic boycott on Israel in protest of its policies in the 'occupied territories.' While a formal boycott has not been passed, indicators

⁷² In this context, the BDS movement's Web site published a joint declaration with the International Coordinating Network on Palestine on the occasion of Israel's 60th anniversary. The declaration was headlined '60 years is enough!' and Israel's independence war characterized as land theft. See: [ICNP 2008 Global Call to Action, 11/4/07](#). A relevant declaration in the BDS movement's Web site attributes the [Palestinian call for BDS](#) against Israel to Palestinians living within Israel's borders. Similarly, the movement's publications [repeatedly refer to the struggle against Israeli apartheid](#) as a goal of action.

Additionally, the BDS movement has known connections to a number of organizations and individuals supportive of the One State Solution: See: [interview with Dr. Haider Eid](#), lecturer at Al-Aqsa University in Gaza and a supporter of the movement, in which he makes a direct connection between the BDS movement and the vision of dismantling the State of Israel in favor of a single, binational state.

⁷³ The Centre for Social Cohesion, a British think tank, compiled a report with examples of Saudi and Iranian funding of British academic institutions. Such examples include massive funding by the Saudi King Fahd Fund providing Oxford University targeted funding towards new buildings; a Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal Saudi fund, which paid for a research center at the University of Edinburgh; and the Iranian government, in partnership with The Islamic Centre of England, which funded scholarship grants for Iranian fellows to the University of London's SOAS. . See: Robin Simcox, **A Degree of Influence: The Funding of Strategically Important Subjects in UK Universities**, (Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009).

Saudi and Iranian funding is not limited to the UK. Several years ago, the New York Post exposed the New York District Attorney's Office investigation based on suspicions that the Iranian government transferred substantial amounts of money through a special fund for various U.S.-based academic institutions in which pro-Iranian and anti-Israel researchers and lecturers are employed. Contributions to this fund included \$100,000 for the Middle East and Iranian studies centers at Columbia University, which was allegedly transferred against the backdrop of an agreement to host Iran's president during his U.S. visit. Another substantial contribution was transferred to Rutgers University, known for the head of its Middle East program's stance legitimizing Hamas and Hezbollah. See: Isabel Vincent, [New York Post](#), 11/22/09.

point to existing informal boycotts on Israeli academics in British academia;⁷⁴

- **Attempts to seize the agenda of trade and labor unions** and promote boycotts and sanctions against Israel in unions that possess significant political influence domestically and internationally. One example is in the influence gained by the PSC – which is active in the UK, U.S., Australia, and additional locations – within Britain's Trades Union Congress (TUC). PSC successes include securing passage of a formal call to boycott Israel that was advanced by the British Fire Brigades Union.⁷⁵ The PSC also successfully obstructed a cooperative initiative between the *Histadrut* and its Palestinian counterpart, and managed to reverse the latter's stance regarding the issue of waging boycotts against Israel;⁷⁶
- **Legal action against IDF officers and Israeli politicians** – In the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Norway, a network of lawyers have compiled a list of 'wanted' IDF officers in order to issue arrest warrants against them, based on universal jurisdiction clauses, for committing war crimes.

According to reports, the lawyers received information regarding their travel plans from pro-Palestinian activists that track invitations extended by Jewish and pro-Israel organization to IDF officials and Israeli politicians. According to one active lawyer in the network, a small number of names of IDF officers even appear on the tracking list of the British police, which are supposed to issue arrest warrants upon their arrival in the UK.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ See: Mansfeld, Gerstenfeld, "[The Academic Boycott Against Israel](#)," **Jewish Political Studies Review** 15: (Fall 2003).

⁷⁵ The ability of certain trade and labor unions to influence agendas and decisions on the national level directly relates to the institutional structure of British workers' organizations and the connections between specific professional workers' organizations and the national union, the TUC. Unlike the Israeli *Histadrut*, various professional organizations fund the national union, and can therefore exert significant influence on its agenda. See: [BBC News](#), 09/16/09.

⁷⁶ A prominent example of this trend can be extracted from the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions' (PGFTU) handling of the boycott movement issue. In the past year – in light of vibrant cooperative efforts between the *Histadrut* and the PGFTU – the latter's General Secretary, Shaher Sa'ad, expressed support for continued contact with the Israeli union and opposition to boycotts against Israeli workers' organizations.

Following a meeting between Sa'ad and Nablus Mayor, Adli Ya'ish, with a delegation from the pro-Israel British Trade Union Friends of Israel organization, elements associated with Britain's boycott movement applied severe pressure on both Palestinians. The result was their renunciation of their previous stance, and issuance of public calls to boycott the *Histadrut*.

⁷⁷ A document published by the [Intelligence and Information Center](#) in the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center exposed the fact that a commission under the authority of the Hamas' law ministry called *al-Tawthiq* ('Documentation') was behind the arrest warrant against former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in Britain. They claim this initiative was carried out in the framework of a campaign aimed at prosecuting Israeli 'war criminals' in Europe on behalf of Operation Cast Lead's victims. The report concludes that the "broad scope of the committee's activities clearly indicates the magnitude of the resources the de facto Hamas administration has

Chapter 4: The Explosive Feedback Loop between the 'Logic of Implosion' and Delegitimization in the Palestinian Arena

Mid-Term Report: Israel is Paying a Tangible Strategic Price

106. An interim assessment of the compounded effect of the Delegitimization Network and the Resistance Network points to the tangible strategic price Israel is paying in critical arenas:

- **Security: Crippling Israel's unilateral option by limiting military use-of-force** – Israel's unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon (5/00)⁷⁸ and Gaza (8/05)⁷⁹ reflected a logic that, in the absence of a partner for a political process, Israel could unilaterally withdraw to a recognized international boundary, and thus secure international legitimacy for harsh military responses in case of future provocations across the border. The combination of military force and international legitimacy were expected to create effective deterrence.

In hindsight, this logic proved only partially correct: Israel initially earned plaudits around the world, primarily from the political leadership of many countries. However, with the perpetuation of military confrontation in both Lebanon and Gaza – a predictable consequence of the Resistance Network's logic – this support eroded and criticism of Israel gathered steam, especially on the grassroots level in Europe. Following Operation Cast Lead, it was expressed in the Goldstone report and in legal proceedings against IDF officers and Israeli politicians;

- **Interior: Breach of Israeli sovereign discretion and internationalization of the issue of Israel's Arab citizens** – Recent years have seen relations between Israel's Arab citizens and the State of Israel undergo a process of internationalization: Israel's policies, law enforcement, and budget allocation in this area are reviewed by other countries and by international organizations;⁸⁰

invested in its efforts to slander Israel after Operation Cast Lead and exploit the findings of the Goldstone report.”

⁷⁸ The blue line was drawn and approved by [UN Resolution 425](#) following the IDF's withdrawal from south Lebanon (7/6/2000), on the basis of the 1923 international border between Israel and Lebanon. Israel and Lebanon agreed to recognize this border.

⁷⁹ Israel withdrew to the 1949 Armistice Line, which is not an internationally recognized border (Rhodes agreement / 1949 Armistice Line). However, Israel continues to control Gaza's air and water space.

⁸⁰ For an assessment of GOI policy, see: [Orr Commission Report](#). For the full report (Hebrew) [click here](#). See also Reut Institute analysis: [Internationalization of the Issue of Israeli Arabs](#).

- **Judicial: Challenge to the legitimacy of Israel's legal system and utilization of universal jurisdiction laws against Israelis** – A prerequisite for applying universal jurisdiction against a particular country is the inability or will of that country's legal system to carry out justice against wrongdoers. Therefore, attacking Israel's legal system is a necessary condition for advancing the delegitimization agenda. The Goldstone report's allusion to the Israeli justice system's alleged bias and partial enforcement represents a significant milestone in this context;⁸¹
- **International image: Israel has been branded as a violent and aggressive state and is on the global diplomatic defensive** – In international public opinion, Israel is increasingly branded as a violent, aggressive, and occupying state that tramples on human and civil rights. This leads to a situation in which it can be easily equated with the apartheid regime and depicted as the moral equivalent of terror organizations. In addition, any Israeli use of force is automatically condemned and framed to reinforce Israel's image, while aggression against Israel is more likely to be regarded as legitimate and justified;
- **Economy: Boycotts, divestment, and sanctions** – Although the tangible economic implications of the BDS campaign have been limited, the thrust of its damage has been in branding Israel as a pariah state;
- **The Jewish world: An attack on the pro-Israel lobby and a social price for supporting Israel** – Over the past decade, the pro-Israel lobby and the Jewish community have been under attack, charged with controlling national agendas through financial contributions or dual loyalty, or even placing Israel's interests ahead of their own country's. Support for the war in Iraq and for sanctions and action against Iran have been used as examples to prove this point.⁸²

Furthermore, **many Jews report a rising personal and social price for expressing support of Israel**. This is particularly apparent in more liberal and progressive communities and in leading universities, and especially in the context of the way Israel has been branded.

107. **The Next Phase: Common goals, coordination, and cooperation between the Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network** – The ripening of the Resistance Network's Strategy of Implosion and the coalescence of the Delegitimization Network in the West occurred separately and resulted from different circumstances and contexts. However, there are signs that these two networks are beginning to explore each other and intensify links, as manifest in, for example:

⁸¹ See Goldstone report, p 503-505, Article 1611-1616; Also [Ministry of Foreign Affairs response](#) to the report 09/24/09.

⁸² One example of this appears in the book by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, **The Israel Lobby and U.S Foreign Policy**, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

- **A growing understanding regarding the impact of Resistance Network activities on European public opinion.** This is evidenced in the continuously improving utilization of Middle East-based media and social networks to feed and fuel delegitimization efforts;⁸³
- **Mechanisms of cooperation, planning, and coordination.** A key example is in the 'International Campaign against U.S. and Zionist Occupation,' also known as the Cairo Conference, which is an annual event that has taken place in Cairo and Beirut since 2002. The event gathers elements of the European radical left especially from the UK,⁸⁴ as well as radical Islamist activists from movements including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.

Hamas' cooperation with allies in Europe during Operation Cast Lead to prepare for the legal and political campaign launched following the operation presents another potent example;
- **Intellectual impact, primarily by the European left on Palestinians, towards adopting the One-State Solution and promoting the voluntary dissolution of the PA** – This Western pro-Palestinian narrative is slowly penetrating into the centrist secular-nationalist camp of Palestinian politics. The narrative encourages the discourse of the voluntary dissolution of the PA and the abandonment of the Two-State Solution in favor of a formal Palestinian inversion upholding a one-person-one-vote principle.⁸⁵

Catch-22 in the Palestinian Arena: Should Israel Stay or Leave?

108. Israel's conundrum: Balancing the foundational values of Zionism

- **Israel's security logic: To stay** – This logic is rooted in the concern that any territory Israel withdraws from will be used as a platform for hostile military activities against it. This threat will increase if the Palestinian state controls its own airspace and borders. According to this logic, Israel must retain control in the West Bank, and potentially renew its control over Gaza.

The problem: This logic serves the Resistance Network's Implosion Strategy, which seeks to increase Israel's overstretch by perpetuating its control of the West Bank and drawing it back into Gaza;
- **Israel's political logic: To leave** – This logic is rooted in the concern that if Israel fails to end its responsibility for the Palestinian population in the West Bank or reoccupies Gaza, demographic trends will erode Israel's fundamental legitimacy, and ultimately render it a pariah state. According to this logic, Israel must urgently end its control in the West Bank.

⁸³ See Ramo, Chapter 8.

⁸⁴ Participating organizations include: Respect, Socialist Workers Party, Stop the War Coalition, and British trade unionists.

⁸⁵ See the Reut Institute analyses: [The Trend of Palestinian and Arab Inversion toward the Two-State Solution](#), [Failure of The Political Process: The Danger of The Dissolution of the PA](#), [Is the PA about To Be Dismantled?](#), and [Dissolution of the PA: An Emerging Trend](#).

The problem: This logic creates a new platform for attacks against Israel utilizing tenets of asymmetrical warfare, and enables bases of terror to be built along its borders.

109. **Israel has swung between these military and security logics** – Over the past 15 years, every attempt by Israel to contend with one of these threats has intensified the other, and vice versa.⁸⁶

The Palestinian Issue is a Pretext. The Next Issue: Israel's Arab citizens

110. **The Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network use the Palestinian issue as a pretext** – Their actions are not motivated by a desire to end Israeli control over the Palestinian population, but to advance Israel's elimination.⁸⁷

111. **Therefore, the establishment of a Palestinian state and even a formal end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not end delegitimization.** Even if, despite the best efforts of the Resistance Network, such an historic event occurs, the same forces will coalesce around new issues that will serve as their galvanizing focus.

Reut expects the status of Israel's Arab citizens will serve as the next outstanding issue. Additional issues could be the status of holy sites in Israel or land rights and use in Israel.

112. **In fact, the Resistance Network has already (unsuccessfully) attempted to harness Israel's Arab citizens** – The Resistance Network accords Israel's Arab citizens a central role in undermining the foundations of the 'Zionist entity' from within. As of now, these attempts have achieved marginal success.⁸⁸
113. **However, there are elements among Israel's Arab citizens that serve the Resistance Network's ideology:** The Northern faction of the Islamist movement and its leader Ra'ad Salah reject Israel's rights to exist and boycott national elections to the *Knesset*; the Future Vision Document challenges the Jewish nature

⁸⁶ For example: Following the Oslo process, which was designed to end Israeli control over the Palestinians, the Palestinian Intifada led Israel to recapture the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield; the political nadir Israel found itself entrapped in thereafter was among the major factors leading to the Gaza Disengagement. Following the Disengagement, weapons smuggling and the firing of rockets and mortars towards Israel precipitated Operation Cast Lead, which in turn led to the strengthening of delegitimization efforts. This could lead to further action in the West Bank based on the logic of ending Israeli control over Palestinian populations.

⁸⁷ Shalom Lappin, [Therapist to the Jews: Psychologizing the 'Jewish Question'](#), Normblog and Howard Jacobson, [Let's see criticism of Israel for what it really is](#), The Independent.

⁸⁸ Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad fanned the flames of last year's conflict in Acre, which occurred on Yom Kippur when they called for Acre's Arabs to continue fighting against the 'Zionists.' See: [Haaretz](#). There are also reported attempts to mobilize agents with the Arab Israeli population. See: Aharon Newmark, [Omedia](#), 05/27/08 (Hebrew).

of the State of Israel; and an increasing number of voices have been heard calling for a One-State Solution.⁸⁹

Summary: Explosive Combination – Implosion Strategy and Delegitimization Network

114. **The challenge facing Israel results from the parallel coalescence of two processes:**
 - **The consolidation of the Resistance Network's Strategy of Implosion, which was designed to lead to Israel's collapse based on:** (1) Israel's overstretch, advanced by undermining the Two-State Solution and increasing the burden of 'occupation'; (2) Israel's delegitimization; and (3) an asymmetrical warfare doctrine for the military arena and against the civilian population;
 - **The consolidation of the Delegitimization Network, with the purpose of politically eliminating Israel by turning it into a pariah state.** Currently, the main anchor of this process is framing Israel as an apartheid regime based on its control of Palestinian populations and the so-called 'Gaza blockade.'
115. **These two dynamics combine to create a predicament for Israel in the Palestinian arena: While the Resistance Network sabotages every move aimed at separating Israel from the Palestinians on the basis of a Two-State Solution; the Delegitimization Network demonizes Israel while calling for a One-State Solution.**
116. **A feedback loop working against Israel is thus created:**
 - **The Resistance Network's successes in undermining the Two-State Solution, and the consequent continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinian population, provides delegitimization processes sustenance, strengthens the effectiveness of asymmetrical campaigns against Israel, and advances the alternative paradigm of the One-State Solution;**
 - **The stronger the delegitimization against Israel and the legitimacy of the One-State Solution grow, the less the Palestinian and Arab side are willing to engage in the Two-State Solution; and so forth.**
117. **This feedback loop poses a threat to Israel's political and economic model. This attack has already gained strategic significance and may evolve into an existential threat in the coming years.**

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See Reut Institute analysis: [The Trend of Palestinian and Arab Inversion towards the Two-State Solution](#). Approximately two years ago, the Adalah organization published a proposal for a new constitution calling for a transnational regime to control historic Palestine, and to entitle Palestinian refugees to fulfill a right of return. See Reut analysis: [Between Adalah's 'New Constitution' and Annapolis](#).

118. A harbinger of such a dynamic would be the collapse of the Two-State Solution as a consensual framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the coalescence behind a One-State Solution as a new framework.

Chapter 5: Relevancy Gap of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy Doctrine

Summary: Assumptions Underlying Israel's Current Doctrine

119. Several assumptions underlie Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine:

- **The primary threat to Israel's existence is military. The IDF and the defense establishment are responsible for meeting this challenge. Victory will be achieved on the battlefield** – Israel's security doctrine reflects a mindset in which the primary existential threat posed to Israel is physical and military. Therefore, the IDF and the security establishment carry the burden of Israel's security, since national victory will be determined in the military arena, usually in a clash between armed forces;
- **Israel's military and technological superiority is the country's bullet-proof vest** – The doctrine emphasizes developing Israel's military superiority and technological edge to enable Israel's preemption of any coalition of Arab armies, or victory in the case of military confrontation. Therefore, this doctrine also mandates the massive allocation of resources to defense;
- **The diplomatic arena is secondary in importance** – The struggle for Israel's fundamental legitimacy succeeded in 1947-49 with UN General Assembly Resolution 181 and the world's leading nations' recognition of Israel upon its establishment in 1948. Furthermore, Israel's key strategic ally is the world's leading superpower, the U.S., so there is no need to heavily invest in an effective foreign affairs establishment. This mindset manifests in all dimensions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' activities, including recruitment and training, financial compensation to diplomats, and the overall scope of resources;
- **Seen it; been there; done that (there is nothing new under the sun)** – Political, ideological, philosophical, and moral challenges to Zionism have persisted since its inception. The State of Israel has also faced attempts to undermine its legitimacy, exemplified by the UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism (1975), which then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin characterized as an "assault on Israel's right to exist";⁹⁰
- **The political leadership of the Western world supports Israel; we fall on the same side of many issues** – Israel's relations with the leading countries of the world – whether the G8 or the G20, as well as others – are strong and resilient, as manifested in the vast array of areas of cooperation. This despite differences of opinion regarding specific Israeli policies. Furthermore, Israel and the leading countries of the world share concerns regarding terrorism, radical Islam, and nuclear Iran;

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See: [Ministry of Foreign Affairs site](#); Also [Haaretz](#), 10/11/09, (Hebrew).

- **Delegitimizers are a small and marginal force in Western societies** – They often belong to the fringes and do not represent a significant force in any major country today;
- **Successes in delegitimizing Israel are due to poor Israeli *hasbara* compared to exceptional Palestinian efforts in this arena** – Challenges in the political arena are perceived as 'technical' in nature and circumscribed within the world of *hasbara*. According to this logic, a fleet of articulate spokespeople, clear messages, and disciplined communication would constitute a sufficient response.⁹¹ Following the Goldstone report, for example, a number of Israeli ministers were sent on rapid-response missions to provide *hasbara* for Israel's stance and policy;
- **It is about policy, and not about *hasbara*; resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would make the delegitimization issue disappear** – Israel's delegitimization feeds off the State of Israel's 'occupation' of the West Bank and, to a lesser degree, the 'Gaza blockade.' Therefore, achieving a Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would neutralize the delegitimization campaign against Israel;
- **The status of Israel's Arab citizens is a domestic matter** – The state of their equality and integration is an internal matter subject to the jurisdiction of Israeli government, courts, and local authorities;
- **The Jewish world is mobilized to be Israel's partner in this struggle** – Israel can rely on Jewish communities abroad to enlist in supporting Israel against local forces advancing its delegitimization.

120. **In practice, emergent trends are challenging these fundamental assumptions:**

- **A primary assault on Israel's existence today is directed at its political and economic model; it may become existential** – The Resistance Network's organizing logic is political and diplomatic, and it aims to precipitate Israel's implosion from within. It is inspired by the models of the USSR and apartheid South Africa, which collapsed in an astonishing dynamic that combined internal political and societal developments, international diplomatic and economic pressures, and global delegitimization campaigns.⁹² More countries have 'disappeared' due to the collapse of their political-economic model than due to conquest or military defeat;

⁹¹ See Three New Government Ministries Created, [Jerusalem Post](#); Also Gil Hoffman, [Jerusalem Post](#) 02/17/10.

⁹² See excerpt from speech delivered by Iranian President Ahmadinejad: "Israel is on a path of collapse. The Soviet Union disappeared, and this will also be the fate of the Zionist regime." (David Cohen, [YNET](#), 12/12/06) (Hebrew); or see Nasrallah's 'spider web theory,' which focuses on Israel imploding as a result of internal political realities (5/26/2000) (Zvi Barel, [Haaretz](#), 07/17/06) (Hebrew).

- **The Resistance Network's logic bypasses Israel's military superiority and targets Israel's legitimacy** – The Resistance Network recognizes Israel's military superiority and thus avoids direct military confrontation to the greatest extent possible.⁹³ Hence, while Israel primarily focuses on achieving military victories, it neglects other critical arenas of its national victory such as the home front (in which a dramatic change is in process), diplomacy and the media;
- **Israel may be militarily and technologically superior, but suffers from conceptual inferiority** – As previously defined, conceptual inferiority refers to the effectiveness and relevance of one side's logic relative to that of the other side. The Resistance Network's logic and operational patterns have proven effective and relevant in repeatedly frustrating Israel's political and military attempts to secure itself as a Jewish and democratic state;
- **We have not seen this before: a new dynamic creates a new type of threat** – The Resistance Network's Logic of Implosion, in concert with the Delegitimization Network's progress toward turning Israel into a pariah state, have precipitated the recent deterioration in Israel's international standing. For the time being, the Israeli establishment is not producing an effective response to the challenges associated with this threat. It is therefore highly likely that Israel will continue to suffer military and political setbacks;
- **In the eyes of civil society: From *Kibbutz* (symbol of model society) to *Kibbush* (occupation)** – Israel still maintains very good relations with political elites. However, in civil society – particularly within academia; among many NGOs; and in liberal circles; especially in Europe – it has come to represent violence, aggression, disregard for human rights, etc.;
- **Delegitimizers punch above their weight by effectively blurring the lines between their efforts and those of critics of Israeli policy** – Despite their small numbers and marginal political power in Western societies, the Delegitimization Network has successfully advanced its agenda by reaching out to, and working with, critics of Israeli policy that are *not* delegitimizers, even if their criticism is unfounded and biased. They are even willing to embrace Israelis and self-proclaimed Zionists;
- **Delegitimization is an ideology and not just a problem of *hasbara*** – The Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network challenge Israel's very existence on ideological, national, religious, philosophical, or moral grounds. Therefore, while efficient and effective *hasbara* may be very important, it provides an insufficient response to delegitimization;
- **Similarly, ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not end Israel's delegitimization** – A variety of radical left wing and Islamic fundamentalist organizations and individuals that reject Israel's existence drive its

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See: Melman, *Haaretz*, 08/29/06.

delegitimization in the West. Therefore, even if an Israeli-Palestinian agreement is reached, these elements will persist in their efforts to destroy the legitimacy of the State of Israel and will simply refocus their efforts on a new issue;

- **The status of Israel's Arab citizens is repeatedly leveraged in order to advance the agenda of Israel's delegitimization, and may gain prominence.** It is likely to become the next item on the top of the agenda of Israel's delegitimizers, particularly if an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is reached;
- **The Jewish world is growing more distant from Israel** – Not only is criticism of Israel more prevalent within the Jewish world than in the past, but a growing number of Jews do not have enough historical knowledge to articulate the justification for Israel's existence, not to mention the choices it faces or the logic of the decisions it makes.⁹⁴

Table Summary: Gaps between Doctrine and Reality

	The Doctrine	The Reality	Policy Directions
What is the strategic threat?	Israel's sole existential threat is military. The security establishment will provide the response. Israel's victory will be determined on the battlefield.	There is a new strategic threat in the political-diplomatic arena, fundamental delegitimization, which may turn existential within a few years. An overhauled foreign affairs establishment must deal with this threat. Israel's successes will be determined in multiple interconnected arenas.	To place delegitimization as a national security priority. To develop a 'Synchronized Victories' doctrine providing a systemic Israeli response in all relevant arenas.
What provides for Israel strategic superiority?	Economic, military, and technological superiority, as well as Israel's close strategic alliance with the U.S., create Israel's strategic	The Resistance Network does not have the capacity to conquer Israel militarily. The Delegitimization Network has no desire to	To carry out a comprehensive reassessment of Israel's security and foreign affairs doctrine with the aim of achieving

⁹⁴ See for example a speech by John Ruskay, Executive Vice President and CEO of UJA Federation of NYC: Living Lives of Sacred Responsibility, [JTA](#) 12/8/09: "...too few of our people ... are able to effectively respond to Palestinian claims or to campaigns which seek to de-legitimize the moral basis for Israel ... an important component of effective Israel education provides settings to work through difficult historical and moral issues, which both deepens knowledge and solidifies personal commitment to and engagement with Israel... we will embark on a major effort to enable young and old to legitimate Israel...".

	The Doctrine	The Reality	Policy Directions
	superiority.	do so. Their assault focuses on Israel's political and economic model through asymmetrical warfare, overstretching Israel, and delegitimization. Israel has no coherent conceptual response to this combined challenge and suffers from conceptual inferiority.	'Synchronized Victories.'
What's new in the threat against Israel?	Not much: Low-intensity asymmetrical warfare has long-been waged against Israel; Arab states have traditionally rejected Israel's right to exist; and principled opposition to Zionism has persistently existed within Europe.	The connection and compounding effect between the Resistance Network, undermining the Two-State Solution, and the Delegitimization Network, promoting the One-State Solution and working to turn Israel into a pariah state, is creating a new reality.	Ditto.
Do we really have a problem?	Not really. Israel has excellent relations with the political leaderships of the leading countries of the world and falls on the same side of issues such as the fight against terrorism and the concern with the rise of radical Islam (even if there are disagreements on issues such as the settlements).	Israel faces a serious challenge in civil society and among some liberal European elites. The compounded effect of the Delegitimization Network and the Resistance Network already exacts a strategic price from Israel.	As above.
Who is on the other side?	Countries. Israel's foreign affairs establishment is organized to work with and vis-à-vis countries and regions (Europe, Latin America, etc.).	A network of organizations and individuals based in civil society.	It takes a network to fight a network.
How powerful	Not very strong. They are often fringe forces of	Delegitimizers punch above their weight by	Weaken delegitimizers by exposing their true

	The Doctrine	The Reality	Policy Directions
are delegitimizers?	anarchists, radicals, Muslim immigrant elements, etc., that do not have any real political power.	branding themselves as 'moral' and 'cool' and by harnessing critics of Israeli policies in broad coalitions with significant impact in civil society.	face; isolate delegitimizers by engaging with critics of Israeli policy.
The relation between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and delegitimization	Two common views: Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will neutralize the delegitimization issue (traditional 'left-wing' view); or, "They are all anti-Israel" and will continue to delegitimize Israel even if the conflict is resolved (common 'right-wing' view).	Both views are both relevant and irrelevant: Ending 'occupation' and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is very important to combating delegitimization; yet Israel's delegitimization is fundamentally ideological, and stems from a core rejection of Zionism's and Israel's political model. Therefore, it is likely to continue even following a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	Israel must demonstrate a credible commitment to ending control of the Palestinian population. ⁹⁵
Israel's Arab Citizens	The status of Israel's Arab citizens is a domestic issue.	Israel's Arab citizens serve a central role in the matrix of the Resistance Network and the Delegitimization Network. Their issues with the Government of Israel feed the agenda of Israel's delegitimization, and their status in Israel is likely to become a future anchor of the delegitimization	Place the status of Israel's Arab citizens as a high priority, seeking equality and partnership. ⁹⁶ Special attention must be given to resolving issues regarding the Bedouin community.

⁹⁵ This topic falls beyond the scope of this document. For Reut's view on the design of the Israeli-Palestinian political process in order to defend the principle of separation between Israel and the Palestinians see: [Reassessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Build a Palestinian State in the West Bank](#).

⁹⁶ This topic falls beyond the scope of this document. For Reut's view, see: [Integrating Israel's Arab citizens into the ISRAEL 15 Vision](#).

	The Doctrine	The Reality	Policy Directions
		campaign against Israel.	
Where is Israel falling short?	<p><i>Hasbara</i> or policy: Israel does not tell its 'true story' well enough or effectively present its side of the issue. Therefore, a greater number of more articulate speakers would do the job; or</p> <p>"It is about what Israel does, not about what it says," i.e. ending control over Palestinians would neutralize the delegitimization threat.</p>	<p>Whereas, both <i>hasbara</i> and Israel's policy are critically important to addressing delegitimization, Israel's delegitimization is fundamentally ideological, and stems from a core rejection of Zionism's and Israel's political model.</p> <p>Therefore this challenge is beyond either PR or policy and requires a systemic approach.</p>	<p>To address the organizational level of delegitimization by focusing on its hubs and catalysts.</p> <p>To overhaul the foreign affairs establishment in order to provide it the capacity to wage a global networked campaign.</p>
The Jewish World and Israeli Diaspora	The support of the Jewish world and Israeli Diaspora is ensured.	The Jewish world is growing increasingly distant from Israel. Furthermore, not only are many Jews and Israelis not mobilized for the struggle against delegitimization, but many do not possess the basic knowledge required for this struggle.	To mobilize Jews and Israelis (in Israel and abroad) within a network that responds to delegitimization.

Foreign Affairs Establishment Not Designed to Address Delegitimization

121. **Israel's foreign affairs establishment is not equipped to meet the delegitimization challenge** – Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was designed in the 1950s to address Israel's foreign affairs in a bipolar Cold War world and in accordance with its secondary importance in the national security apparatus. Decades of neglect in resources, organization, and attention have kept Israel's political and diplomatic arm weak and therefore ill-structured to address the global challenge of delegitimization for the following reasons:⁹⁷

- **No security and foreign affairs doctrine guides foreign policy** and relations and informs objectives, policy, and resource allocation;

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See Reut document: [Memo to Winograd: Overhaul Foreign Policy in National Security Strategy](#).

- **No clear responsibility for central foreign policy issues, and therefore no policy on critical matters** such as relations with the Jewish world; bilateral relationships with the world's most important countries such as the U.S., Russia, India, China, or the European Union; or *hasbara* and media strategies. In practice, Israel's foreign 'policy' is the outcome of a patchwork of actions taken by multiple government agencies, operating in parallel and often without coordination or information-sharing;⁹⁸
- **No coordinated action in any given country; the ambassador is not the de-facto boss of the embassy** – Relevant government offices do not consider the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a leader of foreign policy. Representatives of various government ministries report to headquarters and *not* always to the ambassador, nor are they obligated to report their activities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- **Politicization and unionization** – Unlike institutions within the defense establishment, the professionalism and standing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is compromised by political appointments at its highest levels, as well as by the existence and activities of a union;
- **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not organized to deal with a global civil society challenge** – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is structured according to a geographic logic focusing on regions and countries. It does not have the organization, modes-of-operation, or resources to wage a global campaign. Furthermore, its ethos and personnel are not adapted to dealing effectively with the challenge of a global non-governmental campaign;⁹⁹
- **Budgets and resources are meager and stagnant** – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget stands at approximately one billion NIS (less than \$270,000), with the vast majority designated for non-flexible expenditures such as salaries and real estate. Resources for activities and projects are meager.¹⁰⁰ For example, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employs in the order of 1,000 personnel, only approximately 220 are posted as professional diplomats among approximately 100 embassies and missions abroad at any given time.

⁹⁸ For example, the security establishment's intelligence bodies analyze information with high political value that is not distributed to relevant agencies in foreign service.

⁹⁹ Past years have seen a significant body of work on New Public Diplomacy (NPD), which focuses on concepts such as 'branding', 'smart power' or 'soft power', and expands the scope of 'diplomacy' beyond relations with formal entities of government to non-governmental organizations, municipalities and local governments, influential individuals in business, academia, and even celebrities. See: **Public Diplomacy in Israel**, Joint Project of the S. Neaman Institute, Technion and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, 2009, pgs. 24-37 (written by Dov Shinar).

¹⁰⁰ For example, the budget allocation to advancing Israel's athletic activities globally, advanced by the cultural department, stands at approximately 10,000 NIS (less than \$2,700), and the budget for *hasbara* stands at 40 million NIS (less than \$11 million).

For example, three diplomats alone represent Israel in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific. There are less than ten international law experts employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and until recently, not one of them was a permanent member of Israel's UN mission;

- **Low salaries and compensation, especially for diplomats based in Israel** – Israeli diplomats earn low salaries relative to other defense establishments, and earn significantly less while in Israel than when posted abroad. For example, veteran diplomats with families may earn less than a junior IDF combat officer. This significantly impacts the access of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to talent and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' ability to play a dominant role in Israel's national security establishment;
- **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has unique assets that are not leveraged against delegitimization. It is reactive and defensive** – The unique value of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stems from the issues it covers; the unique abilities, experience, connections, and training of its cadre; and the spread of its embassies worldwide. Yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no clear mode-of-operation that leverages its unique assets in contending with fundamental delegitimization.

Chapter 6: Policy Directions: From Defense to Relationship-Based, Network-Based Offense

Policy and *Hasbara* are Important, but Insufficient

122. As mentioned, credible and persistent commitment to peace and ending the control over the Palestinian population, as well as to equality and integration of the Arabs citizens of Israel within Israeli society, are crucially important for the battle against delegitimization. However, as delegitimizers ideologically reject Israel's existence and the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, their struggle will continue even if, for example, a comprehensive Permanent Status Agreement is concluded that ushers in 'end of conflict' or 'finality of claims'.

The 'Synchronized Victories' Concept

123. **Israel's security doctrine must seek to achieve 'Synchronized Victories' in several arenas simultaneously in any future conflict.** Israel's security doctrine, which emphasizes military superiority to secure decisive battlefield victory, would have to become more sophisticated and synchronize successes in the political-diplomatic, home-front, and media arenas. Because these arenas are systemically interconnected, they should be regarded as an integrated whole. **This is the 'Synchronized Victories' concept. Developing the substance of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper.**

Principles of Response: From Defense to Offense

124. **Delegitimization cannot be eliminated, but it can be contained and marginalized,** if the following principles are employed:
- **The threat of fundamental delegitimization is potentially existential and must be regarded as such:** This requires information gathering, knowledge development, dedicated organizations, strategic planning, effective implementation, and adequate oversight by Cabinet, Government and Knesset bodies;
 - **It takes a network to fight a network**¹⁰¹ – Combating the Delegitimization Network requires a network-based logic that focuses on its hubs and catalysts, while developing the catalysts and hubs of the pro-Israel network;
 - **Engaging in relationship-based diplomacy with elites and influentials in hubs** – The most effective barrier against the spread of delegitimization among the elites is personal relationships. Therefore, Israel must cultivate a network of thousands of such relationships with influentials and elites in

¹⁰¹ This is a well-known principle in the world of networks. See: Dr. Boaz Ganor, **It Takes a Network to Beat a Network**; John Arquilla, **It Takes a Network**; or Dr. Pete Rustan, **Building an Integral Intelligence Network**.

political, business, cultural, media, and security realms in every delegitimization hub;

- **Branding: Re-branding Israel and branding the other side** – Israel's delegitimizers have been quite successful in branding it. Hence, Israel's re-branding should be a priority for Israel's response,¹⁰² as is mounting a counter-offensive aimed at branding the other side for their true values;¹⁰³
- **Establishing a 'price-tag'** for attacking Israel by 'naming and shaming' delegitimizers;
- **Let the local pro-Israel community guide** – While all delegitimization hubs share common characteristics, each is distinct. Therefore, in most cases, the local pro-Israel community would be better positioned to lead the struggle against the delegitimizers with greater sensitivity to local nuances and context than the Israeli delegation;
- **Re-structuring the foreign affairs establishment** in terms of modes-of-operation, resource allocation, human resource management, etc. to meet the global delegitimization challenge.

The Threat: Strategic, and Potentially Existential

125. As stated, Reut contends that Israel's delegitimization poses a strategic threat that may ultimately develop into an existential one. It is imperative to treat this threat accordingly by:

- **Collecting information, analyzing it, and turning it into knowledge** – Delegitimization should rank among the collection and analysis priorities of the intelligence community. There needs to be more and better information identifying delegitimizers, catalysts, and their modes-of-operation. **Much of this information can and should be made public;**
- **Including delegitimization as a distinct topic in the annual National Security Assessment** presented to the government;
- **Designating a specific existing or new unit to integrate the systemic response to delegitimization** among all relevant bodies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Council, intelligence agencies, and other relevant ministries;
- **Developing a 'mode-of-operation'** to preempt and respond to delegitimization, focusing on the catalysts and the hubs of the Delegitimization Network.

¹⁰² Reut thanks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Head of Israel's Brand Management Team Ido Aharoni for this insight regarding branding Israel.

¹⁰³ Reut thanks Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister for Policy Planning Ron Dermer, who expanded on this theme in his address to the 2010 Jerusalem Conference.

It Takes a Network to Fight a Network; Relationship-Based Diplomacy

126. **Network logic: Focus on hubs and catalysts** – Embracing network logic means focusing on delegitimization hubs, and working to undermine catalysts within them by leveraging pro-Israel hubs and mobilizing catalysts dedicated to Israel's legitimacy.
127. **The most effective barrier to Israel's delegitimization is personal relationships** that generate an ability to relate to Israel. Many case studies in which delegitimization attempts failed show that the key to success was the activation of already existing personal connections with key individuals in positions of authority, leadership, or influence. **Hence, cultivating relationships with elites is critically important for the battle against delegitimization.**
128. **Each hub contains a grossly estimated 4,000 individuals that comprise the elite**, including politicians, academics, artists, media figures, celebrities, etc. This group must be qualitatively engaged by Israel or the pro-Israel community.¹⁰⁴

129. **Fighting the delegitimizers' network:**

- **Focusing attention and resources on hubs** – As previously described, the power of a network is concentrated in its hubs. Therefore, Israel must identify delegitimization hubs, usually metropolitan areas hosting strong anti-Israel sentiments and containing a concentration of international NGOs, media, corporations, and academia. Within these hubs – such as London, the San Francisco Bay Area, Madrid, Paris, Toronto, and Brussels – Israel must significantly increase its diplomatic and public diplomacy activities.¹⁰⁵ **Contending with each hub requires a tailor-made approach based on unique constellations of hundreds of relationships with local elites in political, business, media, and security spheres;**
- **Containing and undermining catalysts** – The catalysts of the Delegitimization Network must be identified, studied, and, to the extent possible, undermined by legal, media, political, and diplomatic means;
- **Engaging critics to isolate them from delegitimizers** – As mentioned, a key to the Delegitimization Network's effectiveness is its willingness to cooperate with critics of Israeli policies, including self-proclaimed Zionists. In contrast, Israel frequently turns a cold shoulder to its critics who are *not* delegitimizers, in practice pushing them into the outstretched arms of the Delegitimization Network. In order to drive a wedge between Israel's critics and delegitimizers, Israel should engage with the former while confronting the latter.

¹⁰⁴ The number 4,000 is a rough estimate made by one of the diplomats with whom we spoke.

¹⁰⁵ Barabasi & Eric, "Scale Free Networks", *Scientific American*, May 2003.

130. **Cultivating Israel's own global network** to respond to the delegitimization challenge by identifying its own hubs and empowering its catalysts with the resources necessary for their activities, such as:

- **Strengthening Israeli diplomats and embassies in hubs** – An embassy in a hub such as London should have at least ten diplomats exclusively contending with the delegitimization challenge, supported by a dedicated intelligence operation, and allotted budgets for related activities.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, each embassy and every diplomat should be evaluated on the basis of abilities to cultivate relationships with political, business, media, and security-related elites;
- **Mobilizing and training civil society partners** – The majority of Israel's interface with the world occurs within civil society, rather than through the formal channels of the foreign affairs establishment. A significant number of Israeli organizations are in regular contact with international counterparts, for example students and faculty in academia, NGOs, and the private sector. Israel should harness, train, and prepare them in advance of their international interface. In addition, existing organizations of Israelis and Jews can also contribute to the fight against delegitimization;¹⁰⁷
- **Activating 'catalysts'** who gather, analyze, and distribute information; organize events; mobilize others; and respond to the other side's activities;
- **Empowering friendly NGOs to engage the NGO world** – As previously described, a global network of non-governmental organizations drives Israel's delegitimization:
 - **NGOs promoting delegitimization¹⁰⁸ should be considered catalysts of the Delegitimization Network.** In this context, Israeli NGOs can be empowered to work with local NGOs in isolating such catalysts.¹⁰⁹
 - **NGOs critical of Israeli policy should be continuously, professionally, personally, and substantively engaged,** even if their criticism is harsh, biased, unfair, fails to voice Israel's concerns, and

¹⁰⁶ This number is based on estimation that a hard-working diplomat conducts four out-of-office meetings per day, and that four meetings a year is the minimum required to sustaining a substantial relationship. Hence, each such diplomat can sustain roughly 350-400 relationships.

¹⁰⁷ On harnessing Diaspora populations for diplomatic purposes, see the concept of Diaspora Politics in Gilboa, 72-73; for examples of maintaining strong relations with Diasporas in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, see: [Haaretz](#) article (1/11/09) by Nir Cohen and Israel Popko, co-managers of 'Mishelanu' Organization for Israelis abroad.

¹⁰⁸ This refers to NGOs that tacitly or explicitly reject Israel's right to exist, blatantly employ double-standards, or engage in demonization of Israel.

¹⁰⁹ As an example, the Red-Green Alliance in London has been perceived as a problem within the UK as a result of the growing influence of radical forces on local politics. In recent years there has been considerable opposition within the British public against this alliance, and there are several British bodies that can be regarded as potential future partners in the campaign against extremists.

serves the delegitimization campaign. For the most part, the relationships currently maintained by critical NGOs based in Israel are with Israeli NGOs, mostly from the far left of the political spectrum. The State of Israel, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can empower mainstream NGOs – with information, access, and budgets – to take on the role of engaging critical NGOs.

- **Rebuilding the International Department of the *Histadrut* (Israel's national labor union)¹¹⁰** - The international relations of the *Histadrut* have gone from center stage to backstage. Until the 1980s, the *Histadrut*, through its International Department, maintained many working relationships with trade unions around the world. In the past 20 years, this department has dwindled to comprise only three employees¹¹¹ responsible for all international activity conducted by the *Histadrut* and its affiliated organizations.¹¹²

In recent years, **trade unions have become a primary arena for the Delegitimization Network's operations**, which Israel practically abandoned.

The *Histadrut* is ideally positioned to take central stage in representing Israel in the organized labor community with its 12 percent Arab membership and long-standing relationship with the Palestinian labor union (PGFTU). **Hence, strengthening and expanding the resources allocated to the International Department of the *Histadrut* is integral to the fight against delegitimization in labor and trade unions;**

- **Deepening Jewish communities' commitment** – Israel must strengthen the connection and commitment of Diaspora Jewish communities to Israel by working with local Jewish leadership on information and education programs.¹¹³ In many places, Jews are finding it more difficult to support Israel due to its policies and heightened allegations of 'dual loyalty.' Additionally, in many communities even those instinctively supportive lack the knowledge with which to effectively advocate for Israel;
- **Organizing regular meetings of pro-Israel networks in hubs** in order to exchange information, coordinate, brand, create a sense of urgency, etc.

¹¹⁰ *Histadrut* is a short name for *HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael*, General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel ([click here](#), Hebrew only. No website in English!).

¹¹¹ This past year, the *Histadrut's* International Department entered into a process of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which began to develop direct relationships with a number of pro-Israel professional unions around the world. Still, in light of the importance of the trade and labor union arena, there remains much work to be done.

¹¹² Amir Peretz, former chair of the *Histadrut* (1995-2005), focused on domestic issues, and the international department was practically dissolved. This concept landed on fertile ground since *Histadrut* leaders did not have significant international experience, and some of them did not speak English.

¹¹³ See also Reut Institute document: [A New Covenant between Israel and the Jewish World: A Conceptual Framework](#)

The Clash of Brands

131. **Branding Israel as a violent, occupying country, which abuses human rights and violates international law, is a pillar of the delegitimization campaign.** This brand associates Israel with excessive and repetitive use of force, aggression, arrogance, and disruption of regional and world peace and security. Thus, Israel is rendered irrelevant regarding issues on the global agenda, such as the environment, the war on poverty, and climate change, to broad populations in leading countries who care about such issues.

Such a brand eases Israel's delegitimization and labeling as a pariah and 'apartheid' state. It impedes Israel's engagement with foreign audiences and makes it vulnerable to even the most wildly improbable allegations.

132. **Hence, re-branding Israel is of critical importance to fighting delegitimization** – A strong Israel brand that is associated with 'positive' values, such as innovation, creativity, and contribution to humanity, will make delegitimization more difficult and create a more effective platform for traditional Israeli PR. In this context, the success of the Brand Israel project, which was launched in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become a national project, is of paramount importance.¹¹⁴
133. **Branding the other side is also critically important** – Similarly, if the brand of the other side is weak and associated with 'bad values,' it diminishes the credibility of its efforts to delegitimize Israel and enhances the traction that Israel's narrative can gain.
134. **Branding is different from *Hasbara*:** While *hasbara* is a tool used to manage crises and communicate messages using campaign methodologies, branding is a strategic tool for long-term and 'personality'-based positioning. Furthermore, branding impacts, and sometimes even determines, the ability of *hasbara* to succeed: If Israel's brand remains unchanged, even the most talented spokespeople will have difficulty persuading.
135. ***Tikkun Olam*: Foreign assistance and humanitarian aid** – Significantly contributing to responses to challenges facing humanity is a common human duty and a Jewish value. In relation to the struggle against delegitimization and re-branding Israel, *Tikkun Olam* has great significance because it creates a dissonance with the demonized image of Israel that is advanced by the delegitimizers.

¹¹⁴ For example, a book that was edited on the request and encouragement of British philanthropist Trevor Pears presents Israeli contributions in the fields of science, medicine, technology, agriculture, and society. Hundreds of copies of the book were distributed by Israeli embassies and Jewish organizations worldwide. See: Helen Davis and Douglas Davis, **Israel in the World**, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005).

Establishing a 'Price Tag'

136. **Establishing a 'price tag'** – Today, attacking Israel is 'cheap' and convenient, but it can be turned into a more risky enterprise. Examples include journalist Ben-Dror Yemini's exposure of senior Human Rights Watch (HRW) official Joe Stork, who accused Israel of targeting civilians in Gaza, called for Israel's destruction, and expressed support for terror attacks. Meanwhile, NGO Monitor exposed activities of then-senior HRW expert Mark Garlasco, who compiled some of the organization's most damning reports against Israel, as a collector of Nazi memorabilia – a move that led to his dismissal.¹¹⁵

Let the Locals Guide

137. **Israel is blessed to have many organizations and individuals around the world that support it.** They are Jews and non-Jews, Israeli and non-Israelis, individuals and organization, and in many cases, even federations of organizations with abundant resources, people, and passion.
138. **Local units of the pro-Israel network are likely to have greater sensitivity to local contexts and nuances, enabling them to operate with greater effectiveness.** They are immersed in the local society and culture, and are likely to know the local elite in business, art and culture, politics, and academia better than the local Israeli delegation.
139. **Hence, the relationship between the Israeli diplomatic mission and the local leadership is potentially synergetic and critically important in successfully responding to the delegitimization challenge.** The specific nature of this collaboration should vary from place to place, but its main attributes are based on the unique value of each side, as follows:
- The local Israeli diplomatic mission: Communicates the voice of Jerusalem to the local community and vice versa; serves as a formal front of Israel that draws 'fire'; and engages in the labor-intensive work of relationship-based diplomacy;
 - The local pro-Israel community: Provides people, funding, resources, and platforms for response; compounds Israeli relationship-building efforts; and reaches out to organizations and individuals that a formal Israeli mission cannot.

Re-organizing Israel's Foreign Affairs Establishment

140. As described above, **the challenge facing Israel's foreign affairs establishment by the delegitimization campaign is new in structure and scope. The Ministry**

¹¹⁵ See: Ben Dror Yemini [NRG](#), 16/08/09 (Hebrew); Expert or Ideologues?: HRW's Defense of Marc Garlasco's Nazi Fetish, [NGO-Monitor Website](#), 10/09/09.

of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies are not organized to effectively respond.

Reut recommends the following structural changes:

141. **Zero-based budgeting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign affairs establishment**¹¹⁶ – The context of the foreign affairs establishment's work, and the challenge it faces, have changed dramatically over the past years, requiring a major overhaul. Every department and embassy must be comprehensively restructured to address the challenge of delegitimization. Allocated budgets should be revisited in their entirety, starting from a zero-base and without regard to whether the total budget is increasing or decreasing.

Reut anticipates this process would result in a significant expansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the number of diplomats and the budgets at its disposal, as well as of other related units, such as the Foreign Trade Administration of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor.
142. **Resource allocation based on network logic, focusing on hubs** – Delegitimization predominantly emanates from a few global metropolitan areas – the hubs. Only intensive Israeli activity in them can successfully contend with this threat. This requires not only generously allocating resources and diplomats to these hubs, but also restructuring the embassies in each.
143. **Improving parliamentary oversight of foreign policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** – Currently, the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee primarily deals with military and security issues. The scope of parliamentary oversight of foreign policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not reflect the growing importance of these issues.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ On zero-based budgeting, See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-based_budgeting.

¹¹⁷ Only one out of six subcommittees of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee deals with foreign policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Appendix A:

Erosion of Israel's International Standing: A Sampling of Events

In recent years, Israel has faced a dramatic assault on its fundamental legitimacy, as representing the realization of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. While the ideological framework for this delegitimization was solidified after the first Durban Conference in 2001, the trend has been boosted by the perceived lack of progress in the political process, coupled with the reactions to Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.¹¹⁸

As described in this document, delegitimizers represent a marginal phenomenon in Western politics, who are 'punching above their weight' primarily by blurring the lines with those that are critical of Israeli policies. Their aim is the dissolution of Israel and their strategy is to turn it into a pariah state. This annex provides examples for their activities:

The Strategy: Turning Israel into a Pariah

- Addressing an International Conference on Palestine in London, Betty Hunter of Palestine Solidarity Campaign, UK said that, "Our task is to isolate Israel and to make it a pariah state." ([International Conference on Palestine—London](#) 12/5/04).
- Speaking at Hampshire College, Ali Abuminah explained that, "The loss of legitimacy in the practices of the [South African] apartheid regime is what changed, and when a system loses its legitimacy, all the weapons in the world cannot protect it... we're beginning to see a similar loss of legitimacy for Zionism." ([Conference in Hampshire College](#) 11/21/09).
- During Operation Cast Lead, the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network advised that "unless this ideology [of Zionism] is delegitimized and defeated, the violence in the Middle East will continue to escalate." ([Call to Action on Gaza](#) 01/09/09).

Demonization

Demonization of Israel takes place when Israel is presented as being systematically, purposefully, and extensively cruel and inhumane, thus denying the moral legitimacy of its existence. Associating Israel with Nazism or apartheid or accusing it of unjustifiable acts of evil constitutes demonization. This narrative plays out in several key arenas, such as public protests and demonstrations, media, and campus activities.

- Protestors in Brazil, Madrid, and Buenos Aires held signs equating Israeli leaders and actions with Nazism and genocide ([YNET](#) 11/12/09, [ADL](#) 01/09).
- A series of events, titled "Gaza: Our Guernica," organized by the Palestinian societies at five University of London campuses, is due to take place throughout January and February. The reference to Guernica evokes a fascist attack that targeted Basque civilians ([Jerusalem Post](#) 01/21/10).

¹¹⁸ See: Ari Shavit, [Haaretz](#), 10/15/09; Ethan Bronner, [New York Times](#), 10/19/09.

- First launched in 2005, Israel Apartheid Week is an annual event organized by anti-Zionist groups, which aims to create a link between Israel and the former apartheid regime in South Africa in order to lead a boycott against it. In 2010, Apartheid Week grew to include more than 40 cities, including England, the U.S., South Africa, the West Bank, Mexico, Scotland, and Norway¹¹⁹ ([Jerusalem Post](#) 3/1/10).
- A series of articles aimed to establish Israel as an apartheid state engaging in racist and discriminatory behavior (Guardian feature on Israel and apartheid 2/6/07 [part 1](#) and [part 2](#)).
- The University of Pittsburgh held a conference entitled 'Divest from Israeli Apartheid' ([Pittsburgh Palestine Solidarity Committee](#) 10/23/09).
- One of Sweden's largest dailies published a double-page focusing on claims that Israeli soldiers seized young men from the West Bank and Gaza and later returned the bodies with missing organs ([Aftonbladet](#) 08/26/09).
- Nobel peace laureate Mairead Maguire accused Israel of "ethnic cleansing" policies in east Jerusalem ([Agence France-Presse](#) 04/21/09).

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)

Attempts to demonize Israel provide the ideological and rhetorical platform for pursuing a policy of BDS in the fields of academia, economy, culture, sport, and security.

Despite the BDS movement including several academics, trade unions, and church groups, it has enjoyed limited practical success so far. However, efforts have been highly successful in generating publicity and in mobilizing anti-Israel activism, effectively uniting anti-Zionists with critics of specific Israeli policies.¹²⁰

The risk posed is that such campaigns will create an equivalency between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa that penetrates the mainstream of public and political consciousness. Given Israel's dependence on vigorous trade – as well as scientific, academic, and technological engagement with other countries – this movement towards isolating the country may pose a strategic threat.

The BDS movement is largely spearheaded by non-governmental organizations. In a revealing example, the World Social Forum – an umbrella group for hundreds of social, anti-globalization, and rights groups worldwide – announced it would be launching a campaign calling on all of its affiliates to excommunicate Israel ([YNET](#) 3/30/09). Similar initiatives have also been taken up in academic, cultural and scientific, security, and economic arenas.

¹¹⁹ For more see Reut Concept [Israel Apartheid Week](#).

¹²⁰ See: Gal Beckerman [The Forward](#) 9/16/09.

Academia:

- One of Norway's largest academic institutions, the University of Bergen, intends to impose an official academic boycott against Israel over what it claims is its apartheid-like conduct ([YNET](#) 01/24/10).
- The board of the University of Trondheim in Norway held a vote on adopting an academic boycott of Israel. Three days prior, the institution hosted a lecture on Israel's alleged use of anti-Semitism as a political tool ([Haaretz](#) 10/20/09).
- A group of American university professors recently launched the [U.S. Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel](#) ([Weekly Standard](#) 3/20/09).
- University workers in the Canadian Union of Public Employees passed a motion calling for an academic boycott of Israel, and union members from at least one Toronto university planned to pressure their school to cut any financial ties with the country ([The Star](#) 02/22/09).
- A letter by 400 UK academics urging boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel was published in the *Guardian* ([The Guardian](#) 01/26/09).
- Since 2003, there have been many attempts to impose an academic boycott on Israel in the UK. A prominent example is the successful passage – later overturned – of a motion by Britain's largest lecturers' union (Natlhe) supporting a boycott of Israeli lecturers and academic institutions not publicly disassociating from Israel's "apartheid policies" ([The Guardian](#) 05/30/06; [UCU Website](#) 5/30/06).

Culture and Science:

- The Toronto International Film Festival was the object of controversy for selecting Tel Aviv as its thematic subject, with high-profile artists signing a statement in support of a filmmaker who withdrew his entry ([The Guardian](#) 09/07/09).
- An exhibition celebrating Tel Aviv's White City due to take place in Brussels was postponed after local organizers faced demands to boycott Israeli culture ([YNET](#) 2/9/09).
- The 2009 Edinburgh International Film Festival returned a £300 gift from the Israeli embassy following protests ([The Guardian](#) 09/07/09).
- More than 400 academics called on Britain's prestigious Science Museum to cancel workshops promoting Israeli scientific achievements to schoolchildren ([The Independent](#) 03/03/09).

Security:

- A Norwegian government pension fund sold its shares in Elbit Systems due to its role in building Israel's security fence ([TradingMarkets.com](#) 09/03/09).
- Belgium's government banned the export to Israel of weapons that "strengthen it militarily" ([Haaretz](#) 02/01/09).

- British labor unions voted to support a ban on importing goods produced in 'illegal settlements' and ending arms trading with Israel ([Associated Press](#) 09/17/09).

Economic:

- The Irish Municipal, Public, and Civil Trade Union passed two resolutions endorsing a boycott of Israeli goods and services and supporting divestment from corporations engaged in, or profiting from, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza ([Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign](#) 05/29/08).
- The Congress of South African Trade Unions joined the boycott of Israel, calling Israel "an apartheid nation" ([YNET](#) 08/06/06).
- At its annual meeting, the British National Union of Journalists called for "a boycott of Israeli goods similar to those boycotts in the struggles against apartheid South Africa led by trade unions, and [for] the [Trade Union Congress] to demand sanctions be imposed on Israel by the British government " ([The Guardian](#) 04/13/07).
- Canadian Union of Postal Workers called for a boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign against Israel ([Canadian Union of Postal Workers](#) 04/09/09).

International 'Lawfare'

In parallel to demonization and promotion of the BDS Strategy, groups and individuals have increasingly sought to combat Israel in the legal arena. These efforts comprise attempts to: Utilize laws of universal jurisdiction in European countries in order to charge Israeli generals and politicians with war crimes, levy proceedings against Israel in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and file charges against corporations conducting business with Israel.

While certain initiators of these lawsuits claim to exclusively act according to a humanitarian agenda, Hamas involvement in some of these cases may indicate that the intention of prosecuting Israeli military and political leaders is not always pure.¹²¹

- A British court issued an arrest warrant for Tzipi Livni for war crimes that Livni allegedly conducted as Israel's foreign minister during Operation Cast Lead ([Guardian](#) 12/14/09).
- Two law firms representing a group of Palestinians applied for an international arrest warrant against Ehud Barak, claiming that he committed war crimes and breaches of the Geneva Convention during Operation Cast Lead ([Jerusalem Post](#) 09/29/09).
- French pro-Palestinian organizations filed a law suit with the International Criminal Court against the Israeli president, foreign minister, and defense minister ([JCPA](#) March April 2009).

¹²¹ See Reut post: [Legal Aid: Role in Livni Arrest Warrant and Beyond](#).

- A class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon ([NGO Monitor](#) 09/08). The following year, New Zealand's Auckland District Court issued an arrest warrant for Yaalon on charges of war crimes ([Jerusalem Post](#) 11/30/06).
- A class action lawsuit was filed in a New York U.S. District Court against former Director of Israel's General Security Service Avi Dichter for "war crimes and other gross human rights violations" concerning his alleged involvement in a 2002 military strike in Gaza ([NGO Monitor](#) 09/08).
- Major General Doron Almog avoided arrest in the UK by remaining on an El Al airplane and flying back to Israel, after a UK court issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of breaching international laws during Israel's control of Gaza ([BBC](#) 09/12/05).
- A lawsuit alleging war crimes was filed in a Spanish Court and with Switzerland's Military Attorney General against former Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, former Israel Security Agency Director Avi Dichter, and Doron Almog ([AJC](#) 10/04; [CNN](#) 1/29/09).
- Belgium's highest court was set to try Ariel Sharon for his role as defense minister in the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut ([New York Times](#) 02/13/2003).
- International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo considered investigating Lt. Col. David Benjamin, a reserve officer in the IDF involved in authorizing military actions during Operation Cast Lead, on the grounds of Benjamin's status as a dual citizen of Israel and South Africa, which has signed the ICC's charter ([Newsweek](#) 09/21/09). The ICC also considered whether the Palestinian Authority was "enough like a state" for it to initiate a case alleging that Israeli troops committed war crimes in Gaza ([The Guardian](#) 3/2/09).
- The UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict headed by Richard Goldstone "found strong evidence to establish" that Israel committed serious war crimes and breaches of humanitarian law that may amount to crimes against humanity ([UN](#) 09/15/09).
- In July 2008, lawsuits were filed in Quebec against three Canadian corporations accused of "aiding, abetting, assisting and conspiring with Israel, the Occupying Power in the West Bank, in carrying out an illegal act" through their involvement in construction projects in the town of Kiryat Sefer (Modi'in Ilit) ([NGO Monitor](#) 06/11/09).
- A 2005 lawsuit filed against Caterpillar, Inc. in a U.S. District Court charged the corporation with "providing specially designed bulldozers to the IDF that it knew would be used to demolish homes and endanger civilians" ([NGO Monitor](#) 09/08).
- A lawsuit was filed against the British Government charging that the sale of military equipment to Israel breached guidelines on arms exports and contributed to the oppression of Palestinians in the occupied territories ([The London Times](#) 05/30/07).

Appendix B: The Reut Institute: Frequently Asked Questions

Legal Status and History

The Legal Status of the Reut Institute American Friends of the Reut Institute

The Reut Institute, founded in January 2004, is an Israeli non-profit organization, operating under the Israeli law of nonprofits (*Chok HaAmutot*), which regulates the work, oversight and supervision of organizations in the nonprofit sector. Accordingly, Reut is run by a board of directors and a president whose duties and responsibilities are described in our bylaws (See clauses 17 and 26 – [click here for the Hebrew Version](#)).

[American Friends of the Reut Institute](#) (AFRI) is a non-profit organization registered in the United States and operating under the laws of the State of California. Its mission is to advance a vision of a prosperous and secure Israel. AFRI is the single largest supporter of the Reut Institute, and the Reut Institute is the chief recipient of AFRI's donations.

Who founded the Reut Institute?

Gidi Grinstein is the founder and first and current president of the Reut Institute. Noa Eliasaf-Shoham is Reut's co-founder.

The idea behind Reut was conceived by Gidi Grinstein following his service in the Bureau of the Prime Minister as the Secretary of the Israeli Delegation for the Negotiations with the PLO (1999-2001, the Barak Government). During this time, he came to the conclusion that Israel suffers from a weak capacity for professional and non-partisan long-term systemic thinking on issues that are complex and require transformations. Gidi also understood that the reason for this gap is structural and institutional, stemming from an electoral system that generates short and unstable tenures, and fragmented legislative (*Knesset*) and executive (government) branches.

Hence, Reut was founded to address the mismatch between the complexity of the challenges that Israel faces, on the one hand, and the weakness of its institutions, on the other hand. Our mission and strategy remain focused on this challenge (see below).

For more details about Reut, click [here](#). For information on Reut's founders, [click here](#). For more information on Gidi Grinstein, [click here](#).

Vision, Mission, Strategy, and Unique Value Proposition

Reut's Vision

The Charter of the Reut Institute ([click here](#)) establishes that the Reut Institute is a Zionist organization. It frames the vision as: "A secure, prosperous State of Israel; a state whose existence is secured and citizens are safe; a prosperous state that is a leading nation in terms of its quality of living; a state that is predominantly Jewish, offering

Jewish added value at the heart of the Jewish world and providing a significant contribution to the existence and prosperity of global Jewish peoplehood; a democratic state, which embraces universal humanistic values and aspires to create a society, which sets an example for the family of nations."

This represents the Reut vision of '21st Century Zionism' (For more information on '21st Century Zionism', [click here](#) and [click here](#)). Within this framework, we identify the following topics as ones that require focus:

- Ensuring Israel's national security ([click here](#));
- Aspiring towards the ISRAEL 15 Vision, which calls for Israel to become one of the fifteen leading countries in terms of quality of life ([click here](#));
- Pursuing the vision of a 'model society' which offers an example to the family of nations;
- Enriching the Jewish character of Jewish society's public sphere in Israel;
- Creating effective governance ([click here](#)).

The ISRAEL 15 Vision

The ISRAEL 15 Vision calls Israel to become one of the 15 leading countries in terms of quality of life within 15 years. This vision requires a social and economic leapfrog that would close the gap in quality of life between Israel and developed countries. This vision is the organizing idea of Reut in the context of Israel's social and economic development. For more information, [click here](#).

Reut's Mission

Reut's Charter ([click here](#)) defines our mission: "To sustain significant and substantive impact on the future of the State of Israel and the Jewish people and to leave an indelibly Israeli and Jewish imprint on the future of the world."

- **Sustaining impact** – Reut is committed to ongoing efforts to impact Israel and the Jewish world. Most other policy groups focus primarily on research and limit their efforts to generate impact to 'events,' such as publishing a book or holding a conference. The Reut model is anchored around the concept of 'impact' and we work to effectuate our ideas year round;
- **Significant impact** – Reut focuses on issues that hold great promise or pose grave threats to the State of Israel or the Jewish people. These issues are interchangeably referred to as 'fundamental gaps' or 'relevancy gaps' (as defined by Dr. Zvi Lanir, see [Praxis](#)) or as 'adaptive challenges' (as defined by Ron Heifetz, see below). They require ['leadership'](#), 'transformation,' 'adaptation' (see below), and 'fundamental impact';
- **Substantive impact** – Reut focuses on impacting the design and substance of strategies and policies that are essential for the security and prosperity of our nation and people. We work with ideas, concepts, and strategies, and reach out to other organizations when we need to work 'on the ground';

- **Indelible Jewish and Israeli imprint on the future of the world** – In accordance with the Jewish principles of *Tikkun Olam* (repairing the world) and *Or La'Goim* (a light unto the nations), Reut is obligated to aid humanity in facing its challenges in a way that will echo and express the unique values and abilities of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

Reut's mission is the bridge between its vision, on the one hand, and its strategy and unique added value (see below), on the other hand.

On 'Impact' and 'Leadership'

The concepts of 'impact' and 'leadership' are central to the [mission of the Reut Institute](#). In accordance with [Ron Heifetz's](#) book [Leadership without Easy Answers](#), Reut defines 'impact' as 'adaptive work',¹²² i.e. a change of values, priorities, patterns of conduct, or habits in order to deal with the challenges facing Israel or the Jewish world. In Reut terms, 'impact' is synonymous with 'fundamental change,' 'transformation,' and 'closure of relevancy gap' (as defined by Dr Zvi Lanir, see [Praxis](#)). It is assessed by monitoring the change in the actions, writings or statements of people in positions of leadership, influence, and decision-making authority.

Thus, 'leadership' refers to *activities* aimed at advancing 'impact,' i.e. promoting 'adaptive work' or closing 'relevancy gaps' or 'fundamental gaps'.¹²³ Building on Heifetz's insights, Reut's primary challenge is to provide 'leadership without authority.' The pillars of our strategy are designed to provide this kind of leadership.

Reut's Strategy

The Reut Institute's strategy is designed to serve and realize its [mission](#) and to provide unique 'leadership' as defined above. It has been refined over the past years and rests on three pillars:

- **Fundamental impact / Adaptive work** – Reut will work to offer leadership and generate fundamental impact on the issues that are critical to the security and prosperity of Israel and the Jewish world e.g. Israel's fundamental legitimacy, resilience, development or relations with the Jewish world;
- **Model for emulation** – Reut sees itself as a unique organization specializing in identifying strategic issues, designing appropriate responses and working to effectuate them. The structure and operations of Reut are uniquely innovative and could serve the Government of Israel well. Hence, as we strive for the Government of Israel and other relevant agencies to adopt our model, and as such

¹²² “Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs or behavior.” (Heifetz, p.22).

¹²³ “If we define problems by the disparity between values and circumstances, then an adaptive challenge is a particular kind of problem where the gap cannot be closed by the application of current technical know-how or routine behavior. To make progress, not only must invention and action change circumstances to align reality with values but the values themselves may also have to change.” (Heifetz, p. 35).

we methodically conceptualize and document our work in order to share them with all interested parties in the public sphere;

- **Training a cadre of strategic leaders** – Reut recruits and trains individuals who are committed to lifelong service of the Jewish and Israel public spheres, providing Israel's most extensive and intensive training program for strategic leadership. Reut dedicates significant resources to grooming its staff to key positions of leadership, influence, and authority in the public sphere.

How Does Reut Generate Impact?

There are six stages to Reut's cycle, aimed at generating fundamental impact. They are:

- **Identifying 'fundamental gaps' / 'Adaptive challenges'** – 'Fundamental gaps' – or, interchangeably, 'relevancy gaps' or 'adaptive challenges'¹²⁴ – exist when values, priorities, patterns of conduct, or habits are irrelevant to the challenges facing the community. Reut specializes in identifying such gaps using a package of theory, methodology, and software tools licensed from [Praxis](#);
- **Focused research** – Upon identifying a fundamental gap, Reut focuses on researching the gap and on developing an alternate conceptual framework to apply in coping with the challenges. In this phase, we research literature, interview experts, and develop new knowledge using the Praxis package;
- **Alternative strategies** – Based on the research, Reut proceeds to suggest new strategic ideas that may help bridge the fundamental gap;
- **Identifying individuals in positions of leadership, influence, or decision-making authority** – While progressing in the focused research, Reut identifies individuals and organizations in positions of leadership, influence, or decision-making authority that can promote and advance the new conceptual framework. This community may include elected officials and senior civil servants in municipal and national government, and leaders in the nonprofit, business, philanthropy, or academic sectors, as well as in the Jewish world;
- **Designing an impact strategy** – At this stage, Reut designs a strategic framework for closing the fundamental gap and advancing the adaptive work based on a new vision, which serves as a source of inspiration. The strategy is implemented in multiple phases based on detailed diagnostics. Ron Heifetz's theory on leadership without authority, from his book [Leadership without Easy Answers](#), serves as the theoretical basis for this stage;
- **Reut's role: To be a catalyst** by: (1) Branding the suggested vision; (2) generating a sense of urgency among the relevant constituencies; (3) conducting focused research; (4) creating synergies among individuals and organizations committed to realizing the vision; (5) enlarging the pie of resources available to this community; (6) identifying, documenting, and distributing local success

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“Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs or behavior.” (Heifetz, p. 22).

stories; (7) creating a shared and transparent source of information; and (8) advocating to update regulation and legislation;

- **Exiting** – Reut will continue to address a fundamental gap so long as it has unique added value to make. If we succeed in changing the prevailing mindset or no longer have a meaningful contribution to make, we will abandon the issue for other fundamental gaps ([click here](#)).

How Does the Reut Institute Groom Future Strategic Leaders?

According to our Charter, Reut grooms future strategic leaders in the Jewish and Israeli public spheres. To advance this goal, we operate in five interconnected stages:

- **Recruitment** – Reut recruits individuals committed to lifelong service of the Jewish and Israeli public spheres who wish to specialize in the strategic design of policy;
- **Training** – Reut's training regimen provides a theoretical, methodological, and technical foundation for the art of designing policy and strategy, and for leadership ([click here](#));
- **Team assignments** – Reut believes that to be a leader in the public sphere, one must act within one's passion and talent. Consequently, Reut is dedicated to assigning analysts to projects that can express their unique skills;
- **Personal development** – Reut offers a learning environment by providing professional training and feedback throughout the year, analyzing our own operations, regular study visits in Israel, and extensive international comparative exposure;
- **Placement** – Reut is committed to placing its graduates in positions of leadership, influence, and decision-making authority in the Israeli and Jewish public spheres. To date, a number of Reut graduates have been placed and are contributing to the security and well being of Israel and the Jewish world.

For further details, [click here](#).

What is the Reut Institute's Unique Added Value?

In addition to the three pillars of our strategy, each of which is unique to the Israeli and Jewish public spheres, the unique value of Reut stems from the following:

- **Identifying strategic surprises and opportunities** – Reut focuses on the fundamental level of policy and specializes in highlighting working assumptions and checking their relevance in order to uncover potential strategic surprises;
- **Asking questions in order to leverage already existing resources** – Reut provides decision-support services, which focus on *how* to think and not on *what* to think or do. We focus attention on issues that had been ignored and aim to turn them into the subject of detailed research by government, academia, and think tanks;

- **Integrating strategy and operation** – Reut specializes in integrating strategic level systemic and long-term policy design with front-line operators working in the field;
- **Providing quick turnaround** – Reut provides inputs to decision-making processes in very short time frames;
- **Interdisciplinary** – Reut specializes in addressing interdisciplinary fields that integrate varied fields of knowledge;
- **Developing new knowledge** – Reut specializes in developing new knowledge in fields that require the design and implementation of a new strategic perspective.

How is the Reut Institute Different from Think Tanks and Strategy Consultants?

Reut is unique in its organizational structure and differs from think tanks and strategy consultants in the following ways:

- Reut is structured to have **full flexibility in dealing with a wide range of issues** by identifying explicit and tacit working assumptions and checking their relevance. Most think tanks focus on a pre-determined set of issues and research them by collecting and analyzing information;
- Reut's unique added value is its **mastery of a methodology for researching strategic challenges and designing responses to them**. Most think tanks master specific fields of knowledge – such as economics or national security – and often reflect a political leaning;
- **Reut is a faceless brand** (like the Economist), with its reputation based on its methods and structure. The quality of our work is not influenced by the identity of our employees. Conversely, think tanks' status is often built upon the specific experts they employ, who represent the face of the organization;
- **Reut leads through questions** while most think tanks lead through answers. We offer decision-making services while most think-tanks provide the solutions they would implement were they to have the authority to do so.

How Does the Reut Institute Interact with Think Tanks?

Reut is committed to an effective and efficient public sphere. We are committed to enlarging the pie for everyone and eschew zero-sum games. This is one of our basic tenets and is manifested in all of our operations.

- **Reut views think tanks as potential partners that complement our abilities** – Reut specializes in identifying fundamental gaps based on a unique methodology, and doesn't employ well-known and renowned researchers. Most think tanks have experts, but lack methods to address strategic issues. Hence, the potential synergy;
- **Whereas most think-tanks use their Web sites to highlight their own publications, Reut's Web site – www.reut-institute.org – is designed as a portal for all work, from all organizations, that is relevant to the strategic issues we address.**

Operations

Who is the Reut Institute's Intended Audience?

Reut's target audience is **all individuals in positions of leadership, influence, and decision-making authority in the fields in which we work**, who can contribute to fundamental impact in Israel or the Jewish world. This community includes elected officials and senior civil servants in municipal and national government, and leaders in the non-profit, business, philanthropy, academic, and Jewish worlds.

What are 'Focus Areas'? How Does Reut Select its Focus Areas?

A 'focus area' is a field in which we identify fundamental gaps that require **adaptive work**. Each policy team at Reut addresses a single focus area until the gap is closed, a process that can last from as little as a few months to as long as years. We use the following guidelines when addressing policy issues:

- **Critical importance to the security or prosperity of Israel or the Jewish world** ([click here](#));
- **Complexity**, i.e. many stakeholders but no one is really in charge;
- **Fundamental gap and adaptive challenge** that requires transformation of values, priorities, patterns of conduct, etc., and does not have a technical fix;
- **Unique added value** – The Reut Institute addresses only those issues in which it can make a unique contribution;
- **Built upon previous knowledge** – Reut prefers to select new focus areas that can draw upon our previous experience and knowledge;
- **The team leader's interest** – Reut attempts to focus on issues that our team leaders and analysts are passionate about and have demonstrated talent in.

Who Funds the Reut Institute?

Reut is an Israeli non-profit organization funded and supported by a network of donors and private funds – the vast majority of whom are Israelis and Jews – who believe in our vision. Reut's largest institutional donor is American Friends of the Reut Institute (see above). Any donation that could potentially create a conflict of interest requires a formal and public discussion and decision by our Board of Directors. For more details, [click here](#).

Why Does Reut Provide its Services Pro Bono?

Reut is a non-profit organization that provides its services *pro bono* to people in positions of leadership, influence, and decision-making authority in the Israeli and Jewish public spheres. Reut does not charge for its services for the following reasons:

- **Turnaround time** – Public agencies in Israel can only sign contracts through a transparent tender – a cumbersome process that can take weeks and months. In most of our projects, the turnaround time required of Reut is much shorter;

- **Clients are unable to pay for a blind spot** – Reut's expertise is in addressing fundamental gaps that stem from a policy's irrelevance because of a decision maker's blind spot. Consequently, Reut's clients don't know that they need our services and are thus unable to pay for them;
- **Reut serves issues, not clients** – Reut promotes fundamental impact on the security and well being of the State of Israel and the Jewish world. This requires the freedom to work with multiple organizations and individuals in positions of leadership, influence, and decision-making authority, which may undermine a pure client relationship;
- **Freedom to think and recommend** – Reut's fundamental impact requires changes in values, priorities, patterns of conduct, or habits in the Israeli or Jewish public spheres in general and often times by our 'client' specifically. Consequently, it is of paramount importance that we retain our independence to think, recommend, and act.

There may be exceptions to this rule and Reut may receive funding for a project, but only in the case that the project supports our vision and mission and that Reut would have completed the project regardless.

Who Initiates Project at the Reut Institute?

- Reut identifies fundamental gaps in strategic issues and chooses to address the issue;
- Often, decision makers solicit Reut's decision support services on challenges they face. So long as the project fulfills Reut's vision and mission and exploits our unique added value, we feel obligated to provide the service.

What are the terms of use for Reut products?

All use of our Web site and Reut Institute products are based on acceptance of the [terms and conditions of use](#).

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3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization

Foreword of JPSR Issue

Natan Sharansky

When I was a dissident in the former Soviet Union, one of my regular activities was monitoring anti-Semitism, and smuggling out evidence and records of such activity to the West. I believed then that the free world, particularly after the Holocaust, would always be a staunch ally in the struggle against anti-Semitism.

Unfortunately, I was wrong. Today, as a minister in the Israeli government in charge of monitoring anti-Semitism, I find myself regularly summoning the ambassadors of West European states to protest anti-Semitic attacks on Jews in their countries and the often meek response of their governments.

Over the past four years, we have witnessed a resurgence of anti-Semitic activity in the democratic world. In Europe, synagogues have been burned, rabbis have been abused in the streets, Jewish children have been physically attacked on the way to school and inside schools, and Jewish cemeteries have been desecrated.

Recognizing the "New Anti-Semitism"

Moreover, the so-called "new anti-Semitism" poses a unique challenge. Whereas classical anti-Semitism is aimed at the Jewish people or the Jewish religion, "new anti-Semitism" is aimed at the Jewish state. Since this anti-Semitism can hide behind the veneer of legitimate criticism of Israel, it is more difficult to expose. Making the task even harder is that this hatred is advanced in the name of values most of us would consider unimpeachable, such as human rights.

Nevertheless, we must be clear and outspoken in exposing the new anti-Semitism. I believe that we can apply a simple test - I call it the "3D" test - to help us distinguish legitimate criticism of Israel from anti-Semitism.

The first "D" is the test of demonization. When the Jewish state is being demonized; when Israel's actions are blown out of all sensible proportion; when comparisons are made between Israelis and Nazis and between Palestinian refugee camps and Auschwitz - this is anti-Semitism, not legitimate criticism of Israel.

The second "D" is the test of double standards. When criticism of Israel is applied selectively; when Israel is singled out by the United Nations for human rights abuses while the behavior of known and major abusers, such as China, Iran, Cuba, and Syria, is ignored; when Israel's Magen David Adom, alone among the world's ambulance services, is denied admission to the International Red Cross - this is anti-Semitism.

The third "D" is the test of delegitimization: when Israel's fundamental right to exist is denied -

alone among all peoples in the world - this too is anti-Semitism.

The Rise of Arab and Islamic Anti-Semitism

I am particularly concerned about the constant and growing stream of anti-Semitic propaganda from the Arab and Muslim world - including propaganda that is genocidal in nature against both Jews and the State of Israel. This should be of grave concern, not only to Israel and Jews but to men and women of good conscience everywhere. Such venom defiles the Middle East and the international climate of discourse, and makes it possible for unabashed Jew-hatred to be expressed with impunity.

Earlier this year, my office published a 150-page report on "Anti-Semitism in the Contemporary Middle East." The study surveys anti-Semitic reporting, editorials, and editorial caricatures in the government-controlled press of Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. In the more than one hundred editorial cartoons included in this report, Jews and Israelis are invariably represented as poisonous snakes, murderous Nazis, and bloodthirsty Crusaders.

We found that vicious anti-Semitism which expressly calls for massive terrorism and genocide against Jews, Zionists, and the State of Israel is becoming more and more commonplace across the Arab Middle East. Moreover, the borders between anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism have become almost completely blurred. The overwhelming majority of this propaganda is issued from the government-controlled media and from supposedly respectable publishing houses closely tied to the Arab regimes.

There is a direct link between the laxity with which countries have responded - or not responded - to growing Arab/Islamic anti-Semitism and the sharp increase in physical and verbal attacks on Jews and Israelis globally.

I recognize that there have been positive developments in the fight against anti-Semitism over the past year or so. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has held several meetings on fighting anti-Semitism, and for the first time ever the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned anti-Semitism in three separate resolutions, which were adopted by consensus.

But these important initiatives are not sufficient to combat state-sponsored anti-Semitism, especially of the Arab/Islamic variety described above. For real progress to be made, the free world must be willing to not only publicly and forcefully condemn this anti-Semitism, but also to pursue a policy of linkage against states that support anti-Semitism.

The Need for a Linkage Policy

The effectiveness of a policy based on linkage was powerfully demonstrated a generation ago after a group of dissidents inside the Soviet Union, including myself, decided to form the Helsinki Group in the wake of the Helsinki accords - the very agreement that led to the establishment of the OSCE.

With the help of courageous leaders in the West who were willing to link their relations with the Soviets to their treatment of their own people, the Helsinki Group helped ensure that the Soviets could not take one step in the international arena without their human rights policies becoming an issue. As a result, real progress was made.

I believe that combating anti-Semitism ought to become a much more prominent issue in the bilateral relations between America and the Arab and Muslim worlds. Linkage can be used to marginalize the extremists and to encourage and support those who reject this virulent hatred.

Anti-Semitism is not a threat only to Jews. History has shown us that left unchecked, the forces behind anti-Semitism will imperil all the values and freedoms that civilization holds dear. Never again can the free world afford to sit on the sidelines when anti-Semitism dangerously emerges.

We must not let this happen. We must do everything in our power to fight anti-Semitism. Armed with moral clarity, determination, and a common purpose, this is a fight that we can and will win.

* * *

NATAN SHARANSKY, the former Prisoner of Zion who spent nine years in Soviet jails, was Israel's minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora affairs when he wrote this article. In 2003 he founded the Global Forum against Anti-Semitism, which brings together Jewish leaders and organizations from five continents for coordination and consultation in the struggle against anti-Semitism. He has also served as minister of industry and trade, interior minister, minister of construction and housing, and deputy prime minister. His memoir, *Fear No Evil*, was published in the United States in 1988 and has been translated into nine languages. His book, *The Case for Democracy*, was published by Public Affairs (New York) in 2004.

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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From the Editor - *Manfred Gerstenfeld*

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